The Need for Art and Surgery in Discovery

August 23, 2009

Guest Blog by Shannon Capone Kirk and Kristin Ali*

Dylan

You always said people don’t do what they believe in,
they just do what’s most convenient, then they repent.
And I always said, “Hang on to me, baby, and let’s hope
that the roof stays on.”

Bob Dylan, Brownsville Girl

ART

Not every musician, in fact not one that I can think of, writes lyrics so full of art and poetry as the master himself, Bob Dylan. This does not mean, however, that they shouldn’t try. They should try real hard. Lest we be left with such trite and repetitious, dare I say, overly broad and unduly burdensome, lyrics such as I do, I do, I do, I do, I do. No offense to you Abba fans out there, but I think we can at least agree that there is a smidge more art in any Dylan song than in I do x 5.

While the occasional ABBA song is out there, many musicians pride themselves on creativity—going where no musician has gone before in lyrics and sound. Lawyers, however, fail to do the same when it comes to discovery. It seems that we are still in the same tug-of-war we’ve always been in, the issuance and receipt of vague, repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome interrogatories and document requests and the boilerplate, although often justified and valid, objections. Is it that lawyers want to do what’s most convenient and then repent?

In other words, is it more convenient to issue repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome shotgun interrogatories and document requests to avoid the thought, the creativity, the precision required to ask for what is needed? Are these repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome discovery requests safe in the comfort that no sanctions will come out of their mere existence? Is it that counsel are free to repent their convenience by later reducing the scope and number of previous discovery requests? But, what good does that do anyone? Does this tactic not add delay and expense on what is likely an already expensive endeavor? Is it the fear that not being repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome will mean that counsel neglected to ask for that one teeny tiny little scrap of data in an unused file folder on some tangential witness’s old and unused laptop? But is the cost of such expansive discovery for that minutia scrap of data really worth, really proportionate, with the needs of the case? If not, it’s ok to think about the case, be creative, figure out what’s truly needed, and inquire and request accordingly. Come on, its okay…hang on to me baby, and lets hope that the roof stays on.

There are certainly appropriate occasions for numerous interrogatories and document requests. For example, they may be appropriate in large money cases, involving complicated claims or numerous parties. However, in most civil litigation, there is usually a core set of issues and facts. Yet, interrogatories and document requests continue to mutate in scope and multiply in number like giant monster rabbits left alone and to their own devices in an unguarded carrot field.

fat rabbitMeet the fat rabbit, Unduly Burdensome

I know not all lawyers are poets, or actors, or musicians, or writers (although I’ve met a couple who are pretty darn entertaining). But I do think that some creativity, some thought could be given in lieu of unthoughtful, repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome shotgun interrogatory and document requests. After all, repetitive, overly broad, and unduly burdensome discovery requests only lead to repetitious and boilerplate objections and no one getting anywhere except preserving a ton of ESI and incurring loads of angst for fear of spoliation. The problem is that even though Rule 26 requires pre-discovery meet & confers, and even though great cases like Mancia vs. Mayflower shed great light on the requirements of Rule 26, parties still issue repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome discovery requests—and in most cases, those requests come after the alleged meet & confer and the possible Rule 16 conference and thus, after the time when parameters for preservation and discovery were supposedly set.

Here are some exemplars of some post-Rule 26 meet & confer discovery requests. You can imagine that these particular exemplars were repeated over and over and went on, and on, and on……. into the hundreds. The creativity in massaging a word here and there to make the requests seem less repetitious than they obviously were could have been spent on being more creative and precise in seeking what was really needed.

1. All DOCUMENTS concerning Corporation A’s stock price.

Lawyer’s secret thought: <Really? All? When? Which stock price? The price of the stock is not even debated. The price is the price is the price. What is it that you really want to know? And do I need advise the client to preserve every single possible thing related to “stock price” until we sort this out? When will that be?>

Lawyer’s actual response: Objection.  Request is vague, repetitious, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material admissible evidence.

2. All DOCUMENTS concerning any consideration of acquisitions of any other businesses.

Lawyer’s secret thought: <Really? All? When? What do you mean by “any consideration”? Do you mean consideration as in the “contractual” consideration? Do you mean consideration as in any time anyone ever thought, even on a whim, “hey maybe I might want to acquire such and such a business someday?” And how would that ever be relevant to this case, which has nothing to do with any other acquisitions on this planet? Especially not ones that might have been “considered” or “pondered”, whatever you mean, in some remote past? Also, what do you mean by “acquisitions?” And, really “any” other business.? We’re talking about two businesses in this case, plaintiff’s and defendant’s. What is it that you really want to know? More importantly, what parameters are necessary for preservation and how much will that cost my client?>

Lawyer’s actual response: Objection.  Request is vague, repetitious, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material admissible evidence.

3. All DOCUMENTS concerning forecasting the need to purchase any possible acquisitions.

Lawyer’s secret thought: <Huh?>

Lawyer’s actual response: Objection.  Request is vague, repetitious, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material admissible evidence.

Although Ralph has written of Mancia v. Mayflower in the past year and the case has received quite a bit of press in the E-Discovery world, it does deserve mentioning again. In Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008), Judge Grimm criticized the practice of dumping document requests on the other side, noting the reality that “lawyers customarily serve requests that are far broader, more redundant and burdensome than necessary.” On the flip side, he condemned the practice of boilerplate objections to document requests, explaining that:

It would be difficult to dispute the notion that the very act of making such boilerplate objections is prima facie evidence of a Rule 26(g) violation, because if the lawyer had paused, made a reasonable inquiry and discovered facts that demonstrated the burdensomeness of excessive cost of the discovery request, he or she should have disclosed them in the objection, as both Rule 33 and 34 responses must state objections with particularity on pain of waiver.

Judge Grimm makes clear that boilerplate objections are most definitely a no-no. And, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York seems to agree, as she cites Mancia in an opinion of hers from early this year: S.E.C. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Yet, there is no thought, no art to the above exemplar requests and they unfortunately scream for “boilerplate” objections. I know what the song Brownsville Girl is about, the lyrics tell the exact story, precise and thoughtful. I do, I do, I do, I do, I do not know what the above requests are asking for or how the reader is supposed to respond. What I do know, however, is that these requests are the type of requests that have made E-Discovery so expensive—they are so broad and vague that an ocean’s wide net might have to be cast over the client’s documents and data in order to preserve, collect, cull, and on and on, “All” of the potentially responsive information. Of course, that is if the parties are unable to meet and confer and set realistic goals and parameters, which unfortunately is not as easy or routine as it should be.

SURGERY

The repetitious, overly broad, and unduly burdensome brand of discovery is the type of discovery frowned upon in the Final Report of the Joint Project of The American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (“Joint Project”). The report laments that “unfortunately, many lawyers believe they should—or must—take advantage of the full range of discovery options offered by the rules. They believe that zealous advocacy (or fear of malpractice claims) demands no less.” The Joint Project calls for a reform of the discovery process so that it actually achieves the goals of discovery. “Discovery should enable a party to procure in admissible form through the most efficient, nonredundant, cost-effective method reasonably available, evidence directly relevant to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings. Discovery should not be an end in itself; it should be merely a means of facilitating a just, efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes.”

As the rules currently stand, they allow for discovery to run wild. The Joint Report quotes one respondent saying: “the new rules are a nightmare.  The bigger the case the more the abuse and the bigger the nightmare.”

So what’s an attorney to do when faced with a slew of vague, overbroad, duplicative or irrelevant requests? Providing rational and targeted responses, as called for in Mancia, is certainly in keeping with the cooperative spirit of discovery. Being surgical in request and response should also be considered.

Banning the overly broad and the boilerplate, as called for in Mancia, is a good start to streamlining the discovery process. But it needs to be more than an aspirational goal; it should be enforced. Prior to Mancia, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) already required that every discovery request, response or objection be signed by an attorney of record, certifying that it is, among other things, not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive considering the case. Judge Grimm explains the intention of Rule 26(g) in Mancia:

First, the rule is intended to impose an “affirmative duty” on counsel to behave responsibly during discovery, and to ensure that it is conducted in a way that is consistent “with the spirit and purposes” of the discovery rules, which are contained in Rules 26 through 37.

Second, the rule is intended to curb discovery abuse by requiring the court to impose sanctions if it is violated, absent “substantial justification,” and those sanctions are intended to both penalize the noncompliant lawyer or unrepresented client, and to deter others from noncompliance.

Most importantly,

Third, the rule aspires to eliminate one of the most prevalent of all discovery abuses: kneejerk discovery requests served without consideration of cost or burden to the responding party. Despite the requirements of the rule, however, the reality appears to be that with respect to certain discovery, principally interrogatories and document product requests, lawyers customarily serve requests that are far broader, more redundant and burdensome than necessary to obtain sufficient facts to enable them to resolve the case through motion, settlement or trial.

To Judge Grimm, the appropriate way to deal with redundant and burdensome discovery requests from plaintiffs is not to respond with boilerplate, but for both sides to stop abusive practices by using the meet and confer system to cooperate.

If lawyers approached discovery responsibly, as the rule mandates, and met and conferred before initiating discovery, and simply discussed what the amount in controversy is, and how much, what type, and in what sequence, discovery should be conducted so that its cost – to all parties – is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.

And, here is the surgery of discovery. To me, Judge Grimm is asking the parties to take out their scalpels and perform surgery on the beast of discovery before them.

Gorilla Surgery

Meeting and conferring can be helped along with actively involved judges who manage discovery. It is this kind of judicial enforcement that the Joint Project calls for. One of its main recommendations is to increase the involvement of judges from day one: “Judges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in designing the scope of discovery and the direction and timing of the case all the way to trial. Where abuses occur, judges are perceived not to enforce the rules effectively. … Judges need to actively manage each case from the outset to contain costs; nothing else will work.”

After all, a good surgical team meets and preps before surgery to get a good and efficient game-plan together before cutting the patient open. Or, would it be better for the surgeons not to meet, cut the patient open, then fight over which kidney to cut out, and decide to just cut out both kidneys to avoid leaving the wrong one in?

Perhaps further surgical parameters can be set by imposing a maximum number of discovery requests. For the most part, parties have few restrictions on the amount of discovery requests they can make. The rules generally favor liberal discovery and do not impose numerical limits on the amount of overall discovery a party may request. Of course, courts can impose reasonableness standards on requests when they are in dispute, but overall the result is that parties can frequently make repetitive, overly broad, and unduly burdensome requests on their opponents with few limitations or repercussions.

Some jurisdictions have limited discovery. California, for example, has created two classes of civil cases with two different sets of discovery rules, limiting discovery in lower-stake cases, as a way to create a more proportionate system of discovery to the amount in controversy. The Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have imposed strict definitions on certain broad words used in a discovery request.  For example, words like “document” and the modifiers “any” and “all” each have specific definitions in the context of the local rules. Rule 26.3 establishes the maximum breadth that those terms may have. Some courts have limited interrogatories – Illinois state courts have a limit of 30, and the District of Massachusetts and the Southern District of California have limits of 25.

Perhaps, then, numerical limitations on document requests are part of the surgery necessary to curb discovery abuses. It is difficult, however, to pin down a number. Numerical limits might restrict parties from getting the correct information and prevent meritorious cases from being properly litigated. Numerical limits might also encourage creative accounting – putting multiple requests within a single request or lead to even more jumbled and inarticulate discovery requests. Yet, I’ve practiced in Illinois and I can recall working to fit my requests into the 30 interrogatory limit. Truth is, when it came down to it, in most cases, it wasn’t that hard. Numerical limits are not easy, but they are doable. We should look more to the state courts to see the lessons learned from their experience.

All in all, Dylan, I hope, sets a good high bar to try real hard to reach by way of creativity and thoughtfulness, Judge Grimm provides the idea that lawyers should be more surgical and cooperative, the Joint Project supports judicial enforcement and limits on discovery, and state courts provide examples of numerical and other discovery limitations. All of which all together could make for a good road to follow in curbing discovery abuse.

But to conclude, since I don’t foresee being before him anytime soon, I hope Judge Grimm takes it as a compliment that I’ve put him and Dylan in the same sentence. But, sorry Judge Grimm, although you can write one mean-old, artful, ballad of an opinion, I don’t know if I’d love paying every red cent of $500.00 to see you in concert, like I would to hear Brownsville Girl live.

*Shannon Capone Kirk is E-Discovery Counsel at Ropes & Gray. Kristin Ali is an associate in Ropes & Gray’s litigation department. This guest article encompasses their personal observations and opinions and does not necessarily reflect those of Ropes & Gray and its attorneys or clients.



Plato’s Cave: why most lawyers love paper and hate e-discovery and what this means to the future of legal education

August 11, 2009

The Matrix - modern example of Plato's CaveThe most famous allegory in all of Western Civilization is that of Plato’s Cave. This conceptual image is based on deep insights into the human condition. For millennium this analogy has allowed people to better understand each other and the world in which they live. As proof of its eternal veracity, I offer it as an explanation for why most lawyers today love paper and hate electronic discovery. The Socratic approach also points to a way out of the legal profession’s current crises of e-discovery competence; it suggests that a new form of education is imperative. The alternative may well be radical inter-generational disruptions and discontinuities in the practice of law.

Plato’s Cave

First a refresher on Plato’s Analogy of the Cave. It is found at the beginning of book seven on The Republic, which was written by Plato in 380 BC.  It takes the form of a dialogue between Socrates and Plato’s brother, Glaucon, concerning education. Socrates tells the story of prisoners who have been held captive in a cave all of their lives. They are chained so that they can only see shadows on the wall of people walking on a path behind them in front of  a fire. They can not directly see the people or the things that they carry. They can only see their shadows cast on the cave wall. That is all they have know all of their life and so they mistake the shadows for the people and things themselves. They are totally absorbed by the shadows and have become quite adept at interpreting what they supposedly mean. Here is a common graphic illustration of the cave set up.

Platos cave from The Republic

One day a prisoner is freed of his chains and taken out of the cave and dragged up into the light. After a long period of adjustment he is able to see in the new light filled world and discover that he had been mistaking shadows for reality. He returns to tell his prisoner friends, but has trouble adjusting to the dark and shadows. He cannot still see the fine distinctions that the prisoners make out in the flickering forms. They still cannot turn around or leave the cave. They still see only shadows and know nothing else. They do not believe their returning friend. He does not see the shadows as they do. They think he is quite mad. In fact, they hate him for his better-than-thou stories and would kill him if they could. To refresh your memory with more of the details of the story of Plato’s cave, watch this cool clay animation version. I am sure Socrates would have approved.

Want an even more detailed refresher of the story of Plato’s Cave? Then watch this longer video, featuring a reading of a translation of this segment of The Republic dialogue. Note how in today’s world the cave shadows have been replaced by television images and other mass media.

By the way, The Matrix movie is the latest popular cultural expression of this perennial idea. Check out this video which spells that out for you.

Now read the original words of Plato. After telling the story, Socrates explains to young Glaucon the significance of the analogy of the cave to life and education.

And again, do you think it at all strange, said I, if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries of men cuts a sorry figure and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?

It would by by no means strange, he said.  …

Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions. What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting vision into blind eyes.

They do indeed, he said.

SocratesBut our present argument indicates, said I, that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periactus in the theatre, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good, do we not?

Yes.

Of this very thing, then, I said, there might be an art, an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.

Yes, that seems likely, he said.

This quote is from my favorite translation from the ancient Greek by Edith Hamilton and Hunington Cairns, published by Princeton University Press as part of the Bollingen Series.

Paper Lawyers

Lawyers today, much like the prisoners of Plato’s cave, love paper because that is all they have ever known. They grow up in a paper world. They learn how to read on paper. They study paper books. They go to law schools where they learn that legal documents are made of paper. Their professors are just like them. They surround themselves with great piles of paper literature and paper case law. They teach using paper books and paper flip charts and require students to write papers. When taking evidence and trial classes, law students are taught with paper documents, shown how to test the authenticity of paper records and how to have paper admitted into evidence.

paper doll cutouts

After school, older lawyers give them an endless supply of extra long paper, called legal pads, and do their best to keep them up to their neck in paper work. They are shown how to generate papers, copy papers, pile papers, file papers, notarize papers, shuffle papers, staple papers, clip papers, highlight papers, redact papers, watermark papers, and even add paper stickums to paper. They also learn how to keep paper calendars, speed-read large files full of papers, spot check papers, and carefully proof-read papers till they are perfect.

milton waddams

Some lawyers cover all of the furniture in their office with papers. A few even go so far as to put piles of paper on the floor creating an obstacle course to and from their desk, which is also entirely covered with papers. Papers make lawyers feel safe and secure. They provide status and prestige as a demonstration of productivity. They like to frame papers and put them on their walls. Some lawyers learn how to fax papers back and forth to each other. Some even learn how to email letters to each other and print out important ones to make them real.

Dunder Mifflin

Most judges and courts love paper too. Lawyers are required to serve papers on parties and opposing counsel, file papers with the court, and make paper trial exhibits. No witness exam is complete without marking papers, handing them to the clerk, opposing counsel, the judge, and then the witness. Some lawyers even blow up the special papers that they like to make them really, really big papers that everyone can easily see.

The trial lawyers are especially good with papers. They learn to chase paper trails, find tons of paper in other people’s filing cabinets, copy the paper, stamp the paper, produce the paper, and then explain the papers to a judge and jury. Some even learn advanced paper techniques such as Bates stamping papers to bring out their hidden order.

Lawyers live their entire life in a paper world. They start each day by reading a newspaper. When not doing paper work, they read paper books and magazines for fun. It is all paper, all the time, at work and at home. Lawyers are very adept at interpreting paper. They are the experts of paper forms. No paper is too lengthy or complex for them to figure out. Lawyers can and do stare at papers all day long

Just like the prisoners in Plato’s Cave, they do not know that their beloved papers are shadows, mere print outs of a greater electronic reality.

Electric Lawyers

Almost all of the papers that lawyers love come from computers. There, in the electronic realm, they live in their full native glory.  There, and only there, is all of their information intact, their metadata, interconnectedness, and search-ability. None of this information ever makes it to the printer. The paper printouts are just two dimensional depictions of parts of the original ESI, in the same way that shadows are just two dimensional depictions of the original 3D objects. Papers are pale substitutes for the original electronic creations.

Just as the prisoners in Plato’s cave saw only the shadows of the people and things that happened to pass on the path behind them, so too the lawyers see only the papers that happened to have passed through a printer. They thereby miss most of the information world. In truth, only a very, very small percentage of information is ever printed out. In fact, almost all businesses records today only exist in electronic form and are never reduced to paper. The world of electronic information is far larger, more complex, interconnected, and beautiful than the paper lawyers could ever imagine.

Some lawyers manage to escape from their paper prisons, embrace the new world of electronically stored information, and sing the body electric. The transition from the paper shadows to full ESI is not easy. At first, most are overwhelmed by the sheer complexity and volume of the electronic source behind the paper shadows they knew so well. They are dazed and confused by the full magnitude of the information. It takes them time to grow acclimated to the new metadata they can now perceive. It takes them time to understand the interconnectedness of all digital information and grasp how it can be instantly searched and processed. But when they do, a whole new world of languages and skills opens up to them. Slowly they become masters of the electronic world that most of their clients take for granted. They learn to speak in new technical languages and start to understand how the world around them really operates. They stop printing out their emails and start using spreadsheets. They learn to hack and hash. They enter the Internet unafraid and rejoice in the near infinite webwork of html. They are reborn in cyberspace. They become electric lawyers.

matrix neo

Just as in Plato’s story, some of the electric lawyers feel compassion for their paper brothers. They decide  to return to the cave to try to practice law in the shadows again and share their new-found knowledge. At first, their eyes cannot adjust. They cannot remember all of the false distinctions made by those who do not grasp that paper is a mere printout of a larger reality. They speak in a language that the paper lawyers call techno-talk gibberish or computerese. They are not understood. Indeed, they are laughed at as nerds and geeks. When they first began to return in the early 1980s, the ones Ken Withers calls the protodigitals, the paper lawyers saw only their keyboards. In their darkness they understood them as typewriters and ridiculed the computer lawyers as secretaries.

The tales by electric lawyers of a vast new world of digital information, of better and faster, are misunderstood and ridiculed. The paper lawyers do not believe their wild stories of a so-called information explosion. They ignore the need to include requests for ESI in discovery. They reject the new hash stamps of digital information and stubbornly cling to their Bates stamps. The papers lawyers stick to the paper discovery. If they even bother to request email at all, they take the paper print-outs as if they alone were real. They do not understand metadata. It is invisible to them. So they refuse to produce it, whatever it is.

Just as in Plato’s story, the paper prisoners feel threatened by their electric brothers and sisters who speak a strange new language and live in a different world. They counter-attack in many ways. For instance, in the 1990s they persecuted electric lawyers who were the first to the Internet and accused them of broadcasting television ads without permission. One electric lawyer was even forced to submit his entire website to his state Bar association for approval as a television ad. His attempts to explain the world outside of the paper cave were futile. They saw the web show for themselves on the televisions sitting on their secretaries’ desks, which were actually computer monitors, but they did not understand the difference. The protodigital lawyer complied and printed out his whole website, disclaimers and all, consisting of thousands of pages of paper when so downgraded into two dimensions. Once the Bar governors saw the television add in the paper they loved and understood, they quibbled with a few terms, required a couple of revisions, and then approved his website, floridalawfirm.com, as a TV broadcast. The channel still remains, although the show has changed many times over the years.

Ostrich with Head in SandIn the Twenty First Century the paper lawyers continue to react as Plato predicted, albeit with more sophistication than before. They now spread rumors that electronic discovery is too expensive and will destroy our system of justice if not stopped. Other times they dismiss e-discovery as a mere fad that will pass. It is as if they really believed that people will soon abandon technology and return to the word of phone calls, ink, and parchment that they know and love. Flat screen computer monitors are starting to appear on cave walls everywhere, but they do not believe them. They live in denial.

When paper lawyers of today speak of computers at all, they speak only of computer viruses and threats to security. They attempt to clamp down on all employee computer use. They limit permissible software to ancient versions of Microsoft Office programs. They also try to make most of the Internet off-limits to all employees. They still pretend like only their clients’ paper records are real and only these papers contain information valuable for law suits. The only reason most clients have not left them years ago is that the senior in-house counsel are detached from the rest of the technologically sophisticated segments of the company. The senior in-house counsel are paper lawyers too and so they protect their own.

Ostrich head - careful, they bite

Some trial attorneys, with or without the permission of their clients, go so far as to enter into secret agreements with each other to ignore the alleged larger world outside the cave. They agree to look only at paper. Their often skeptical clients go along, intimidated by the rumors of runaway costs. Indeed, when paper lawyers dabble with ESI that they cannot ignore, they try to catch the fire through its shadows. That leads to mistakes, do overs, and wasteful expenses. It also often leads to sanctions and what appears to be unethical behavior. An ostrich can be mean when their head is removed from the sand against their will and they are forced to confront their own shadow.

Bray & Gillespie

A new order by Magistrate Judge Karla R. Spaulding illustrates this later point perfectly. Bray & Gillespie Management LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co. 2009 WL 2407754 (M.D.Fla. August 3, 2009). Severe sanctions were entered against the plaintiff and its lawyers for not producing hotel guest attendance records. The plaintiff’s paper lawyers only looked for these records in warehouses full of papers. When they found them in segments, they only made selective disclosures of what they found.  They were caught and sanctioned. The whole thing could have been avoided by simply producing the electronic guest records that were, of course, at all times readily available in the plaintiff’s computer system. They did not even try to look there, even though a native production was specifically requested and ordered by the court.

As an excuse plaintiff had a legal secretary for in-house counsel file an affidavit where she said it was impossible to download or export the data from their software, IQWare. She actually swore that the only way to get the information was to print it out onto paper. This is of course absurd, as a ten second search shows that their software is just a customized MS SQL database. It would have been easy to copy the database and turn it over, but the lawyers and their assistants only understood paper. As a result, they will now almost certainly lose the case. Judge Spaulding has entered a report and recommendation that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice and fees taxed against the plaintiff, now in bankruptcy, and its lawyers, not in bankruptcy, for their intentional, bad faith withholding of evidence and defiance of court orders requiring production of electronic evidence.

Some Electric Lawyers Stay and Some Go

Some electric lawyers grow frustrated with paper law and disputes like we see in Bray & Gillespie. They leave the cave and the practice of law entirely. They go to work for high-tech companies, e-discovery vendors, or become consultants, and the like. They devise ways to make ESI accessible to lawyers by making ESI seem like paper. They learn to convert electronic information to pseudo-paper images called TIFF and JPEG files. They keep most of the metadata in separate load files and try to convince the paper lawyers to use these image files instead of the paper print-outs. They enjoy some success and whole industries have been started devoted to the creation of a netherworld of image files between ESI and paper. Special software has been devised to allow the paper lawyers to review the electronic files on computers as if they were paper. This kind of TIFF review is expensive, but it allows paper lawyers many of the comforts of the cave. They can keep their familiar Bates stamp and can easily make print-outs of any image files they see for use at paper trials.

electric headOther electric lawyers refuse to leave their firms, they refuse to go solo or join the world of vendors and consultants. They love the law firm culture for the same reason that paper lawyers love paper. It is all they have ever known. They remain in the practice of law and learn to hide the light and play the shadow games. They go along with the vendors go-between world of electronic TIFF image files. They stop crusading about the wonders of full digital reality and thus escape the ire of their partners, but they never give up on trying to subtly persuade them. Some are successful. It is a slow process. More and more lawyers free themselves from their paper chains. The electric lawyers learn to sidestep the reactionary rules and deal directly with the clients who understand. They leave the cave as needed to maintain their sanity.  They find sanctuary in their homes, families, and friends that are entirely out-of-cave and in the light.

Some electric lawyers are no longer satisfied with the compromise solution of hot-shadow TIFFs. They insist that the paper lawyers leave the cave entirely and deal directly with the original native forms. The clients of the paper lawyers are also not satisfied because the nether world of image review is expensive and they are asked to pay the bills. Some of the judges are also becoming dissatisfied with such pretend paper discovery. Yes, many judges have also been able to find their way out of the cave and see the light of full ESI. Once they return, they no longer tolerate the paper lawyers’ pretenses. They grow weary of the mistakes, hide-the-metadata blunders, last minute discovery requests, and the many sanctions motions that happen whenever paper lawyers play with the fire of ESI.

Education by Changing Direction, Not Inserting Vision

Although many lawyers have now escaped, the vast majority of the legal profession still live in the cave. Most lawyers are not able to keep up with technology, they are unable to deal with the electronic evidence underlying most lawsuits. They cannot adequately preserve it, collect it, process it, search it, or present it. In short, they cannot conduct e-discovery or comply with the new rules of procedure governing e-discovery because they do not know how. They only know and understand paper discovery and paper evidence. They are blind to the dynamics of electronic information.

If Plato’s theories of education are correct, this knowledge cannot simply be transmitted to them. There is no lecture or CLE program brilliant enough to insert vision into those habituated by a lifetime of paper. The mind is not a tabula rasa to be written upon by subject matter experts, especially by the time a person is an adult. As Plato said, learning requires “turning the whole body.” Lawyers must leave the caves, stop staring at the paper shadows, and make a change of direction. Lawyers must enter cyberspace and become familiar with computers and software of all kinds.  Then, and only then, will learned lectures, over time, be effective.

seeing new worlds

The Socratic process of learning by changing direction and action has already begun. Many lawyers and paralegals today are ready to change and leave the cave. The message has gotten through and they know that paper is only a small part of reality. Most lawyers already have a computer on their desk and use email throughout the day. They are ready to escape the paper chains.

All that they need now is an effective education that facilities the process of a new direction. We cannot use paper to awaken people from a paper induced trance. By logic only a cyberspace approach to education will be effective. Our current brick and mortar approach to e-discovery education is conceptually flawed. Online education is the answer. As Marshall McLuhan said: “The medium is the message.”

Not just any online education of course. It has to be good, it has to be effective. For online education to work, to turn people around in the Socratic sense, it needs to be interactive, hands on, creative, and include dialogues and community. It needs to be a high quality art form.; in Plato’s words: “an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul.” Of course, I do not mean anything religious by this, but I do mean a total transformation of perception, attitude, thinking, and action.

This new education will not come from law schools, they are tied up by paper bound professors. It will come from private companies that lead in technology. It needs to come soon, because society will not wait on the paper lawyers much longer.

Conclusion

Some of the protodigitals in all lines of work raised families and taught their children to read on computers, not paper. Unlike all of their friends who were raised by paper parents, they learned about the world by computers and other digital media. They grew up with computers around them at all times. These children of protodigitals are the postdigital generation. Some of these second generation nerds are starting to graduate from law schools now.

Born into an all electric world, with electric parents, they have never known paper blinders. They see the shadows for the printouts that they are. They grew up using new software programs and computer games. They have blinding speed on the keyboard. Many now have an innate mastery of all software. If it plugs in, or has a battery, they understand it. The Internet is their playground. The information explosion and non-stop technology changes are their friends.

matrix kid bends spoon with his mind

That is all they have known their entire lives. They do not read the newspaper. They do not particularly like paper, they like pixels. The postdigitals write with paper as a novelty, the way their parents first used a computer.

Electronic discovery comes easy and natural to these second generation digitals. The protodigital lawyers, protodigital judges, and technology clients are their friends. The future of the law is in the hands of these postdigitals. They will serve the needs of the technology companies and people of today and tomorrow.

The only question now is whether the new education that the rest of the profession needs will come quickly enough. If not, the vast majority of the legal profession may be stuck in their caves while the world passes them by. They need help now to get out and be able to compete with the second generation digitals.

If not, there is likely to be a sudden shift in fortunes unlike the profession has ever seen before. The law firm rankings are likely to change rapidly and permanently over the next ten years. Moreover, once the winds of change become obvious, law firms of the future will be forced to put the paper dinosaurs out to pasture well before their prime. That will be the only way they can survive, the only way to try to regain their standing. Early retirement may become mandatory, especially for trial lawyers, as they are no longer able to understand what is really going on. The information in dispute may simply be beyond their ken.

Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan

The postdigitals are not tied by bonds of affection to the prisoners left behind in the same way that the protodigitals are. The postdigitals will carry the profession forward into the light of new technology and information, with or without the paper prisoners. The businesses and public that the profession serves will see to that. So too will the protodigital lawyers and judges.

Without a new kind of education, those still bound in the caves by paper chains may simply be left behind. Even if they want to get out, and I think many now do, they may be unable to. Even if they get out, they may be unable to function effectively. They may be overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of it all. No matter what their age, the paper bound lawyers may become irrelevant before their time. They may simply fade away along with the newspapers they love.

That would be a shame, for they still have much to offer the future of our system of justice. I suspect that such a radical discontinuity would not be healthy. But, it may be inevitable. One way or another, radical change will come because the law must keep up with the society it serves.


Most Popular Post of All Time (Summer Rerun): District Court in LA Decides Computer RAM Memory Must Be Preserved and Produced

August 9, 2009

RAM Computer Memory Chips

Originally Published in May 2007, this is the all time most popular e-Discovery Team blog post.

A Los Angeles District Court rocked the e-discovery world by holding, for the first time, that the contents of a computer’s Random Access Memory (”RAM”) memory are discoverable. Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell. The Order dated May 29, 2007, by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian was entered in a copyright infringement case against the owners of the popular media search-engine web, TorrentSpy. The order has been highly criticized by computer experts and e-discovery lawyers alike for greatly expanding the legal duty to preserve and produce electronic data to the most elusive and transitory of information, that held only in a computer’s RAM chips.

Many contend that this a rogue decision, and if not reversed on appeal could force companies and individuals to store and produce vast amounts of data that would otherwise exist only temporarily on their computer’s RAM hardware.  Ken Withers, director of The Sedona Conference, was quoted by CNET News as stating that he feared the judge’s decision may mean a “tremendous expansion” of the scope of discovery in civil litigation, creating yet another what he calls “weapon of mass discovery.” By this,he means a discovery burden that could be tremendously expensive to meet, and thus could be exploited by plaintiffs and defendants alike to force the settlement of a dispute to avoid that expense.

Commentators all seem to agree that in most circumstances, if not all, it would be prohibitively burdensome for a person or company to try to preserve and produce the transitory contents of computer memory.  The burdensomeness would derive not only from the expense, but also from the disruptive actions required to comply.

Moreover, many contend that an order requiring the production of RAM data necessarily requires a party to create computer records where none before existed.  This goes against a fundamental legal precept that a party is only required to produce documents and electronically stored information that  have already been created and stored.  A party to litigation is never required to generate and create new documents and information so as to satisfy the curiosity of the opposing party.  As Ken Withers stated in the CNET article:

There’s never been a requirement that (defendants) must create documents that they wouldn’t ordinarily maintain for the purpose of satisfying some (plaintiff’s) discovery requests.

Judge Chooljian considered this argument, but rejected it, because in her view, the information already existed in RAM.  She concluded that the defendants were not required to create new data, they were just required to transfer it to permanent form and preserve it.

Withers and others think the order is ill conceived in part because it is based on a misunderstanding of technology and computer memory.   Computer memory RAM files are temporary files that are created by the computer for operational efficiency.  Computer memory like this is by nature information designed only for very temporary storage in the memory chips of a computer.  It is quickly overwritten and is always purged - literally disappears - when a computer is turned off.  (Unpowered RAM memory chips contain no information of any kind.)  The same CNET News article also quotes Dean McCarron, principle analyst at Mercury Research, as saying:

RAM is the working storage of a computer and designed to be impermanent.  Potentially your RAM is being modified up to several billions of times a second. The judge’s order simply reveals to me a lack of technical understanding.

In short, RAM memory is temporary and transitory, and leaves no trace or record.  Still, a computer system can be designed so that information temporarily stored in RAM is copied onto a hard drive or flash memory storage where it then becomes fixed.

Before this decision, most e-discovery attorneys I know thought that only information fixed on a storage device, such as a hard drive, flash memory or Read Only Memory (ROM) (which are permanent), CD, DVD, etc., would be considered “stored” and thus discoverable under the new Rules as “Electronically Stored Information”. See, e.g., Rule 34 and commentary in the Page 34 at the top of the Blog.  This decision broadens the meaning of “stored” to include the temporary holding of information in a volatile memory chip.

The opinion concedes that computer RAM memory has never previously been adjudicated to be Electronically Stored Information (”ESI”) under new Rule 34.  For that reason, Judge Chooljian declined to impose sanctions on defendants for failing to preserve and produce the RAM ESI in the past, but she did order its preservation and production going forward.   Although the opinion concedes it is a case of first impression for construction of Rule 34, Judge Chooljian argues that her conclusion is compelled by the unique circumstances of this case and prior Ninth Circuit law, primarily MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-519 (9th Cir. 1993).  The MAI Systems case is well known for its holding that the copying of software into RAM memory is equivalent to  “affixing” it in a tangible medium for purposes of copyright law, where ”fixed” is a term of art.  Judge Chooljian reasoned that if information in RAM was sufficientlyfixed to constitute a copyright infringement, then it was sufficiently fixedfor purposes of discoverability as electronically stored information.

In this case, the RAM memory at issue was the information stored for up to six hours, but no longer, on the webserver for the TorrentSpy web, as to what web-pages were downloaded, when, by whom, and other similar information.   That is called a webserver log.  For this particular kind of RAM data, it is not technically difficult to set up a webserver so that the log is transferred from RAM to a permanently stored file on the hard drive. Many webs are set up to do this.  These website owners want to keep track of who visits their site, which pages are the most popular, etc.

But TorrentSpy did not set up their system that way.  They did not want to have any tracking information on their users, and in fact they put this privacy guaranty in their user agreement.  The Plaintiffs in this case, Columbia Pictures Industries, et al., were frustrated by the fact that the defendants did not know who its users were, and in fact did not want to know.  Plaintiffs claimed that TorrentSpy’s users were illegally downloading their copyrighted materials – their movies, music and television shows - based on information they obtained from TorrentSpy’s web. Plaintiffs claimed that TorrentSpy set up their computer systems with RAM anonymity on purpose in order to encourage their users to steal plaintiffs’ copyrighted materials without fear of being caught.

Note that the plaintiffs do not claim that their copyrighted materials are stored on TorrentSpy’s web, and do not claim that TorrentSpy’s users downloaded the files from TorrentSpy. It appears to be undisputed that TorrentSpy “only” provides information as to where these materials are located, usually on the computers of individuals located around the world.  Plaintiffs sued the TorrentSpy web owners, and not the individuals who illegally downloaded the files or the individuals who supplied the files (for free), based on theories of vicarious copyright infringement, contributory infringement, and inducement.

Here, in my view, is where an old legal axiom comes in: “bad facts make bad law.”  The facts in this case are unusual.  The judge was convinced that the webserver logs were essential to the plaintiffs’ case.  This much is certain, and this is a highly unusual situation. Moreover, the tone of the opinion suggests that the judge thinks the plaintiffs are likely to prevail if they obtain these logs, that it will enable them to prove their infringement conspiracy theories.  The plaintiffs have successfully argued that defendants were hiding this crucial evidence in their RAM, and that this was an essential part of their conspiracy to steal their intellectual property.

Further, the defendants were, according to Judge Chooljian, unable to demonstrate that it would be “unduly burdensome” for them to transfer all of the webserver logs on an ongoing basis from RAM to hard drive, and thereafter to preserve and produce this evidence.  The court was referring to the burden of proof placed on a party opposing discovery under new Rule 26(b)(2)(B). Under this rule, ESI is not discoverable if the party opposing discovery can show that it is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” Personally, I am surprised defendants could not prove undue burden or costs.  If they had, then under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) the burden of proof would have shifted to the plaintiffs to provide good cause that the “not reasonably accessible” information be produced anyway.  Apparently defendants failed because the court went entirely with the plaintiffs’ expert, and rejected defendants’ contrary testimony.  This certainly shows the importance of credible experts, especially in a case like this.

Judge Chooljian appears to recognize that her decision would be controversial, and took some pains to note that it was not intended to serve as precedent for the routine discovery of computer memory in other cases.  Her position is explained in footnote 31, at page 31 of the 35-page opinion:

The court emphasizes that its ruling should not be read to require litigants in all cases to preserve and produce electronically stored information that is temporarily stored only in RAM. The court’s decision in this case to require the rentention and production of data which otherwise would be temporarily stored only in RAM, is based in significant part on the nature of this case, the key and potentially dispositive nature of the Server Log Data which would otherwise be unavailable, and defendants’ failure to provide what this court views as credible evidence of undue burden and cost.

I do appreciate this footnote.

POSTSCRIPT: The Magistrate’s discovery ruling was appealed and later approved by the district court judge. See:  Order Denying Defendants’ Motion For Review dated Aug. 24, 2007Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Later, a district court in New York reached the same result in a case where the defendant’s lawyers agreed to produce the ephemeral data, but then later reneged. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 2009 WL 185992 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009).

SECOND POSTSCRIPT: Interested in the law and digital pirates? See my July 5, 2009 blog post:
Inside the Head of a Digital Pirate.


Federal Judge in Louisville Imposes Sanctions for Pre-Suit Spoliation

August 2, 2009

chess and strategyI generally do not like motions for sanctions against a defendant when they are based on alleged destruction of ESI before suit is filed. All too often these motions are not part of a legitimate pursuit of truth. Instead, they are litigation tactics, just chess moves in litigation as a game. As Bobby Fischer said: “Chess is life.” The players here exploit the frequent inability of a defendant to know when and if a potential plaintiff will sue and exactly claims they will bring if they do sue. The plaintiff causes this vagary to begin with, and then exploits it. This is an unfair strategy and I wish more judges would wise up to this trick.

When to Pull the Trigger?

The timing of the trigger of a pre-litigation hold is often just guesswork. A litigation hold in a large organization, especially when there is just a vague dispute of unknown parameters (again, this vagary is typically controlled by the plaintiff), can be very expensive and burdensome to implement. That burden is a good reason not to trigger a hold prematurely. The expense and disruption may prove to be totally unnecessary. Yet, if you guess wrong, you are susceptible to this kind of tactical attack.

This question of timing of a hold is a huge issue for all large organizations, corporations and government agencies alike. I recall talking to David Shonka, the Assistant General Counsel for Litigation for the Federal Trade Commission, about this issue. The FTC sometimes get sued just like everybody else. He told me that timing of a pre-litigation trigger is a very troubling problem. He found that it is often impossible for him, or anyone else, to know when to impose a litigation hold.  Yet, the penalties for guessing wrong can be draconian. See my prior article, e-Discovery at the Harvard Club in New York City, for more on David Shonka’s views on e-discovery.

chess menSome counsel know very well how to take advantage of this grey area. No matter when you decide to pull the trigger and implement a hold, they will argue that it was too late. You should have done it earlier. Again, this is just a chess tactic, not the good faith pursuit of justice. Plaintiffs make the argument to the court with nothing to lose, and everything to gain. All too often judges are persuaded by these Monday morning quarterbacking type arguments. Since a suit is in place, it is easy to argue that the defendant should have seen it coming. After all, it did come. What judges often do not know is the many false alarms of litigation that a big company is faced with every day. Nor do most fully appreciate the tremendous expense and burden of a hold.

Just think how foolish an assistant general counsel looks to management for pulling the trigger,  doing the full drill, imposing an expensive hold, and then nothing happens. Worse, the company is forced to keep it in place and just wait to see if a suit is filed. The company could be left guessing for years whether or not the danger is gone. In the meantime, the very real expenses and harassment of the hold continues. Then in situations where counsel guessed wrong and a suit is never filed, the attorneys are left with egg on their face. Statutes of limitation give plaintiffs way too much leeway to delay suit for years.

The bar is sometimes encouraged in this misbehavior by incredible opinions like Phillip M. Adams & Associates, L.L.C., v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 910801 (D.Utah March 30, 2009). In Adams a magistrate actually held that a defendant should have imposed a hold eight years before the suit was filed. I found this decision so egregious that I wrote a long, two-part blog about it: Utah Court Mines Safe Harbor Rule 37(e) Into Oblivion – Part One and Part Two: Eight Years of Imminence. I was surprised that some experts, including my friend Craig Ball, argued to the contrary that I was wrong and the Adams was correctly decided. I stand by my opinion and encourage you to read the Adams case and see what you think. As Bobby Fischer said: “My opponents make good moves too. Sometimes I don’t take these things into consideration.”

BOBBY FISCHER in 1971

Although Craig and I agreed to disagree on that one, a a new case has come along where I can easily agree with Craig and side with the plaintiff.  KCH Services, Inc. v. Vanaire, Inc. 2009 WL 2216601 (W.D.Ky. July 22, 2009). Here the plaintiff was correct to move for sanctions against the defendant for pre-suit spoliation. KCH Services shows that the imposition a pre-suit duty to preserve is good law in the right circumstances. I just wish the application of the rule was restricted to the kind of factual scenario you see in KCH Services and not applied to every case in town by a trigger happy plaintiffs Bar.

KCH Services, Inc. v. Vanaire, Inc.

This is a case by one air scrubber company against another suing for unfair competition. The primary complaint appears to be an allegation that the defendant misappropriated and illegally used the plaintiff’s custom software.  The dispute started when the president of the plaintiff corporation called the president of the defendant corporation in October 2005. The plaintiff alleges that he told defendant that he knew he had taken his software and he was going to sue him, or words to that effect. No doubt the defendant had a different recollection of the phone call, but everyone seems to agree about what happened next. The president of the defendant company ordered his employees to delete all copies of plaintiff’s software from his computer systems and any other software on his company’s computers “that he did not purchase or did not own.” Id. at * 1. The defendant’s employees apparently admitted as much, and even admitted they received the instructions right after he got off the phone with the plaintiff. It is hard to imagine a more obvious case of intentional destruction of evidence.

This plaintiff did not then wait eight years to sue, he filed suit the next month, November 2005. The next month he followed up with a preservation demand letter. Of course, the software at issue in the case had already been deleted, but the defendant had not yet deleted all of his responsive email and other ESI. The court found that he went ahead and continued to delete relevant ESI even after the complaint and  preservation demand letter had been served. According to the findings made in this opinion, the defendant was obviously a hard core spoliator. The motion for sanctions was based on deletion of ESI both before and after the suit was filed.

Based on these circumstances, District Court Judge Jennifer B. Coffman granted plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and imposed an adverse-inference instruction to the jury at trial. Judge Coffman made the following rulings to explain her application of the law in this case:

The federal law of spoliation governs in this case. See Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir.2009). “As a general matter, it is beyond question that a party to civil litigation has a duty to preserve relevant information, including ESI, when that party ‘has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or … should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation. ’ ” John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir.2001)). FN1. The Sixth Circuit also cites Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216-18 (S.D.N.Y.2003), an employment discrimination case, in which the duty to preserve arose as soon as the plaintiff’s superiors became reasonably aware of the of the possibility of litigation, rather than when an EEOC complaint was filed months later. See Goetz, 531 F.3d at 459 (6th Cir.2008). See generally The Sedona Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, Second Edition 11, 28 (The Sedona Conference Working Group Series, 2007), available at http://www.thes edonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_ PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf.

Hankinson’s telephone call to Vanegas, Sr. in October 2005 should have put the defendants on notice that issues of software may be relevant to future litigation. For the duty to preserve to have attached, it is not required that Vanegas, Sr. actually knew that litigation was on the horizon, or that the software would be relevant, but only that he “should have known” the software “may be” relevant to future litigation. Id. In October 2005, the defendants were familiar with their competitor’s willingness and ability to file suit; Vanegas, Sr. had been personally involved with Vanaire during the 1995 litigation with KCH. See KCH Services, Inc. v. Brooks, et. al., No. 3:95-cv-672-S, Dep. (R. 19), Dec 4., 1995. Even with such experience, Vanegas, Sr. ordered the software deleted immediately after the telephone call, before KCH had an opportunity to inspect. FN2. Vanegas Sr.’s conversations with Vanaire employees and other correspondence among Vanaire employees immediately after Hankinson’s telephone call show clearly that the defendants were, in fact, alerted to the problem and saw it as such. FN3.

FN2. Cf. Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 435-36 (2d Cir.2001) (Trial court denied sanctions where the defendant destroyed evidence but not before the plaintiff had an opportunity to inspect.).

FN3. See, e.g., e-mail from Scott Freeman to Guillermo Vanegas, Ray Steele, Gary Vanegas, and Michael Vanegas (Oct. 17, 2005, 11:45 a.m.) (“I am currently working with Keith to insure [sic] there is nothing left on the computers….”).

After the plaintiff filed the complaint on November 23, 2005, the defendants not only “should have known” that e-mail and other electronic evidence concerning the plaintiff’s claims “may be” relevant to litigation, but had notice that they were relevant to litigation. See Goetz, 531 F.3d at 459. However, the defendant Vanaire, Inc. failed to preserve them by continuing to delete and overwrite, even after receipt of a preservation letter. See Vanegas, Jr. 30(b)(6) Dep. 211:10-18. The defendants’ conduct in regard to electronically stored evidence falls beyond the scope of “routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(e). Vanegas Sr.’s order to delete the software and the defendants’ continued unwillingness to place a meaningful litigation hold on relevant electronic information after being placed on notice resulted in a loss of evidence relevant to the plaintiff’s case. Whether the evidence was lost in good faith or was “an intentional attempt to destroy evidence,” Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 436, the plaintiff is bereft of the very subject of the litigation as well as any e-mail correspondence contemporaneous to the software’s installation and use. FN4.

FN4. For example, the evidence of software on Vanaire’s computers may have been important for the plaintiff to show that it is the same software that originated at KCH and that it was used by Vanaire in “layout,” resulting in enhanced profits vis-à-vis KCH, Vanaire’s competitor in the industry. The deleted e-mails may have been relevant to the plaintiff’s other claims, such as unfair competition.

Id.

Conclusion

It makes sense to impose a duty not to destroy ESI after you “become reasonably aware of the of the possibility of litigation,” but this trigger date should be strictly construed in favor of the allegedly burdened party. This rule is designed to protect our system of justice from the intentional spoliator, not to serve as a gotcha ploy for win-at-all-costs chess playing lawyers. As Bobby Fischer said: “Chess is war over the board. The object is to crush the opponents mind.” But litigation is not a game; it is not chess; it is not war like some mistakenly believe. It is far more than that. As George Bernard Shaw said: “Chess is a foolish expedient for making idle people believe they are doing something very clever when they are only wasting their time.” Litigation is no place for games. The pursuit of justice is more important than that. As Justice Felix Frankfurter said: “Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess.”

felix frankfurter

The courts should only impose sanctions for pre-litigation spoliation in cases like KCH Services where there is strong evidence of intentional destruction of evidence. They should otherwise exercise great restraint and caution in deciding that a defendant “should have known” that certain ESI “may be” relevant to future litigation. The present always seems obvious and inevitable, yet few are able to predict the future. We must look carefully at yesterday to seek how murky today then looked. As Justice Frankfurter said: “Judicial judgment must take deep account of the day before yesterday in order that yesterday may not paralyze today.”