Five Easy Pieces – An Interview Without Toast

July 25, 2009

Five Easy PiecesKurt Leafstrand on his Clearwell Systems blog e-Discovery 2.0 runs a feature from time to time called Five e-Discovery Questions with various e-discovery types, beginning with Craig Ball. Kurt uses a format where he writes out five questions, emails them to you, and then asks you to email answers back. Personally, I prefer live interviews with some interactivity and spontaneity. Still, if Craig could do it. After all, it was only five questions, five easy pieces. That reminded me of the great movie, Five Easy Pieces, where Jack Nickolson’s character Bobby Dupea found out you can’t always get toast with your breakfast. Here’s the famous “toast” scene from the movie, which is well worth the view.

With that in mind, I decided to at least read the questions and see if this was something I was willing to do. The first thing I notice is that these are news-conference type questions. You know the ones where the reporter cleverly asks three questions all mixed up as one question, and then has the nerve to ask a followup. For instance, the first question Kurt asks is clearly three questions. He does not even try to hide it like a professional reporter. Apparently this is not his day job. Still, I kept reading and the alleged fifth question (really the ninth) was amusing to me, so I agreed to do it. Besides, it sounded like a pretty easy way to write my own blog on this lazy summer weekend.  But be warned, this may well end up being a fast road to nowhere; we’ll see.

Here are the “five” questions I was asked, in writing no less and without toast. I tried to keep the responses fresh by starting with a tape recorder and dictating my off-the-cuff, linked answers.

e-Discovery Teams

Kurt Leafstrand’s First Question: We have always loved the name of your Blog –”e-Discovery Team.” It succinctly sums up your overall approach and philosophy of e-discovery. What’s the current state of the “e-discovery team” in most organizations? How has it progressed over the last few years? Where does it need to go to next?

Losey’s Answer: You are correct that the name of my blog – “e-Discovery Team” does sum up my overall approach. I believe that e-discovery should be handled differently from all other areas of the law. It requires a team approach where lawyers and IT work closely together. That is why I have also devoted my web Floridalawfirm.com to this proposition. It also requires a different kind of lawyer, one who is comfortable with technology.

You first first question asks about the current state of e-discovery teams in “most organizations.” I have seen surveys indicating that most of the so called “serial litigant” companies, that is, the large corporations who because of their business tend to be sued a lot, such as the pharmaceuticals, large telephone companies and the like, have set up internal e-discovery teams. For companies that are not serial litigants and thus are not force to address e-discovery right away, the percent decreases dramatically. I would guess less than half. For law firms, my guess is that about ten percent have set up e-discovery type departments or teams, or at least say they have.

These survey based statistics can be misleading. When I talk to members of large corporate e-discovery teams in an informal off-the-record manner at conferences and such, most confess that they are struggling. Typically, I think it is because they are asked to do too much with too little. Companies need to adequately fund an e-discovery team in order for the team to succeed.

As for the law firms, most of the e-discovery teams you see touted on websites are just marketing. My guess is that there are only about 25-50 law firms in America with bonafide, functioning e-discovery teams, and many of the top AmLaw 100 firms are stumbling along without one. That is why you keep seeing them making horrible e-discovery bloopers. Their clients’ reaction to these mistakes is the truly amazing thing. Unlike Jack Nicholson’s character in the great ending to Five Easy Pieces, the clients just put up with it all and never seem to leave. They may be on a fast road to nowhere, but don’t seem to care.

Moving on to your second first question on how the e-discovery team approach has progressed over the last years, I would say that the progress has been mixed. I have given umpteen presentations to corporate counsel and others to explain the benefits of e-discovery teams over the past three years. The argument itself is easy to make and compelling, so long as you add enough graphics to keep everyone awake. I have not run into anyone yet who doesn’t agree that it’s a good idea. So I think we’ve come a long way in selling the concept. But the implementation is another question. There we still have a long way to go.

Again, the answer is adequate funding and real training, which I address in a minute. You can’t simply add this job description and demands on people’s time and expect it to work. Most corporate counsel and their IT and business partners on corporate e-Discovery Team already have more than enough to do. You can’t expect them to do this new job, and do it right, and keep doing all of their old jobs too. You have to take stuff off their plate to make room for them to perform these new functions. The best solution is to hire someone whose sole job it is to run an e-Discovery team. Then you also have to give the team money for software and outside vendors and consultants.

Although these comments have been directed to the internal corporate e-discovery team, the same comments apply to law firms forming their own e-Discovery Team service group. They need to combine whatever lawyers they have that know about e-discovery with whatever tech support and paralegals they have that know about e-discovery. There is a tendency for the two to operate in separate fiefdoms, which is contrary to the team approach. Such integration is not easy, however, especially since there is an extreme shortage of knowledgeable e-discovery lawyers. It seems like there are two or three knowledgeable e-discovery techs for every attorney. Either that or they are just better at fooling me than lawyers are.

Jack Nicholson as an oil rigger in Five Easy PiecesAs to your third first question, where this needs to go next, companies and law firms need to better fund and train their internal e-discovery teams so that they can be fully operational and realize their cost-saving and quality control potentials. It takes some money to save a lot more. Obviously, this is hard sell in the current economy, so I expect there will be several more years of struggle before this happens. But when it does and these skilled teams becomes a priority for companies, then they can affect significant cost savings in e-discovery. As a bonus, fewer mistakes will be made and the whole process will be far less painful than it is now.

From the law firm perspective, e-Discovery Teams can affect significant profits and competitive advantage by the skilled rendition of e-discovery services. The existence of an internal corporate e-Discovery Team does not make outside counsel obsolete, it just changes the role and requires higher skills and greater collaboration. Further, many companies, especially the medium size and small ones, will never form their own teams and so law firms and vendors will continue to have to do everything for them.

But there is more to this than just throwing money at the problem and funding the teams. We also need a lot more in the way of knowledge input. There are several dozen people across the country that really know this field, but that is not nearly enough to address the hundreds, if not thousands of companies and law firms that need this knowledge. Short of cloning, the best solution is to retain an outside “coach” for teams; one that assists many teams at once. The coach is not a full time team member, but rather an outside expert that helps organize the team, train the players, design the plays, and after that, helps encourage the players to win the game on their own. Although these days I spend a lot more time in litigation than I do in e-discovery teamwork, my favorite role is that of e-Discovery Team coach.

“Empty Head, Pure Heart” Defense to Spoliation

Kurt Leafstrand’s Second Question: Should there be an adverse inference distinction between cases where e-discovery may have been conducted in a sloppy, incomplete fashion, but without malice, versus one in which the party actively sought to hide or suppress documents in the case?

Losey’s Answer: There should be and there is. The law already distinguishes between negligent spoliation, grossly negligent spoliation, and intentional spoliation. Also, other circumstances may enter into a judge’s determination of whether there has been bad faith exercised in connection with the destruction of evidence. If a judge is convinced by the evidence that it is simply an empty head, but pure heart destruction of evidence, they are going to be easier on the attorney and the parties. As Bobby Dupea said: “If you wouldn’t open your mouth, everything would be just fine.”

Still, the pure heart empty head defense will only take you so far. It might be enough to stop an adverse inference instruction, but not enough to stop lesser sanctions. For instance, opposing counsel may still be able to talk about what happened to the jury, which could be just as effective as an actual instruction. Further, the empty headed attorney with the pure heart may also end up with an empty wallet. The attorneys may be personally required to pay fees and expenses, as we have seen in numerous cases recently. Further, if its not the attorney’s fault at all, but rather the party’s empty head and pure heart, you can rest assured that most judges will not hesitate to make the party’s pocket empty too.

Pure heart or not, people are going to have to pay for these mistakes because the loss and destruction of evidence is, and long has been, a serious issue in the common law. If you have any doubt about that, take a look at my recent blog on Armory v. Delamarie, the case decided in 1722 that started the spoliation doctrine. The defendant in that case, a goldsmith named Delamarie, tried the empty head pure heart excuse for losing the precious stones that were at issue on this case. The judge didn’t buy the argument. He assumed that the goldsmith had intentionally hidden the evidence so that the jury could not see it and the goldsmith would not have to give the gems back.

That is always a danger with the pure heart defense. The judge or jury may not believe you. You may claim that you just didn’t know what you were doing and this is a common thing for “bad guys” to do, but that doesn’t mean the judge and jury are going to believe you. It’s all a matter of weighing the evidence. I think judges are going to look very closely at these defenses in the future and that they will be skeptical of lawyers who come up with “Opps – my bad! Sure didn’t mean to” defense. The lawyer and parties may well be telling the truth, but clever opposing counsel may be able to make it look like they did it on purpose. So the best thing to do is get your act together and save the evidence. This does not mean perfection – mistakes will always happen – but it does mean the exertion of reasonable efforts.

Kurt Leafstrand’s Third Question: Are judges equipped with enough information to be able to make this distinction? (between intentional and accidental destruction)

Jack Nicholson as the Devil in The Witches of EastwickLosey’s Answer: There’s an old expression that all attorneys involved in litigation know very well: “The devil is in the details.” This is true with most issues in litigation. The facts of a particular case shape the law. This is how the common law system of justice is supposed to work. In the United States the judges do not go out and get these facts like they do in civil law countries. Here fact gathering is up to the attorneys. Therefore, the judges will be equipped with enough information to make this distinction if the attorney’s involved do a good job in bringing the facts to the judge.

How do attorneys get this information? Through discovery of course. That’s where we get into the can of worms of “discovery about discovery.” Whenever you get into a motion for sanctions situation you have opened up that can. Before you know it, you are taking depositions and having evidentiary hearings about what you did to collect documents, what you did to preserve documents, even who said what at the Rule 26 “meet and greet” conference between attorneys, as we saw recently in the Bray and Gillespie case.

This kind of discovery about discovery and evidentiary hearings on who did what in discovery can become tremendously expensive. I don’t point this out to suggest that we not get to the truth and that we not protect the system from people who would try to hide their wrong doings by destroying the evidence. I point this out to stress the importance of doing e-discovery right, which includes preserving the evidence correctly. Yes, it does take a little time, effort, and thus money to preserve evidence upon notice of a dispute. But this is money well spent. This kind of money will protect the company from later being involved in these kinds of expensive sanctions hearings, discovery about discovery, and the like. Again, this all comes back to the e-discovery team approach of preventive medicine. Companies and law firms need to take the time to set up the systems to prevent the destruction of evidence, both accidental or intentional. Either way, pure heart or not, it is going to open up an expensive can of worms and therefore it is worth the money to nip it on the bud.

Kurt Leafstrand’s Fourth Question: What is the biggest gap today between e-discovery vendor offerings and what legal end-users need.

Jack Nicholson in The ShiningLosey’s Answer: It is the gap between the ears of the end-users and vendors. I say this with respect because these end-users and vendors are often extremely bright people, but most of the attorneys have not had the opportunity to receive training in electronic discovery. For one thing, it was never offered in law school, until recently. Even now less than 5% of the law schools in the country offer any classes in e-discovery. Most of the end-users learn what they know by on the job experience. This is a process of trial and error that rarely leads to best practices. End-users need better education.  The CLEs are inadequate. The education programs in most law firms are also inadequate, if they exist at all. Better educated and knowledgeable end-users will make for better consumers of vendor offerings.

Vendors share some responsibility in this as well. They need to take the time to really educate their users about their products, rather than just dazzle, scare, and promise. Vendors should never use words or phrases that are not commonly employed by the end-users, or, if they must, then they should carefully explain it to them in an apologetic manner. A vendor that goes around talking geek-talk over the heads of end-users is not doing anybody a favor, including themselves.

Kurt Leafstrand’s Fifth Question: How much time does it really take you to crank out one of your blog posts? Does the hot Florida sun keep you indoors typing away at your computer? Or do you have some sort of waterproof lap top that allows you to write while floating in your screened in pool?

Losey’s Answer: There you go again, three questions in one. Not to mention you are now getting kind of personal here, aren’t you, especially for an email interview with no toast? As Bobby Dupea says in Five Easy Pieces (imagine Jack Nicholson’s voice now):

I don’t know if you’d be particularly interested in hearing anything about me. My life, I mean… Most of it doesn’t add up to much that I could relate as a way of life that you’d approve of… I’d like to be able to tell you why, but I don’t really… I mean, I move around a lot because things tend to get bad when I stay. And I’m looking… for auspicious beginnings, I guess…

Jack Nichoson in 2006 at age 68 in the film Departed EndingMy real answer is not particularly interesting either, but for the brave reader still hanging on, I’ll give you what passes for a straight answer. It takes me about 8 to 20 hours per weekend to grind out a blog post, which typically runs from 3,000 to 6,000 words. This week’s blog, with the interview and all, will only take about 6 hours, thank you very much. Of course, it’s not really that good either, but then there is always this famous exchange in Five Easy Pieces to make up for it:

Bobby: What else do you do?
Catherine: Well, there’s fishing, boating, and concerts on the mainland. [Laughs] I feel funny telling you this. This is really your home. You probably know better than I what there is to do.
Bobby: Nothing.
Catherine: Nothing?
Bobby: Nothing.
Catherine: Well, it must be very boring for you here.
Bobby: That’s right.
Catherine: I find that very hard to comprehend. I don’t think I’ve ever been bored. Excuse me.

To help ease the boredom for my readers I also have guest bloggers contribute to the e-Discovery Team blog from time to time. In which case it only takes me a couple of hours to help them along with editing, hyper-linking, design, photographs, proofing, and final posting to the blog.

Obviously all of this is a labor of love on my party. I enjoy trying to make legal education interesting and wherever possible, maybe even somewhat entertaining. I believe that legal writing should be integrated with both popular and classical culture, but preferably not in the same article. That is why I try each week to weave cultural elements into each blog and to include visual images. This week it is the good Mr. Nicholson and Five Easy Pieces and last week it was Charles Dickens. Who knows what next week may bring? It often depends on what new cases are published or what other events in the world of e-discovery come to my attention. This is a fast moving field that is still in its formative stages and I enjoy being a part of it. Like Bobby says, I’m looking… for auspicious beginnings.

Five Easy Pieces

Legal writing should not be cold, dull, and isolated. The law is wrapped up in society; it is the bones which holds it all together. So why shouldn’t writing about the law include cultural references? I think that words and pictures should go together; that the ideal approach to education is multimedia. Most legal writing is too sterile and aloof for me. It is often clever, but that is not enough. It should also be interesting. To put it another way, boredom is the enemy of education and imagination and creativity are its friends. I think I just made that up. Anyway, it sounds like a good motto for a training program that I am working on now.

As to your question about my floating in a pool: well, you made a pretty good guess, although I do not have a waterproof laptop. Is there such a thing? Typically I have every tech toy in the world, so I doubt there is or I would already have purchased one. Right now I’m an avid fan of the Macbook Air all flash drive version. I can take it with me anywhere, and usually do. I have written my blog in all kinds of places, but usually I just write at home. To quote one last time from the oh-so-mortal Bobby Dupea:

Bobby: What are you doing screwing around with all this crap?
Catherine: I do not find your language very charming.
Bobby: It isn’t. It’s direct.
Catherine: I’d like you to leave so that I can take a bath. Is that direct?


The Chimney Sweep Boy and the Goldsmith: the Ancient Origins of the Doctrine of Spoliation

July 19, 2009

chimney sweep boy photoIt was the best of times, it was the worst of times. It was the year of Our Lord one thousand seven hundred and twenty two. Sir John Pratt, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and his assembled jury at the Court of the Kings Bench were preparing to hear an odd civil case, Armory v. Delamirie, brought by a chimney sweep boy. Sir Pratt had just returned to the bench after serving as the interim Chancellor of the Exchequer for two months at the request of King George. He was glad to be back to the Kings Bench, but yesterday had been hard. The jury convicted a boy of pick-pocketing, one of 240 capital offenses, forcing him to sentence the poor lad to death by hanging. Sir Pratt was glad to be hearing civil trials today.

After the case was called, Judge Pratt saw the plaintiff, Marc Armory. He was a young lad, dirty, and black with soot as only a chimney sweep’s apprentice can be, but unlike the doomed pickpocket of yesterday, he had a confident, grim air of determination. Young Mr. Armory had had the audacity to bring suit in trover against a prominent London goldsmith, Shannan Delamirie. Armory sought damages for Delamirie’s alleged wrongful taking of two valuable gems. Armory had no Barrister to assist, while the jeweler, Delamirie, had a lawyer of the King’s Bench at his side. Still, Chief Justice Pratt would hear this boy out and help his story be told for the jury to decide. For he did not much like the Lord who was defendant’s Barrister, and liked even less the looks of Delamirie.

18th century man The defendant Delamirie was sitting at defendant’s table. He was a mere man of business, an elderly, pimply-faced, vegetable-diet sort of man, in a black coat, dark mixture trousers, and small black gaiters; a kind of being who seemed to be an essential part of the desk at which he was writing, and to have as much thought or sentiment. No, Lord Chief Justice Pratt did not like this French goldsmith. He would do what he could to help the jury do justice that day in the Kings Court.

The chimney sweep boy’s  story began with light and hope. He told of finding a ring quite by chance in the dirt by the side of a road. He saw a glittering among the ash and picked it up. He discovered it was a ring, and after cleaning it, realized that it had two jewels of the finest water. Armory hoped that his fortune was now made, that he could buy his way out of servitude from his cruel master Gamfield. He had only to find out the value of his fortune and seek to sell it to an honest jeweler.

Armory’s tale soon turned to darkness and despair upon entering the store of Delamirie. There he was eyed suspiciously by the jeweler’s apprentice, a boy of his own age named Thompson. Armory told Thompson that he had found a ring and wanted to know its value. When Thompson saw the ring, he told Armory that the two stones might have some slight value, but he could not possibly know for sure until he removed the stones from the ring to weigh and examine them. The jury listened to this testimony with rapt attention. They guessed what would happen next.

18th century ringArmory did not want to part with his precious ring, but he saw no way around it. He would have to let him weigh the stones to learn their value. So, the goldsmiths’s apprentice took the ring to a back room while the master, Delamirie, stayed to keep an eye on the chimney sweep boy. The goldsmith’s apprentice then called out that the weight of the stones showed their value to be three halfpence. The master jeweler then offered to pay that sum to the boy, telling him that was all he could get for it, that he should take it quick and get out of the store. He knew that he had stolen it from someone’s chimney and should be happy to get anything.

The boy refused the three halfpence. He had dreams that the ring and jewels might be worth ten pounds, more than enough to buy his way out of indentured servitude and start his own chimney sweep business. Armory demanded ten pounds, and Delamirie just laughed and told him to leave. Armory demanded the return of the ring and began shouting. The goldsmith’s apprentice came back and handed him the ring and chased him out of the store with a knife. Armory looked and saw the ring no longer had the jewels. Its sockets were empty.  Delamirie then knew that his only hope was to try to find justice in the Kings Court.

After Armory’s own testimony, two more witnesses were called in his behalf. They were goldsmiths who were competitors of Delamirie. They had examined the ring and from the size of the sockets estimated the approximate range of value of the gems that could fit in them. The price ranged from a half a pound, if the gems were of poor quality, to a high of ten pounds, as the boy had dreamed, if in fact the jewels had been of the finest water.

Next the elderly goldsmith, Delamirie, and his apprentice gave their testimony. They told a different tale, but did admit that the chimney sweep boy brought in a ring with two small stones in it. They said they inspected the stones and that they were, in their professional opinion, of very poor quality, worth at best three halfpence total. Now it is true as lawyers hold that there are two kinds of particularly bad witnesses–a reluctant witness, and a too-willing witness. The goldsmith and his apprentice were both. Their story had the hollow ring to it of convenient lies. Judge Pratt was a wise man who had heard many witnesses testify under oath. He had known a vast quantity of nonsense talked about bad men not looking you in the face. Don’t trust that conventional idea. Dishonesty will stare honesty out of countenance any day in the week, if there is anything to be got by it.

The Lord Chief Justice asked Delamirie to show the two stones to the jury and tradesman in attendance so they could see for themselves their size and brilliance. That is when all were told that the stones had been lost, accidentally thrown away by Delamirie’s assistant after the suit had been filed. Delamirie’s lawyer then spoke up, noting that it was a shame they were gone, but it was just an accident and they were of no value anyway. This whole suit was just a pig in a poke, drawing a fine laugh from the jury.

The Barrister argued that the plaintiff had completely failed to prove that the stones had any value. Obviously the boy did not know, for that is why he came to the goldsmith to begin with. The other tradesman who testified did not know either, for they had never seen the stones and did not know their quality. Delamirie’s barrister argued that Armory’s action in trover should fail because he had no proof of ownership. It was obvious that the boy had found the ring in a chimney while practicing his trade. He was not its rightful owner. The boy was just a thief.  The goldsmith, once possession of the chattel was tendered to him, had as much right to the stones as the boy. Neither had received the stones by purchase or inheritance. The fact that he had since misplaced the stones was of no importance because the boy did not own them anyway. He cited to several cases to support his arguments. Several of the law clerks were seen nodding in agreement to the points of law and learned case discussion, but not Judge Pratt. He knew full well that there is a wisdom of the head, and a wisdom of the heart. He also knew from experience that if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers. Of course, poor pro se Armory had nothing to say in response to the learned brilliance of opposing counsel. He was beginning to wonder why he had ever spent the half pence to bring this suit.

The case was fully presented in an hour and it was then time for the Lord Chief Justice to render his charge to the jury for the King’s justice to be dispensed. At that point, the Lord turned to the jury and began to speak in his deep authoritative voice. He was wearing his full red and white robes, elaborate gold chain, and finest wig.

Lord Chief Justice

Chief Justice Pratt spoke with affection beaming out of one eye, and calculation shining out of the other as he gave the jury history’s first adverse inference instruction, saying:

That unless the [goldsmith] did produce the jewel [and he did not], and shew it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of their damages.

After that instruction, more like an order, there was no doubt how the jury would rule. They left to meet in private to decide and returned ten minutes later. The verdict was handed to the Chief Justice. The jury had ruled for the young chimney sweep boy and awarded him the full ten pounds requested. That was a vast sum of money in those days. The defendant was shocked. There was no appeal. The chimney sweeps and other tradesmen in the court stood and cheered. The people’s faith in the government was renewed.

Lord Phillips 2009The Chief Justice left the court room with all rising before him, a few even bowed their heads. His demeanor never changed, not even a smile. But he had a pleasant thought in his head for a change: It is a far, far better thing that I do, than I have ever done; it is a far, far better rest that I go to, than I have ever known. The Lord Chief Justice had not been sleeping well those days. He was one of the most powerful men in the country, if not the world. He possessed a vast fortune and had many great accomplishments to his name. Little did he know that they would all be forgotten in the dust bin of history, save for this one small act of kindness to a dirty chimney sweep boy.

chimney sweep boyAnd what of the lad? The chimney sweep boy sat stunned too. He was surrounded by his tradesman friends who patted him on the back. Nearby too were a horde of well-wishers, including several lawyers now more than willing to help the boy to collect his judgment. Yes, the civility which money will purchase, is rarely extended to those who have none. The chimney sweep boy was overjoyed with the justice of the Kings Bench. His life was changed forever.

As Charles Dickens said, whose other quotes are italicized above: A boy’s story is the best that is ever told.

This case not only explains the origin of the doctrine of spoliation, but shows how justice is sometimes built by small acts of human kindness. In the immortal words of Charles Dickens at the end of A Tale of Two Cities:

I see a beautiful city and a brilliant people rising from this abyss, and, in their struggles to be truly free, in their triumphs and defeats, through long years to come, I see the evil of this time and of the previous time of which this is the natural birth, gradually making expiation for itself and wearing out.

Dickens, charles

Armory v. Delamirie

This historical event, obviously somewhat fictionalized here, is forever memorialized in the written opinion of Lord Chief Justice John Pratt, which is still studied in law schools around the world. Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.1722). Here is the full text of this opinion. It is the first case in the world to be won by an adverse inference instruction to the jury as the result of bad faith spoliation of evidence.

The plaintiff being a chimney sweeper’s boy found a jewel and carried it to the defendant’s shop (who was a goldsmith) to know what it was, and delivered it into the hands of the apprentice, who under pretence of weighing it, took out the stones, and calling to the master to let him know it came to three halfpence, the master offered the boy the money, who refused to take it, and insisted to have the thing again; whereupon the apprentice delivered him back the socket without the stones. And now in trover against the master these points were ruled:

1. That the finder of a jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an absolute property or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the rightful owner, and subsequently may maintain trover.

2. That the action well lay against the master, who gives a credit to his apprentice, and is answerable for his neglect, Jones v Hart, Salk 441. Cor. Holt CJ, Mead v Hammond, supra. Grammer v Nixon, post, 653.

3. As to the value of the jewel several of the trade were examined to prove what a jewel of the finest water that would fit the socket would be worth; and the Chief Justice directed the jury, that unless the defendant did produce the jewel, and shew it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the strongest case against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of their damages: which they accordingly did.

Thanks to Judge Paul Grimm for bringing the ancient roots of sanctions in the Armory case to my attention in his new opinion, Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc. _F.Supp.2d_, 2009 WL 1955805 (D.Md. July 7, 2009). Although I have filled in some of the facts above to spin the tale, the case of Armory v. Delamirie is very real. As Judge Grimm put it, Armory is a “Dickensian tale of avarice and trickery” which appears to be the first case to originate what we now call the doctrine of spoliation. As Judge Grimm’s states in Goodman at *17:

The doctrine of spoliation originated in England in 1722 in the case of Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.1722). See, e.g., Sullivan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 772 F.Supp. 358, 360 n. 3 (N.D.Ohio 1991) (“At least two federal courts have traced the origins of [the spoliation doctrine] to Armory v. Delamirie.…”) (citing Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir.1988); Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir.1982)); Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 Fla. L.Rev. 345, 346 (1999) (“Perhaps the earliest recorded decision to recognize and reprimand the spoliation of evidence was the eighteenth century decision in Armory v. Delamirie.”); Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 Emory L.J. 1085, 1087 & n. 4 (1987) (noting that an unfavorable inference for spoliation of evidence is of “ancient lineage”) (citing Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. 664) (citations omitted)).

The common law, based as it is on a close examination of the particular facts of the case at hand, has long abhorred the destruction of evidence and has taken a strong stance against it from the days of 1722 forward. As an American Judge so eloquently put it in 1882:

The law, in hatred of the spoliator, baffles the destroyer, and thwarts his iniquitous purpose, by indulging a presumption which supplies the lost proof, and thus defeats the wrongdoer by the very means he had so confidentially employed to perpetrate the wrongdoing.

Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882).

Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc.

Goodman is another of Judge Grimm’s law review articles cleverly disguised as a discovery order. Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc., _F.Supp.2d_, 2009 WL 1955805 (D.Md. July 7, 2009). Judge Grimm here writes a long scholarly opinion on a motion for sanctions in a breach of contract case. It is an excellent compilation of the law of spoliation sanctions, especially in Judge Grimm’s federal jurisdiction in Maryland, but also of great use to e-discovery lawyers everywhere. This is the third in a series of similar scholarly orders by Judge Grimm in small cases.

The first was Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1300739 (D. Md. May 4, 2007), which I wrote about in The Admissability of Electronic Evidence. The lawyers in this case involving $21,900 in insurance proceeds were surprised when their cross-motions for summary judgment were denied for failure to lay a proper foundation for the electronic documents submitted to support these motions. Judge Grimm’s 101 page opinion reads like a law review article and collects the law in the U.S. on the admissibility of electronic evidence.

The second was Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., Civ. No. 1:08-CV-00273-CCB (D. Md. October 15, 2008). His 30-page discovery order in this suit for unpaid overtime provides an excellent overview of the federal rules and other law that require a cooperative approach to discovery.

Now with Goodman, we have another great scholarly opinion in an otherwise unremarkable case, unusual only for the fact that it features a pro se plaintiff in federal court. The plaintiff, Marc Goodman, is suing a large corporation for a $30,000 bonus he says is due to him under a consulting contract. The defendants are represented by one of the biggest and best law firms in the country, and – here is the amazing part – Mr. Goodman is winning.

Marc Goodman

It is the story of the poor little chimney sweep boy all over again, but this time it is email, not jewels, and the underdog plaintiff is a consultant.  A few months after I first wrote this article, Marc Goodman emailed me and, among other things, sent the attached photo of himself in Dickensian costume. It was part of a larger magazine cover photo that was taken well before my article. A clear case of life imitating art imitating life. Quite strange really.

Anyway, back to the case. The defendants admit they lost their email, but say it was not on purpose, besides they were of no value anyway. They contend that Goodman’s motion is just a pig in a poke desperate move by a man who cannot prove his case. After all, the defendant’s CEO, Shannan Marty, printed out all of the emails of importance and the paper copies were produced. Defense counsel went so far as to demand that Goodman himself be sanctioned, not them, for bringing a frivolous motion. A tad arrogant, eh? Know your judge, I say.

Judge Grimm at *6 made the following comment regarding defense counsel:

There is no evidence that has been brought to the Court’s attention to suggest that Tracer’s counsel instructed Marty to implement the litigation hold, or that any other Tracer employees or consultants were advised to implement a litigation hold.

Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc., supra at *6. Hmm. Way to go defense counsel.

Judge Grimm was also not pleased by the pig in a poke argument, especially their contention that the production of the paper print-outs of all of the relevant emails proves that nothing of value was lost by the destruction of the email.

The argument of an accused spoliator that it did not violate its duty to preserve evidence because it retained the “relevant” information and only deleted “irrelevant” information rings particularly hollow. The ultimate decision of what is relevant is not determined by a party’s subjective assessment filtered through its own perception of self-interest.

Id. at *17.

The Timing, Hair-Trigger, Scope, and Culpability Issues in Goodman

The Goodman opinion goes into great depth in addressing the issue of when a sanctions motion should be made. This analysis was made in response to defendants’ argument that the pro se plaintiff’s motion should not even be considered because it was filed too late, after the close of discovery and filing of summary judgment motions, but before they were ruled upon.

Judge Grimm also went to great lengths in Goodman to explore the issue of when a litigation hold should have been triggered. He found that the duty to preserve was triggered by a letter from Goodman dated January 5, 2001, which Judge Grimm says “openly threatened litigation.” Id. at pg. *6, *13. I read the letter quoted in the opinion and must respectfully disagree. Id. at pg. *5. It just seems like another in a series of vague threats to me and should not have triggered a burdensome litigation hold duty. Why Judge Grimm labored so long over this fact question is beyond me, because Goodman’s next letter of February 19, 2001, wherein Judge Grimms admits “Goodman markedly ratcheted up the dispute,” caused defendants to consult with their attorneys for the first time regarding Goodman’s demands and implement their version of a litigation hold. The real problem here was not the timing of implementation of the hold, it was the inadequacy of the hold.

Judges should be conservative when using hindsight to pick a trigger date. Parties are not blessed with clairvoyance and should be given the benefit of the doubt. Litigation holds are expensive to implement, well at least they are when done right, and parties should not be required to have a hair trigger to avoid later possible sanctions.

Of course, the six week difference in this case was of no importance here whatsoever, which is what makes the analysis so mysterious. The CEO instituted a litigation hold in February 2001, by consulting an attorney and telling herself not to destroy any more emails. I kid you not. According to the opinion, that is all she did and, as mentioned, the law firm did nothing further. Since the spoliation complained of here came years later when the computers were recycled and wiped, this parsing of the meaning of “reasonably anticipated litigation” for a trigger date by reading between the lines of letters was of no real importance.

Judge Grimm’s analysis of another issue was better done, namely the issue of when agents and other third parties should also be notified of a litigation hold.  He applied the well-known rule that:

[D]ocuments are considered to be under a party’s control when that party has “ ‘the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action.’ “ Id. (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y.1997)).

Id. at *16. Judge Grimm found that:

Apart from Goodman’s conclusory statements, no evidence has been presented to demonstrate that Tracer/PSI had any legal control over documents prepared or maintained by Wilson.

Id. at *17.

Judge Grimm then does an excellent analysis of the spoliation issues of culpability. Id. at *18-*21. He concludes the order with his ruling:

*23 In conclusion, Goodman’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, he is entitled to an adverse jury instruction fashioned by Judge Garbis with respect to Tracer/PSI’s failure to preserve Marty’s laptop and Marty’s failure to preserve her relevant emails and documents. The appropriate instruction would be a general adverse instruction that permits, but does not require, the jury to draw an adverse inference against Tracer/PSI as a result of its violation of the duty to preserve relevant evidence. All other requested relief is denied, with exception to Goodman being entitled to seek reimbursement for costs, exclusive of attorney’s fees, properly apportioned to the Motion filed and relief received.

Conclusion

I turn to Dickens again for the final four quotes to conclude this story of destruction of electronic evidence, justice, encouragement, and hope.

Charles Dickens

Electric communication will never be a substitute
for the face of someone who with their soul
encourages another person to be brave and true.

Whatever I have tried to do in life,
I have tried with all my heart to do it well;
whatever I have devoted myself to,
I have devoted myself completely;
in great aims and in small
I have always thoroughly been in earnest.

No one is useless in this world
who lightens the burdens of another.

And so, as Tiny Tim observed,
God bless Us, Every One!


Inside the Head of a Digital Pirate

July 5, 2009

What goes on in the head of a digital pirate who is hauled into court? A recent case in New York gives us a pretty good idea. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 2009 WL 1873589 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2009). All images of Johnny Depp aside, tis not a pretty sight.

Arrr ... Pirates are cool! (Or are they?)

Arrrr.  Mateys … Here’s what we do. We hide the treasure and destroy the evidence. No nay they’ll ne’er be able to convict us then. The land lubber lawyers and scurvey dog judges are too lily-livered to stop us. Aye. We gentlemen o’ fortune be above their laws. Aye. Information wants to be free; yo ho ho! Just so long as we gets our cut and not the Scallywags.

Yes. The defendants in Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc. probably thought something like this when the case started; but shiver me timbers were they in for a surprise.

Pirates Sought Safe-Harbor Sanctuary Under §512(c)
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

priate.ship.harborThe plaintiffs here are a group of record companies, a/k/a the RIAA. They sued Usenet.com, Inc., Sierra Corporate Design, Inc., and their director and sole shareholder, Gerald Reynolds for copyright infringement. Jerry Reynolds is, by the way, well known, but not much liked by the anti-RIAA community. Also, his company, Usenet.com, Inc., is not the same thing as USENET, a global system of online bulletin boards with a long and honorable history. The supposed infringement took place when users of defendants’ website accessed USENET to download copies of plaintiffs’ music. I say supposed infringement because the law is not yet clear as to whether and when such for-profit provision of access to copyrighted files by an Internet Service Providers (“ISP”) is illegal copyright piracy. See eg.: Cartoon Network LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n. 17 (1984). I am not an expert in this area, but I understand the strongest defense to this type of enforcement action against an ISP derives from the safe harbor protection of §512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).

pirate.musicNote that this defense under the DMCA is for service providers, not for individuals charged with illegal music sharing, which seems to be nailed down by the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Act 1999. Again, I am no expert on this, but as far as I can see, the primary substantive defense left for individuals is a constitutional challenge to that law, such as is now underway by Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson in Sony v. Tenenbaum, Civ. Act. No. 07‐cv‐11446‐NG (USDC Mass.). See the recent interview of Professor Nesson and one of many articles on his challenge to the RIAA’s controversial enforcement actions. See also these key pleadings in the case: Tenenbaum’s Motion to Dismiss dated March 9, 2009, on constitutional grounds, and the Order Denying the Motion dated June 15, 2009; Tenenbaum’s Memorandum raising a fair use defense dated May 15, 2009, and the Order denying Plaintiffs motion to strike this defense, thus allowing the fair use defense to be heard by a jury. This whole subject, including the Tenenbaum case, is closely followed in the popular blog, Recording Industry vs The People, written by New York City lawyer Ray Beckerman.

pirate flag om shipNaturally, the defendants in Arista Records, LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc. raised the DMCA safe-harbor defense and argued that the entire enterprise operated like any user-generated content site. That is, it was users (and not Usenet.com) that were uploading and downloading the infringing files. The DMCA’s Safe Harbor provision provides protection for ISPs from copyright infringement lawsuits as long as they take down offending material once they are served with a notice of infringement. If the defendants had played fair, they might  just have won. But alas, we will never know because the defendants tried to hide the evidence and were caught. Their true colors were then made known to the judge, just as sure as if they had raised a Jolly Roger flag.

The judge in question, Senior District Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr., was no lily-livered wimp as defendants may have thought. No, he is a native New Yorker. Once the pirate-like discovery misconduct was made known, Judge Baer slammed the pirates hard. He made them walk the plank by striking their only real defense, the DMCA safe-harbor, and entered summary judgment against them.

How Pirates Respond to Discovery

Just what caused Judge Baer to keelhaul the scallywags? The story begins with an earlier opinion in this case by Magistrate Judge Theodore H. Katz. Arista Records, LLC v. Usenet.com Inc., 2009 WL 185992 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009). Judge Katz found that defendants had acted in bad faith by intentionally destroying evidence, namely transitory server log user data, much like the Columbia v. Bunnell case, which I have written about before. For this reason, the defendants were sanctioned with an adverse inference instruction, plus taxation of fees and costs. Here are the highlights of Judge Katz’s earlier findings about the conduct of defendant Reynolds and his attorney:

Defendants counsel affirmatively advised Plaintiffs in a March 8, 2008 e-mail that Defendants would extract and produce Usage Data for newsgroups that contain the words “mp3” or “sound.” (See id. Ex. 6.) Nevertheless, after giving that assurance  … On the very day that Defendants’ counsel agreed to produce Usage Data to Plaintiffs, Defendant Reynolds disabled newsgroups with the words “music,” “sounds,” or “mp3” in the title and the Usage Data for those files was lost.

Id. at *16, *18.

Captain Jack Sparrow

So you have the lawyer promising one thing, presumably after consultations and promises by the client to comply, and then the client turns around and does the exact opposite of what they were supposed to do. Assuming they were not in it together, and the opinion gives no reason to suspect that, this shows a totally out-of-control client, which is every lawyer’s worst nightmare of a client. This is exactly the kind of thing you would expect from Captain Jack Sparrow, would you not? As he said in Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl:

Me? I’m dishonest, and a dishonest man you can always trust to be dishonest. Honestly. It’s the honest ones you want to watch out for, because you can never predict when they’re going to do something incredibly… stupid.

And so the background was set for Judge Baer to have a look at the discovery conduct of Reynolds and his crew.

The instant order considers a motion for sanctions against defendants, along with cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge Baer made the following findings of fact that explain some of  the reasons he struck the Safe-Harbor defense and entered final summary judgment for the plaintiffs:

The record in this case is replete with instances of Defendants and their employees specifically engendering copyright infringement and targeting infringement-minded users to become subscribers of Defendants’ service. First, Defendants’ own former employees have testified that their marketing department specifically targeted young people familiar with other file-sharing programs and suggested they try Defendants’ services “as a safe alternative to peer-to-peer file sharing programs that were getting shut down” due to copyright infringement lawsuits and resulting injunctions. … Indeed, Defendants’ promotional literature, created by marketing specialists at Reynolds’s behest, stated that when Napster and Kazaa began to have problems from copyright owners’ enforcement of their rights, “[t]his made the way for Usenet to get back in the game.” … Defendants’ website also had pages devoted to certain popular recording artists and expressly promoted the availability of “FREE MUSIC” and mp3 files for download. Pls.’ SUF 20-26, 29; Goldade Decl. ¶ 18. Defendants were aware that the downloading free music was, at the very least, a principal reason for a substantial portion of their subscribers’ signing up for their service: their own consumer survey showed that 42% of responding subscribers identified downloading music files as a “primary” reason they used Defendants’ service.

Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 2009 WL 1873589 at *3.

software_pirateAs to the hide-the-discovery-treasures actions, Judge Baer found substantially more misconduct than had been shown earlier to Judge Katz. The misconduct of Reynolds and his crew included:

  • Reynolds used special wiping software to write-over the contents of seven hard drives of his key employees, thus permanently destroying their documents and emails. He told a series of changing dog-ate-my-homework type stories to try to explain why this happened. The stories went from we never used them before; we just purchased them wiped like that on eBay; to ok, we used them and wiped them; to no, we did not really wipe them, they just appear to be wiped because we upgraded to Vista. Testimony by forensic experts disproved all of the excuses and proved instead intentional destruction. Arr. The pirates did not see that coming.
  • Reynolds fired other employees and got rid of their computers by telling the departing employees to take the computers as “parting gifts.” Arr. Such a generous captain, but the land lubbers did not fall for it.
  • They made misrepresentations regarding the utilization of internal email, saying they were a small company and hardly ever used it. They used that excuse to explain why they produced so few emails. Arr. Once again the scurvy dogs did not believe it and were able to prove that they used email all of the time.
  • The captain tried another email trick too, he told his crew to use Gmail, and not the company account, and then didn’t search the private Gmail accounts. This too was exposed when one of the crew, a real son of a biscuit eater, went and told the truth.
  • Reynolds engineered the unavailability of his key employees for deposition by “causing them to travel to Europe on an expense-paid vacation” and attempting to convince them to remain out of the court’s jurisdiction until discovery closed. Arr. The ungrateful sprogs came home too soon and the truth came out.
  • They provided misleading information as to the employment and whereabouts of defendants’ former president. Arr. The wench be in Davy Jones’ locker.
  • They knowingly provided false responses to interrogatories. Arr. Everybody does it.
  • They violated two court orders requiring disclosure of information related to the spoliated hard drives and missing employee computers. Arr. We swashbucklers have our own laws, we don’t have to follow yours.

Judge Baer concluded that:

Plaintiffs’ evidence credibly illustrates a pattern of destruction of critical evidence, a failure to preserve other relevant documents and communications, and at best dilatory (and at worst, bad-faith) tactics with respect to Defendants’ conduct during discovery.

Id. at *10.

Software PirateYou might well ask what were the defendants’ lawyers doing while all of this was going on? Were they pirates too and a part of the hide the booty scheme? Were they victims of the pirates, threatened by a walk on the plank if they did not do exactly as they were told? Or were they innocents, mere squiffies, kept entirely in the dark as to the dastardly deeds of their pirate clients? I am inclined to think the later. Neither Judge Baer nor Judge Katz criticized the lawyers directly. Their comments are all directed at the defendants, primarily Reynolds. It appears that the lawyers were duped by their far-too-clever client. This happens to all lawyers from time to time, although it seems to happen to some lawyers more often than others.

Sanctions Law

Here is Judge Baer’s recitation of the law governing the imposition of sanctions for destroying evidence and other bad faith discovery tactics:

*9 A district court has wide discretion to determine appropriate sanctions for discovery abuses under both Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its inherent powers. Gutman v. Klein,No. 03 CV 1570(BMC)(RML), 2008 WL 4682208, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2008). Rule 37 sanctions require a showing of violation of a court order. Daval Steel Prod. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1363 (2d Cir.1991). Sanctions under the court’s inherent power require a showing of bad faith or willfulness. See DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park,163 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir.1998). When deciding a proper sanction, a court generally must consider, in light of the full record of the case, (a) willfulness or bad faith on the part of the noncompliant party; (b) the history, if any, of noncompliance; (c) the effectiveness of lesser sanctions; (d) whether the noncompliant party has been warned about the possibility of sanctions; (e) the client’s complicity; and (f) prejudice to the moving party. Id. In the spoliation context, the court must also consider the “prophylactic, punitive and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine.” West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir.1999). Thus, the sanction should “(1) deter parties from engaging in spoliation; (2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created the risk; and (3) restore the prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence.” Id.

In view of the facts in this case, Judge Baer certainly could have imposed the ultimate sanction of default judgment as the plaintiffs requested. But he declined to do so. Id. at *12. Frankly, his stated reasons for stepping back from the brink are not too persuasive, essentially saying only that “such sanctions ‘should be imposed only in extreme circumstances, usually after consideration of alternative, less drastic sanctions.’ West, 167 F.3d at 779.” For that reason he imposed the lesser sanction of only striking the safe harbor defense. Still, in this case, that was a distinction without a difference. Striking the defense here had to result in entry of the final summary judgment. Thus, by restraining the sanction somewhat, the judge made the order stronger and far more likely to survive appeal. Clever move for a land lubber, proving that once again Captain Reynolds has met his match.

Conclusion

Digital pirates are like all other e-discovery scallywags. They think they are smarter than everybody in the room, and they usually are, that is until they end up in a court room with competent opposing counsel. They know a little bit about computers, or maybe they know a lot, and so they think they can get away with wiping hard drives or some of the other tricks shown by Reynolds. But they don’t realize that when it comes to computers, there is always a forensics expert who knows more than you do.

The e-discovery pirates also think they are above the law or can manipulate the law to suit their goal of winning at all costs. They usually justify their hide-the-ball conduct, or in a pirate’s case hide-the-booty conduct, with self-serving rationalizations of some kind. To quote Captain Jack Sparrow’s Schopenhaueresque favorite: “The only rules that really matter are these: what a man can do and what a man can’t do.”

Allright, Johnny Depp playing Captain Jack Sparrow may be cool, but real life pirates are not.

These excuses all amount to the same false logic, that the ends justify the means. In a legal system, the meansdue process – is an end in itself. Just ask the lawyers, judges, professors, and other citizens of Iran, Pakistan, and countless other countries that have or had no due process, where anyone, even the judges, can be arrested and jailed at the whim of a dictator. The rules and law governing procedure in all legal proceedings, criminal and civil, are essential to our way of life. They must be followed, even if it means disclosing evidence that you think might help your enemy to defeat you.

These procedures, which in the case of e-disclosure typically means disclosing emails you’d rather not, must  be followed by all sides to a dispute, not just one. If one side is caught cheating, the court must respond with harsh sanctions, as it did here. For otherwise, one side may be punished unfairly for following the law and another rewarded for breaking the law. Judges bear a heavy burden to actively police their courts to insure that this does not happen. Courts and discovery must be pirate-free zones, which to me seems like a Fiddlers Green.

To quote the immortal words of Jack Sparrow:

Well! I’m actually feeling rather good about this. I think we all arrived at a very special place eh? Spiritually. Ecumenically. Grammatically.

———————–

SUPPLEMENT: On June 30, 2009, District Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr., entered an order of Summary Judgment against the defendants. Judge Baer also entered another sanctions order against defendants for ”certain even more egregious discovery violations.” The plaintiff’s were finally able to get their hands on all of defendant’s wiped hard drives. Their forensic expert found enough file fragments left to prove that many relevant emails and files had been present. A deposition of a witness was also taken who proved the obvious, that the defendant’s employees emailed each other all the time. Here is Judge Baer’s summary of their pirate-like misbehavior:

Defendants despoiled the Seven Hard Drives, [*37] removed computers used by other employees, and failed to preserve email communications, all in bad faith. Defendants have failed to come forward with a scintilla of credible evidence to support the disappearance of this likely relevant information or their allegations that all files were backed up on a central server. First, with respect to the Seven Hard Drives, Plaintiffs’ forensic expert’s testimony conclusively dispels Defendants’ purported explanation that the drives were erased as a result of an upgrade to the Vista operating system early last year. The evidence reveals that, based on file fragments that were able to be extracted from some of the drives, the documents were in existence and had been accessed as late as June 2008, which is consistent with Reynolds’s admission that he pulled the drives from employee workstations at about that time. Also, Loveland’s testimony explains that complete and permanent evisceration of files from the drives would not have been accomplished by a simple operating system upgrade; rather, “wiping” documents permanently from a computer requires running specialized software. …

Based on this evidence, it is clear that Defendants’ “wiping” of the Seven Hard Drives was intentional and in bad faith, and their failure to ensure that all documents – including emails, to the extent they existed – were preserved before intentionally disposing of employees’ hard drives was at least grossly negligent. Here, where internal documents concerning, among other things, marketing plans, reports and assessments of the popularity of user newsgroups and communications with users are among the most critical in assessing Defendants’ knowledge and fostering of, or material contribution to, copyright infringement, there can be no doubt but that the despoiled documents were highly relevant to this case. Moreover, when evidence is destroyed in bad faith or with gross negligence, that alone has been found to be sufficient to support an inference that the missing evidence would have been favorable to the prejudiced party, and thus relevant. See Residential Funding Corp. v. Degeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002).

By the way, as to what happened to Jerry Reynolds, the owner who allegedly profited from the copyright infringement,  he was held personally liable. Again, here are Judge Baer’s words:

Here, the evidence bears out that Reynolds was personally responsible for a major share of Defendants’ infringing activities; moreover, he was the moving force behind the entire business of both corporate Defendants. UCI has never had employees; rather, its business is carried out by Sierra’s employees, all of whom (besides Reynolds) were terminated by August 2008. Reynolds is the director and sole shareholder of both companies, and he and other employees of Sierra have expressly admitted his ubiquitous role in the companies’ activities. …

The next step in the case is briefing to determine the terms of the Final Judgment. The judgment will include a permanent Injunction and damages. Then it will be the appellate court’s turn. We take due process very seriously in America, even for pirates.