Reasonability is a core concept of the law and foundation of our system of justice. Reason, according to accepted legal doctrine, is how we judge the actions of others and determine right from wrong. We do not look to Truth and Love for Justice, we look to Truth and Reason. If a person’s actions are reasonable, then, as a general matter, they are good and should not be punished, no matter what the emotional motives behind the actions. It is an objective standard. Actions judged as unreasonable are not good, no matter the emotional motive (think mercy killing).
Irrational actions are discouraged by law, and, if they cause damages, they are punished. The degree of punishment slides according to how unreasonable the behavior was and the extent of damages caused. Bad behavior ranges from the barely negligent – a close question – to intentionally bad, scienter. Analysis of reasonability in turn always depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the actions being judged.
Reasonability Depends on the Circumstances
Whenever a lawyer is asked a legal question they love to start the answer by pointing that it all depends. We are trained to see both sides, to weigh the evidence. We dissect, access and evaluate degrees of reasonability according to the surrounding circumstances. We deal with reason, logic and cold hard facts. Our recipe for justice is simple: add reason to facts and stir well.
The core concept of reasonability not only permeates negligence and criminal law, it underlies discovery law as well. We are constantly called upon the evaluate the reasonability of efforts to save, find and produce electronically stored information. This evaluation of reasonability always depends on the facts. It requires more than information. It requires knowledge of what the information means.
Perfect efforts are not required in the law, but reasonable efforts are. Failure to make such efforts can be punished by the court, with the severity of the punishment contingent on the degree of unreasonability and extent of damages. Again, this requires knowledge of the true facts of the efforts, the circumstances.
In discovery litigants and their lawyers are not permitted to make anything less than reasonable efforts to find the information requested. They are not permitted to make sub-standard, negligent efforts, and certainly not grossly negligence efforts. Let us not even talk about intentionally obstructive or defiant efforts. The difference between good enough practice – meaning reasonable efforts – and malpractice is where the red line of negligence is drawn.
Bagely v. Yale
One of my favorite district court judges – 86-year old Charles S. Haight – pointed out the need to evaluate reasonability of e-discovery efforts in a well-known, at this time still ongoing employment discrimination case. Bagely v. Yale, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-1890 (CSH). See eg. Bagley v. Yale University, 42 F. Supp. 3d 332 (DC, Conn. 2014). On April 27, 2015, Judge Haight considered Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order.
The plaintiff, Constance Bagley, wanted her former employer, Yale University, to look through the emails of more witness to respond to her request for production. The defendant, Yale University, said it had already done enough, that it had reviewed the emails of several custodians, and should not be required to do more. Judge Haight correctly analyzed this dispute as requiring his judgment on the reasonability of Yale’s efforts. He focused on Rule 26(b)(2)(B) involving the “reasonable accessibility” of certain ESI and the reasonable efforts requirements under then Rule 26(b)(2)(C) (now 26(b)(1) – proportionality factors under the 2015 Rules Amendments). In the judge’s words:
Yale can — indeed, it has — shown that the custodians’ responsive ESI is not readily accessible. That is not the test. The question is whether this information is not reasonably accessible: a condition that necessarily implies some degree of effort in accessing the information. So long as that creature of the common law, the reasonable man, paces the corridors of our jurisprudence, surrounding circumstances matter.
 The phrase is not gender neutral because that is not the way Lord Coke spoke.
Bagley v. Yale, Ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 108) (April 27, 2015) (emphasis added).
The Pertinent e-Discovery Facts of Bagley v. Yale
Judge Haight went on to deny the motion for protective order by defendant Yale University, his alma mater, by evaluation of the facts and circumstances. Here the plaintiff originally wanted defendant to review for relevant documents the ESI that contained certain search terms of 24 custodians. The parties later narrowed the list of terms and reduced the custodian count from 24 to 10. The defendant began a linear review of each and every document. (Yes, their plan was to have a paralegal or attorney look at each any every document with a hit, instead of more sophisticated approaches, i.e. – concept search or predictive coding.) Here is Judge Haight’s description:
Defendants’ responsive process began when University staff or attorneys commandeered — a more appropriate word than seized — the computer of each of the named custodians. The process of ESI identification and production then “required the application of keyword searches to the computers of these custodians, extracting the documents containing any of those keywords, and then reading every single document extracted to determine whether it is responsive to any of the plaintiff’s production requests and further to determine whether the document is privileged.” Defendants’ Reply Brief [Doc. 124], at 2-3. This labor was performed by Yale in-house paralegals and lawyers, and a third-party vendor the University retained for the project.
It appears from the opinion that Yale was a victim of a poorly played game of Go Fish where each side tries to find relevant documents by guessing keywords without study of the data, much less other search methods. Losey, R., Adventures in Electronic Discovery (West 2011); Child’s Game of ‘Go Fish’ is a Poor Model for e-Discovery Search. This is a very poor practice, as I have often argued, and frequently results in surprise burdens on the producing party.
This is what happened here. As Judge Haight explained, Yale did not complain of these keywords and custodian count (ten instead of five), until months later when the review was well underway:
[I]t was not until the parties had some experience with the designated custodians and search terms that the futility of the exercise and the burdens of compliance became sufficiently apparent to Defendants to complain of them.
Too bad. If they had tested the keywords first before agreeing to review all hits, instead of following the Go Fish approach, none of this would have happened. National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, 877 F.Supp.2d 87 (SDNY, 2012) (J. Scheindlin) (“As Judge Andrew Peck — one of this Court’s experts in e-discovery — recently put it: “In too many cases, however, the way lawyers choose keywords is the equivalent of the child’s game of `Go Fish’ … keyword searches usually are not very effective.” FN 113“); Losey, R., Poor Plaintiff’s Counsel, Can’t Even Find a CAR, Much Less Drive One (9/1/13).
After reviewing the documents of only three custodians, following the old-fashioned, buggy-whip method of looking at one document after another (linear review), the defendant complained as to the futility of their effort to the judge. They alleged that the effort:
… required paralegals and lawyers to review approximately 13,393 files, totaling 4.5 gigabytes, or the equivalent of about 450,000 pages of emails. Only 6% of this data was responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery request: about 300 megabytes, or about 29,300 pages of emails. In excess of 95% of this information, while responsive to the ESI request, has absolutely nothing to do with any of the issues in this case. Thus, defendants’ lawyers and paralegals reviewed approximately 450,000 pages of material in order to produce less than 1,500 pages of information which have any relationship whatsoever to this dispute; and the majority of the 1,500 pages are only marginally relevant.
I do not doubt that at all. It is typical in cases like this. What do you expect from blind negotiated keyword search and linear review? For less effort try driving a CAR instead of walking. As Judge Scheindlin said in National Day Laborer back in 2012:
There are emerging best practices for dealing with these shortcomings and they are explained in detail elsewhere. There is a “need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and cooperation with opposing counsel in designing search terms or `keywords’ to be used to produce emails or other electronically stored information.” And beyond the use of keyword search, parties can (and frequently should) rely on latent semantic indexing, statistical probability models, and machine learning tools to find responsive documents. Through iterative learning, these methods (known as “computer-assisted” or “predictive” coding) allow humans to teach computers what documents are and are not responsive to a particular FOIA or discovery request and they can significantly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of searches. In short, a review of the literature makes it abundantly clear that a court cannot simply trust the defendant agencies’ unsupported assertions that their lay custodians have designed and conducted a reasonable search.
National Day Laborer Organizing Network, supra 877 F.Supp.2d at pgs. 109-110.
Putting aside the reasonability of search and review methods selected, an issue never raised by the parties and not before the court, Judge Haight addressed whether the defendant should be required to review all ten custodians in these circumstances. Here is Judge Haight’s analysis:
Prior to making this motion, Yale had reviewed the ESI of a number of custodians and produced the fruits of those labors to counsel for Bagley. Now, seeking protection from — which in practical terms means cessation of — any further ESI discovery, the University describes in vivid, near-accusatory prose the considerable amount of time and treasure it has already expended responding to Bagley’s ESI discovery requests: an exercise which, in Yale’s non-objective and non-binding evaluation, has unearthed no or very little information relevant to the lawsuit. Yale’s position is that given those circumstances, it should not be required to review any additional ESI with a view toward producing any additional information in discovery. The contention is reminiscent of a beleaguered prizefighter’s memorable utterance some years ago: “No mas!” Is the University entitled to that relief? Whether the cost of additional ESI discovery warrants condemnation of the total as undue, thereby rendering the requested information not reasonably accessible to Yale, presents a legitimate issue and, in my view, a close question.
Judge Charles Haight (“Terry” to his friends) analyzed the facts and circumstances to decide whether Yale should continue its search and review of four more custodians. (It was five more, but Yale reviewed one while the motion was pending.) Here is his summary:
Defendants sum up the result of the ESI discovery they have produced to Plaintiff to date in these terms: “In other words, of the 11.88 gigabytes of information(which is the equivalent of more than 1 million pages of email files) that has so far been reviewed by the defendant, only about 8% of that information has been responsive and non-privileged. Furthermore, only a small percentage of those documents that are responsive and non-privileged actually have any relevance to the issues in this lawsuit.” Id., at 4-5. . . .
 11.88 gigabytes is the total of 4.5 gigabytes (produced by review of the computers of Defendant custodians Snyder, Metrick and Rae) and 7.38 gigabytes (produced by review of the computers of the additional five custodians named in text).
Defendants assert on this motion that on the basis of the present record, “the review of these remaining documents will amount to nothing more than a waste of time and money. This Court should therefore enter a protective order relieving the defendant[s] from performing the requested ESI review.” Id. . . .
Ruling in Bagley v. Yale
Judge Haight, a wise senior judge who has seen and heard it all before, found that under these facts Yale had not yet made a reasonable effort to satisfy their discovery obligations in this case. He ordered Yale to review the email of four more custodians. That, he decided, would be a reasonable effort. Here is Judge Haight’s explanation of his analysis of reasonability, which, in my view, is unaffected by the 2015 Rule Amendments, specifically the change to Rule 26(b)(1).
In the case at bar, the custodians’ electronically stored information in its raw form was immediately accessible to Yale: all the University had to do was tell a professor or a dean to hand over his or her computer. But Bagley’s objective is to discover, and Defendants’ obligation is to produce, non-privileged information relevant to the issues: Yale must review the custodians’ ESI and winnow it down. That process takes time and effort; time and effort can be expensive; and the Rule measures the phrase “not reasonably accessible” by whether it exposes the responding party to “undue cost.” Not some cost: undue cost, an adjective Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014 at 1759) defines as “excessive or unwarranted.” . . .
In the totality of circumstances displayed by the case at bar, I think it would be an abuse of discretion to cut off Plaintiff’s discovery of Defendants’ electronically stored information at this stage of the litigation. Plaintiff’s reduction of custodians, from the original 24 targeted by Defendants’ furiously worded Main Brief to the present ten, can be interpreted as a good-faith effort by Plaintiff to keep the ESI discovery within permissible bounds. Plaintiff’s counsel say in their Opposing Brief [Doc. 113] at 2: “Ironically, this last production includes some of the most relevant documents produced to date.” While relevance, like beauty, often lies in the eyes of the beholder, and Defendants’ counsel may not share the impressions of their adversaries, I take the quoted remark to be a representation by an officer of the Court with respect to the value and timing of certain evidence which has come to light during this discovery process. The sense of irritated resignation conveyed by the familiar aphorism — “it’s like looking for a needle in a haystack” — does not exclude the possibility that there may actually be a needle (or two or three) somewhere in the haystack, and sharp needles at that. Plaintiff is presumptively entitled to search for them.
As Judge Haight understood when he said that the “Plaintiff is presumptively entitled to search for them,” the search effort is actually upon the defendant, not the plaintiff. The law requires the defendant to expend reasonable efforts to search for the needles in the haystack that the plaintiff would like to be found. Of course, if those needles are not there, no amount of effort can find them. Still, no one knows that in advance (although probabilities can be calculated), whether there are hot documents left to be found, so reasonable efforts are often required to show they are not there. This can be difficult as any e-discovery lawyer well knows.
Faced with this situation most e-discovery specialists will tell you the best solution is to cooperate, or at least try. If your cooperative efforts fail and you seek relief from the court, it needs to be clear to the judge that you did try. If the judge thinks you are just another unreasonable, over-assertive lawyer, your efforts are doomed. This is apparently part of what was driving Judge Haight’s analysis of “reasonable” as the following colorful, one might say “tasty,” quote from the opinion shows:
A recipe for a massive and contentious adventure in ESI discovery would read: “Select a large and complex institution which generates vast quantities of documents; blend as many custodians as come to mind with a full page of search terms; flavor with animosity, resentment, suspicion and ill will; add a sauce of skillful advocacy; stir, cover, set over high heat, and bring to boil. Serves a district court 2-6 motions to compel discovery or for protection from it.”
You have got to love a judge with wit and wisdom like that. My only comment is that truly skillful advocacy here would include cooperation, and lots of it. The sauce added in that case would be sweet and sour, not just hot and spicy. It should not give a judge any indigestion at all, much less six motions. That is one reason why Electronic Discovery Best Practices (EDBP.com) puts such an emphasis on skillful cooperation.
What is Reasonable?
Bagley shows that the dividing line between what is reasonable and thus acceptable efforts, and what is not, can often be difficult to determine. It depends on a careful evaluation of the facts, to be sure, but this evaluation in turn depends on many subjective factors, including whether one side or another was trying to cooperate. These factors include all kinds of prevailing social norms, not just cooperativeness. It also includes personal values, prejudices, education, intelligence, and even how the mind itself works, the hidden psychological influences. They all influence a judge’s evaluation in any particular case as to which side of the acceptable behavior line a particular course of conduct falls.
In close questions the subjectivity inherent in determinations of reasonability is obvious. This is especially true for the attorneys involved, the ones paid to be independent analysts and objective advisors. People can, and often do, disagree on what is reasonable and what is not. They disagree on what is negligent and what is not. On what is acceptable and what is not.
All trial lawyers know that certain tricks of argument and appeals to emotion can have a profound effect on a judge’s resolution of these supposedly reason-based disagreements. They can have an even more profound affect on a jury’s decision. (That is the primary reason that there are so many rules on what can and cannot be said to a jury.)
Study of Legal Psychology
Every good student of the law knows this, but how many attempt to study the psychological dynamics of persuasion? How many attempt to study perceptions of reasonability? Of cognitive bias? Not many, and there are good reasons for this.
First and foremost, few law professors exist that have this kind of knowledge. The only attorneys that I know of with this knowledge are experienced trial lawyers and experienced judges. They know quite a lot about this, but not from any formal or systematic study. They pick up information, and eventually knowledge on the psychological underpinnings of justice by many long years of practice. They learn about the psychology of reasonability through thousands of test cases. They learn what is reasonable by involvement in thousands of disputes. Whatever I know of the subject was learned that way, although I have also read numerous books and articles on the psychology of legal persuasion written by still more senior trial lawyers.
That is not to say that experience, trial and error, is the quickest or best way to learn these insights. Perhaps there is an even quicker and more effective way? Perhaps we could turn to psychologists and see what they have to say about the psychological foundations of perception of reasonability. After all, this is, or should be, a part of their field.
Up until now, not very much has been said from psychologists on law and reasonability, at least not to my knowledge. There are a few books on the psychology of persuasion. I made a point in my early years as a litigator to study them to try to become a better trial lawyer. But in fact, the field is surprisingly thin. There is not much there. It turns out that the fields of Law and Psychology have not overlapped much, at least not in that way.
Perhaps this is because so few psychologists have been involved with legal arguments on reasonability. When psychologists are in the legal system, they are usually focused on legal issues of sanity, not negligence, or in cases involving issues of medial diagnoses.
The blame for the wide gulf between the two fields falls on both sides. Most psychologists, especially research psychologists, have not been interested in the law and legal process. Or when they have, it has involved criminal law, not civil. See eg: Tunnel Vision in the Criminal Justice System (May 2010, Psychology Today). This disinterest has been reciprocal. Most lawyers and judges are not really interested in hearing what psychologists have to say about reasonability. They consider their work to be above such subjective vagaries.
Myth of Objectivity
Lawyers and judges consider reasonability of conduct to be an exclusively legal issue. Most lawyers and judges like to pretend that reasonability exists in some sort of objective, platonic plane of ideas, above all subjective influences. The just decision can be reached by deep, impartial reasoning. This is the myth of objectivity. It is an article of faith in the legal profession.
The myth continues to this day in legal culture, even though all experienced trial lawyers and judges know it is total nonsense, or nearly so. They know full well the importance of psychology and social norms. They know the impact of cognitive biases of all kinds, even transitory ones. As trial lawyers like to quip – What did the judge have for breakfast?
Experienced lawyers take advantage of these biases to win cases for their clients. They know how to push the buttons of judge and jury. See Cory S. Clements, Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation: Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 319 (2013). Justice is sometimes denied as a result. But this does not mean judges should be replaced by robots. No indeed. There is far more to justice than reason. Still a little help from robots is surely part of the future we are making together.
More often than not the operation of cognitive biases happen unconsciously without any puppet masters intentionally pulling the strings. There is more to this than just rhetoric and sophistry. Justice is hard. So is objective ratiocination.
Even assuming that the lawyers and judges in the know could articulate their knowledge of decisional bias, they have little incentive to do so. (The very few law professors with such knowledge do have an incentive, as we see in Professor Clements’ article cited above, but these articles are rare and too academic.) Moreover, most judges and lawyers are incapable of explaining these insights in a systematic manner. They lack the vocabulary of psychology to do so, and, since they learned by long, haphazard experience, that is their style of teaching as well.
Shattering the Myth
One psychologist I know has studies these issues and share his insights. They are myth shattering to be sure, and thus will be unwelcome to some idealists. But for me this is a much-needed analysis. The psychologist who has dared to expose the myth, to lift the curtain, has worked with lawyers for over a decade on discovery issues. He has even co-authored a law review article on reasonability with two distinguished lawyers. Oot, Kershaw, Roitblat, Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry, Denver University Law Review, 87:2, 522-559 (2010).
I am talking about Herbert L. Roitbalt, who has a PhD in psychology. Herb did research and taught psychology for many years at the University of Hawaii. Only after a distinguished career as a research psychologist and professor did Herb turn his attention to computer search in general and then ultimately to law and legal search. He is also a great admirer of dolphins.
Schlemiel and Schlimazel
Herb has written a small gem of a paper on law and reasonability that is a must read for everyone, especially those who do discovery. The Schlemiel and the Schlimazel and the Psychology of Reasonableness (Jan. 10, 2014, LTN) (link is to republication by a vendor without attribution). I will not spoil the article by telling you Herb’s explanation of the Yiddish terms, Schlemiel and Schlimazel, nor what they have to do with reasonability and the law, especially the law of spoliation and sanctions. Only a schmuck would do that. It is a short article; be a mensch and go read it yourself. I will, however, tell you the Huffington Post definition:
A Schlemiel is an inept clumsy person and a Schlimazel is a very unlucky person. There’s a Yiddish saying that translates to a funny way of explaining them both. A schlemiel is somebody who often spills his soup and a schlimazel is the person it lands on.
This is folk wisdom for what social psychologists today call attribution error. It is the tendency to blame your own misfortune on outside circumstances beyond your control (the schlimazel) and blame the misfortune of others on their own negligence (the schlemiel). Thus, for example, when I make a mistake, it is in spite of my reasonable efforts, but when you make a mistake it is because of your unreasonably lame efforts. It is a common bias that we all have. The other guy is often unreasonable, whereas you are not.
Herb Roitblat’s article should be required reading for all judges and lawyers, especially new ones. Understanding the many inherent vagaries of reasonability could, for instance, lead to a much more civil discourse on the subject of sanctions. Who knows, it could even lead to cooperation, instead of the theatre and politics we now see everywhere instead.
Roitblat’s article contains a two paragraph introduction to another important psychological factor at work in many evaluations of reasonability: Hindsight Bias. This has to do with the fact that most legal issues consider past decisions and actions that have gone bad. The law almost never considers good decisions, much less great decisions with terrific outcomes. Instead it focuses on situations gone bad, where it turns out that wrong decisions were made. But were they necessarily negligent decisions?
The mere fact that a decision led to an unexpected, poor outcome does not mean that the decision was negligent. But when we examine the decision with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we are naturally inclined towards a finding of negligence. In the same way, if the results prove to be terrific, the hindsight bias is inclined to perceive most any crazy decision as reasonable.
Due to hindsight bias, we all have, in Rotiblat’s words:
[A] tendency to see events that have already occurred as being more predictable than they were before they actually took place. We over-estimate the predictability of the events that actually happened and under-estimate the predictability of events that did not happen. A related phenomenon is “blame the victim,” where we often argue that the events that occurred should have been predicted, and therefore, reasonably avoided.
Hindsight bias is well known among experienced lawyers and you will often see it argued, especially in negligence and sanctions cases. Every good lawyer defending such a charge will try to cloak all of the mistakes as seemingly reasonable at the time, and any counter-evaluation as merely the result of hindsight bias. They will argue, for instance, that while it may now seem obvious that wiping the hard drives would delete relevant evidence, that is only because of the benefit of hindsight, and that it was not at all obvious at the time.
Good judges will also sometimes mention the impact of 20/20 hindsight, either on their own initiative, or in response to defense argument. See for instance the following analysis by Judge Lee H. Rosenthal in Rimkus v Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010):
These general rules [of spoliation] are not controversial. But applying them to determine when a duty to preserve arises in a particular case and the extent of that duty requires careful analysis of the specific facts and circumstances. It can be difficult to draw bright-line distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable conduct in preserving information and in conducting discovery, either prospectively or with the benefit (and distortion) of hindsight. Whether preservation or discovery conduct is acceptable in a case depends on what is reasonable ,and that in turn depends on whether what was done–or not done–was proportional to that case and consistent with clearly established applicable standards. [FN8] (emphasis added)
Judge Shira A. Scheindlin also recognized the impact hindsight in Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan, et al. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010 as amended May 28, 2010) at pgs. 463-464:
While many treatises and cases routinely define negligence, gross negligence, and willfulness in the context of tortious conduct, I have found no clear definition of these terms in the context of discovery misconduct. It is apparent to me that these terms simply describe a continuum. FN9 Conduct is either acceptable or unacceptable. Once it is unacceptable the only question is how bad is the conduct. That is a judgment call that must be made by a court reviewing the conduct through the backward lens known as hindsight. It is also a call that cannot be measured with exactitude and might be called differently by a different judge. That said, it is well established that negligence involves unreasonable conduct in that it creates a risk of harm to others, but willfulness involves intentional or reckless conduct that is so unreasonable that harm is highly likely to occur. (emphasis added)
The relatively well-known backward lens known as hindsight can impact anyone’s evaluation of reasonability. But there are many other less obvious psychological factors that can alter a judge or jury’s perception. Herb Roitblat mentions a few more such as the overconfidence effect, where people tend to inflate their own knowledge and abilities, and framing, an example of cognitive bias where the outcome of questions is impacted by the way they are asked. The later is one reason that trial lawyers fight so hard on jury instructions and jury interrogatories.
Many lawyers are interested in this law-psych intersection and the benefits that might be gained by cross-pollination of knowledge. I have a life-long interest in psychology, and so do many others, some with advanced degrees. That includes my fellow predictive coding expert, Maura R. Grossman, an attorney who also has a Ph.D. in Clinical/School Psychology. A good discovery team can use all of the psychological insights it can get.
The myth of objectivity and the “Reasonable Man” in the law should be exposed. Many naive people still put all of their faith in legal rules and the operation of objective, unemotional logic. The system does not really work that way. Outsiders trying to automate the law are misguided. The Law is far more than logic and reason. It is more than the facts, the surrounding circumstances. It is more than evidence. It is about people and by people. It is about emotion and empathy too. It is about fairness and equity. It’s prime directive is justice, not reason.
That is the key reason why AI cannot automate law, nor legal decision making. Judge Charles (“Terry”) Haight could be augmented and enhanced by smart machines, by AI, but never replaced. The role of AI in the Law is to improve our reasoning, minimize our schlemiel biases. But the robots will never replace lawyers and judges. In spite of the myth of the Reasonable Man, there is far more to law then reason and facts. I for one am glad about that. If it were otherwise the legal profession would be doomed to be replaced by robots.