Good, Better, Best: a Tale of Three Proportionality Cases – Part One

April 8, 2012

Three cases came out recently on proportionality, the key legal doctrine to discovery based on Federal Rules 26(b)(2)(C), 26(b)(2)(B)(iii), and 26(g)(1)(B). I-Med Pharma Inc. v. Biomatrix, 2011 WL 6140658 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011) (GOOD); U.S. ex rel McBride v. Halliburton Co.,, 272 F.R.D. 235 (D.D.C. 2011) (BETTER); DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Techs, LLC, 2011 WL 5244356 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (BEST).  Since all three cases embody proportionality, they are all good. But some are better looking than others.

The quality of the application of the doctrine in these cases is directly tied to the parties timing. In the best case the issue was raised fast, even before discovery. It was raised in the 26(f) conference and 16(b) hearing. DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Techs, LLC, 2011 WL 5244356 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011). Counsel followed the Facebook good-hacker credo, as I explained in Impactful, Fast, Bold, Open, Values: Guidance of the “Hacker Way.”  They were fast, and their bold use of proportionality will likely have a big impact on the case. With the guidance of the wise judge supervising the parties’ discovery, U.S. Magistrate Judge Paule S. Grewal, the application of the proportionality doctrine should lead to open, yet cost-controlled discovery. This should allow both parties in the patent case to focus on  the merits. It should help avoid wasteful email reading endurance contests. Is that not a positive value we should all endorse? Answer: Yes! See Rule 1 and Judge Waxse’s article, Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, as discussed in last week’s blog, Judge David Waxse on Cooperation and Lawyers Who Act Like Spoiled Children.

The Good Case: I-Med Pharma

Before I get into the California case that shows the right way to raise proportionality – at the beginning of the case – let’s look at the other two cases. The responding parties in both cases raised proportionality, but they came to the party a tad late. The worst of these good cases illustrates the saying better late than never. I-Med Pharma Inc. v. Biomatrix, 2011 WL 6140658 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011). The party responding to discovery, the plaintiffs, finally raised the doctrine when their backs were against the wall fighting sanctions for failing to comply with a discovery order they had stipulated to.

Yup. You read that right. The plaintiff, I-Med Pharma Inc., was seeking relief on the basis of disproportionate burden from a discovery order they had agreed to. Kind of makes you wonder. But no explanation is provided in this opinion as to why plaintiff’s counsel in this case agreed to review and produce all non-privileged files that matched a ridiculously long list of keywords from opposing counsel. This was a contract dispute and the keyword list dreamed up by defense counsel, who apparently engaged in a rousing game of “Go Fish,” included such zingers as: contract*, loss, profit*, credit, refund, revenue, CL, HS*, return, claim, FDA, HA. I could go on, but you get the picture. (Side note: when I say keyword search sucks, as I did in Secrets of Search: Part One, this is the kind of search I am referring to: the blind guessing, Go Fish, linear kind with no quality controls. I am certainly not referring to the kind of iterative keyword search on steroids that we see in Kleen Products, which appears to be almost as good as predictive coding based hybrid multimodal methods. But I digress.)

In I-Med Pharma the attorneys not only used Go Fish keyword search, the kind that sucks, they agreed to have the search run by an outside forensic expert with no limits placed on target custodians. It was a search of the plaintiff’s entire corporate computer system. Not only that, there were no time limits placed on the search. To make matters worse, they not only agreed to search the active files with word matches, they agreed to search the slack space too. That is the so-called “unallocated space files” recovered by a  forensic exam of plaintiff’s computer system.

Yup. You read all that right again. No wonder the wise judge presented with this conundrum, Senior U.S. District Court Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise, began his opinion with these words:

This case highlights the dangers of carelessness and inattention in e-discovery.

Boy did Judge Debevoise get that right!

Plaintiff’s counsel finally woke up and discovered proportionality (here is where we get to the better late than never part), when the forensic expert searched the unallocated space of their client’s computer system and found 64,382,929 hits covering the equivalent of 95 Million pages of documents! Based on the complete failure to limit the search to custodians, or date, and the Go Fish type list of keywords, this result, in Judge Debevoise’s own words, should come as no surprise. Id. at pg. 5.

The opinion does not say how many pages of documents with hits were found in the allocated spaces of the system, the active files, but it was probably millions more. I-Med Pharma, Inc., apparently did not oppose the privilege review and production of these documents. No doubt they paid millions in vendor costs and attorney fees to comply with this portion of the stipulation.

Since plaintiff’s counsel by now probably had a pretty good idea of what a privilege review of another 95 Million pages of mostly gibberish from slack space might cost, and since at this point the client probably did not want to pay for more, plaintiff’s counsel said no. They asked defense counsel to give them a break on their prior agreement. Defense counsel said no to that, a deals a deal, and  perhaps sensing victory, refused to modify the prior stipulation. Then plaintiff moved for a protective order asking relief from the prior stipulation on discovery that had, as a matter of course, been converted to an order.

Here is where plaintiff raised the doctrine of proportionality and suggested that the costs and burdens to review 64,382,929 hits covering the equivalent of 95 Million pages of documents from slack space would exceed any possible benefit from that exercise. The Magistrate assigned to hear the dispute, Judge Shipp, quickly agreed, and the defendant, having little to lose (except perhaps credibility), appealed the decision to Judge Debevoise.

Judge Debevoise, of course, affirms his magistrate, which is why, after all, I call this comedy of errors a good decision. Judge Debevoise is a master of understatement and notes that:

A privilege review of 65 million documents is no small undertaking. Even if junior attorneys are engaged, heavily discounted rates are negotiated, and all parties work diligently and efficiently, even a cursory review of that many documents will consume large amounts of attorney time and cost millions of dollars.

Id. at pg. 10.

Judge Debevoise granted a hearing on plaintiff’s appeal, which I imagine would have been interesting to observe, since this judge really seems to have a good understanding of e-discovery. At the hearing defense counsel argued that plaintiff’s obligation to review 95 Million pages was not really that burdensome. As footnote six of the opinion explains, Judge Debevoise responded by asking defense counsel how they would do a privilege review of that many documents. That’s where it gets fun, as defendants’ counsel said they would simply run a search for the word privilege and only review the documents with that word. Uh, huh. Sure. Judge Debevoise observed in footnote six:

In spite of the answer given, it is difficult to believe that lawyers from xxxxxxx and xxxxxxxx regularly disclose large quantities of information from their client’s files without examining it.

Id. at pg. 10-11, FN 6. (self censored, hey it could happen to any otherwise good firm.)

So, Judge Debevoise let’s plaintiff’s counsel off the hook and relieves them of their prior e-discovery agreement. But he has some choice words for them too (and again I will not name plaintiff’s counsel), and provides good advice for all on a better way to do keyword search, a way that goes far beyond the simple guessing game the attorneys in this case had apparently been playing:

While the precise number of hits produced was not known in advance and Plaintiff argues that it could not have predicted the volume of material that the search would uncover, it should have exercised more diligence before stipulating to such broad search terms, particularly given the scope of the search. In evaluating whether a set of search terms are reasonable, a party should consider a variety of factors, including: (1) the scope of documents searched and whether the search is restricted to specific computers, file systems, or document custodians; (2) any date restrictions imposed on the search; (3) whether the search terms contain proper names, uncommon abbreviations, or other terms unlikely to occur in irrelevant documents; (4) whether operators such as “and”, “not”, or “near” are used to restrict the universe of possible results; (5) whether the number of results obtained could be practically reviewed given the economics of the case and the amount of money at issue.

While Plaintiff should have known better than to agree to the search terms used here, the interests of justice and basic fairness are little served by forcing Plaintiff to undertake an enormously expensive privilege review of material that is unlikely to contain non-duplicative evidence.

Id. at pgs. 11-12.

I-Med Pharma Inc. v. Biomatrix, is a good case, not only for proportionality, but also for search. It is very telling to note that even though the case embodies the doctrine of proportionality, the keyword itself is never used – even Rule 26(b)(2)(C) is never referred to. This once again demonstrates the limits of keyword search. I would not have found this case but for the genius of a non-linear, protodigital, artificial intelligence agent I know, a mobile Siri of e-discovery, Kenneth J. Withers. Thank you Ken. (Actually, truth be known, he found all three of these cases.)

The Better Case: U.S. ex rel McBride

The next case demonstrating proportionality is U.S. ex rel McBride v. Halliburton Co. , 272 F.R.D. 235 (D.D.C. 2011). It is a better case than I-Med-Pharma because proportionality was applied in a slightly more timely fashion. True, discovery had already closed, but at least protection was sought before stipulation to an order. It is also a good case because it was written by one of my favorite judges, a master wordsmith and  e-discovery guru, John M. Facciola. He’s got a proportional look too.

Judge Facciola is a strong advocate for proportionality. By the way, that does not mean the judge has prejudged anything, or favors responding parties over requesting parties, or anything like that. It is the same thing as saying a judge favors reasonability, or motherhood, or apple pie, or, dare I say it, modern efficient search and review methods.

Judge Facciola was one of my keynote speakers in a CLE event that I co-chaired in 2010 with Maura Grossman. The sole topic of that day-long event was proportionality. It was one of the best CLEs I have ever done for that reason. There was a thorough examination of one issue from some of the top minds in e-discovery, including especially the top judges who specialize in the subject. Judge Facciola started us off by speaking of proportionality in the law and art and music where the principle is called the golden mean or golden ratio. He even played a few lines of Bach that demonstrated the golden ratio in music. I followed his presentation with my own where I spoke and showed slides on proportionality in the law and art, paintings and design. I showed famous paintings, buildings (Parthenon) and other golden ratio based designs (iPods) and examined how this ratio would apply to e-discovery costs. It seemed like part two of what Judge Facciola had started.

Judge Facciola and I were both blown away by the eerie coincidence of our art based approaches to explaining proportionality in the law. I am sure everyone there thought this was a well orchestrated presentation. But the truth is, I had no idea he was going to use the same art based approach to proportionality. Neither of us had ever talked to the other about what we were going to say. (You don’t need to have prep talks with a pro like him.) The truth is, there was no need for us to talk and prepare in order to have harmonious presentations. There is a high degree of consensus and similar thinking among judges and lawyers who specialize in this area. We have all read each others writings and heard each other speak a number of times. We think about this stuff, a lot. We tend to reach the same conclusions. There is a general consensus on most issues. What’s wrong with that? But I digress.

Back to U.S. ex rel McBride v. Halliburton Co.. Although Judge Facciola is an expert and strong proponent of proportionality, my keyword search of the opinion shows that he never once uses the word in this opinion. He cites Rule 26(b)(2)(C) several times to be sure, but never says proportionality, proving once again the limits of that old keyword technology. For more on new search alternatives to 1940s era software methods, new technologies that favor the truth, not one side of the Bar or another, see (in reverse chronological order) my following recent articles (yes, I’m obsessed with this):

So Judge Facciola implements proportionality without ever saying the word, and grants the defendant’s motion for protective order. Here Halliburton in this qui tam action had already reviewed and produced relevant emails of 230 custodians. Yup, you read that right, 230! Discovery closed and what does the plaintiff want? They want Halliburton to search and produce still more email from an additional 35 custodians. These additional custodians were now targeted by the plaintiff, McBride, because they were shown as CCs on emails transmitting relevant documents that were already produced as part of the 230. No other reason provided. Let’s listen to how the Sage from D.C., who loves the mathematical proportionality of Johann Sebastian Bach (not to mention Bruce Springsteen), deals with such a dissonant request:

In excruciating, but highly educational and useful, detail, she (one of Halliburton’s e-discovery compliance managers) explains how the process and collection of data from a current or former employee takes place, from what may be many different sources … Once the data is found, it must be copied in a forensically appropriate manner to preserve its metadata and prevent its alteration. … The data must then be processed to be rendered searchable by the review tool being used, a process that can overwhelm the computer’s capacity and require that the data be processed by batch, as opposed to all at once. …

All discovery, even if otherwise permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it is likely to yield relevant evidence, is subject to the court’s obligation to balance its utility against its cost. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C). More specifically, the court is obliged to consider whether (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or obtainable from a cheaper and more convenient source; (2) the party seeking the discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the sought information by earlier discovery; or (3) the burden of the discovery *241 outweighs its utility. Id. The latter requires the court to consider (1) the needs of the case; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ resources; (4) the importance of the issues at stake in the action; and (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

While the present record does not permit a precise conclusion, I can presume, given the numbers of hours for which the defendants billed and the period of time at issue, that the amount in controversy is great and that the defendants’ resources are greater than the relator’s. Claims of fraud in providing services to military personnel raise important, vital issues of governmental supervision and public trust. Thus, these factors might weigh in favor of the discovery sought.

On the other hand, the defendants protest, and relator does not deny, that they have already spent a king’s ransom on discovery in this case–$650,000–without the addition of attorneys’ fees.  They have produced more than two million paper documents, thousands of spreadsheets, and over a half a million e-mails.

Id. at pgs. 240-241 (record citations omitted).

Judge Facciola goes on, and note once again that he never says proportion* or any variation thereof:

Given the discovery that relator has had, what defendants have already spent, and the detailed showing made of how much more time and money will likely have to spent to search an additional thirty-five custodians, surely relator has to make a showing that the e-mails not produced are crucial to her proof. She has not made such a showing, and they are not. First, she has the LOGREP reports, and no one is pretending that defendants are (or could) be asserting that, without the transmitting e-mails, she cannot establish the submission of a false claim. To the contrary, the defendants conceded that point. Thus, the transmitting e-mails seem to be hopelessly insignificant.

In this context, it is telling that relator does not show from the e-mails she has received that there is good reason to believe that the ones she claims are missing are highly probative of some fact. Indeed, there is no showing whatsoever from what has been produced that those e-mails not produced will make the existence of some crucial fact more likely than not. It is, after all, unlikely that a transmitting e-mail will do any more than transmit attached information and, by copy, alert others of that transmittal.

Without any showing of the significance of the non-produced e-mails, let alone the likelihood of finding the “smoking gun,” the search relator demands cannot possibly be justified when one balances its cost against its utility. The motion will be denied.

Id. at 241.

Well put Judge Facciolla. This is music to the ears of any e-discovery devotee. I am reminded of my favorite, the Goldberg Variations. There are additional melodic words in this opinion about a party not losing their right to proportionate discovery because of preservation failures, but I suggest you read the opinion yourself for that last variation. Id. at 241-242.

The Best Case: DCG Systems

End of Part One. Stay tuned for the exciting conclusion, where you will hear the happy ending to this tale of three cases with the story of the best case, DCG Systems, more case-law on proportionality, and an opinion-riddled conclusion that will leave your jaws gaping.

As a sneak preview on the ending I will say this much. Although I agree with Siri’s explanation of DCG Systems, err, I mean, Ken Withers’ explanation: DCG Systems is a case that “proactively cuts the Gordian Knot by adopting Judge Rader’s Model Patent Discovery Order,” (yes, he actually talks like that, and with links too), I nevertheless have some criticisms of this case and the Model Order on which it is based. Its reliance on five keywords is flawed. Still, given the cost of most vendor’s predictive coding software these days, and the weak understanding most lawyers have of legal search, this reliance on outdated technology and search methods is to be expected.

Now for something completely different, I leave you with a few lyrics from Judge Facciola’s favorite musician-poet, Bruce Springsteen:

That you know flag flying over the courthouse
Means certain things are set in stone
Who we are, what we’ll do and what we won’t.

“Long Walk Home”

God have mercy on the man who doubts what he’s sure of.

“Brilliant Disguise”

But it’s a sad man my friend who’s livin’ in his own skin
And can’t stand the company.
Every fool’s got a reason to feelin’ sorry for himself
And turn his heart to stone.
Tonight this fool’s halfway to heaven and just a mile outta hell
And I feel like I’m comin’ home.

“Better Days”

So let’s take the good times as they go and I’ll meet you further on up the road…

“Further On (Up the Road)”


Judge David Waxse on Cooperation and Lawyers Who Act Like Spoiled Children

March 30, 2012

A core problem facing the law today is the inability of lawyers to cooperate with each other. This failure is one of the primary causes of the explosive growth of e-discovery expense. It also explains the general lack of civility that now plagues our profession. Judge David J. Waxse recently added to the growing body of legal scholarship in this area with his excellent article: Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, XVIII Rich. J. L. & Tech. 8 (2012).

This blog will summarize the article with the intent of enticing you to read the whole thing. You will also want to cite to this article in your legal practice, especially when dealing with lawyers who still play the old game of fight everything. The article offers practical rule based advice on how to deal with lawyers like this. Professor Gensler, whom Judge Waxse cites with approval, compares such lawyers to spoiled children.  Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 Duke L.J. 669, 734-37 (2010). This problem of petulant children in the law is very real, as I well know. If you are dealing with such counsel in any of your cases, I highly recommend that you read and use Judge Waxse’s fine article.

What Happens When a Petulant Child Gets a License to Practice Law?

Professor Gensler, who recently finished his term on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, picks up the spoiled child theme from another professor before him on the Committee:

Professor Thomas Rowe, himself a former member of the Advisory Committee, has observed that the case-management model will inevitably struggle to control costs if lawyers continue to act like spoiled children, requiring judges to provide the equivalent of constant adult supervision.289 Perhaps this suggests that what we need is not new rules but better play.

Id. at 734.

Professor Gensler goes on to note that:

Too often, lawyers simply default to battle mode in discovery, without even considering what they are fighting over, why they are fighting, or whether it is in their clients’ best interests to fight over that particular item.294  …

Cooperation skeptics, however, would argue that the cooperative ideal is unrealistic because lawyers and clients will continue to view it as advantageous to demand everything and produce little.313 If that is true, then we are effectively left, at best, with Professor Rowe’s spoiled children in need of constant “‘adult supervision,’” and at worst with his “adversarial scorpions in [the] litigation bottle.”314 In that event, the case-management model may well need to be paired with something else—perhaps significant structural reforms—if it is to succeed.

Id. at 735, 738

I agree with the sentiments of the professors. So does Judge Waxse who is famous for threatening to require lawyers to videotape their Rule 26(f) conferences. As Judge Waxse put it in his new article:

Lawyers are more cooperative when they know that the judge is watching (providing “adult supervision”) and enforcing cooperation responsibilities.63

Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, supra at 17.

Judge Waxse concludes this article by elaborating on the spoiled child theme:

Finally, it may be helpful for a few lawyers to remind them that cooperation is something they should have learned in school. Some, who cannot seem to learn to cooperate, might benefit from this list for elementary school teachers, explaining how to be a cooperative person:

LISTEN carefully to others and be sure you understand what they are saying.

SHARE when you have something that others would like to have.

TAKE TURNS when there is something that nobody wants to do, or when more than one person wants to do the same thing.

COMPROMISE when you have a serious conflict.

DO YOUR PART the very best that you possibly can. This will inspire others to do the same.

SHOW APPRECIATION to people for what they contribute.

ENCOURAGE PEOPLE to do their best.

Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, supra at 17-18.

This is good advice for persons of any age. You might think that lawyers do not need such simplistic advice. But the state Bars only test for intellectual comprehension, not maturity. Once a law school graduate is armed with a license to practice law, the petulant child types who never grew up can do a lot of damage to our system of justice. This is especially true if they are raised in a law firm culture that encourages adversarial scorpion tactics. Often these firm’s look for and recruit over-zealous types. They have ways to make them even more vicious and drunk with power.

Judge Waxse recognizes the psychological dynamics at work here:

[L]awyers who become litigators often have personalities that love conflict and competition. They do not enjoy cooperation as much as they enjoy conflict. Some lawyers may also be operating under the impression that their clients are impressed by shows of aggression. In addition, combative pretrial behavior may be an attempt to avoid or postpone something that some lawyers fear, and that is an actual trial on the merits.

Id. at 12.

Judge Waxse’s advice on how to be cooperative reminds me of the advice given by Robert Fulghum in his bestseller All I Really Need To Know I Learned in Kindergarten:

All I really need to know about how to live and what to do and how to be, I learned in kindergarten. Wisdom was not at the top of the graduate-school mountain, but there in the sand pile at Sunday School. These are the things I learned. These are the things you already know:

Share everything.
Play Fair.
Don’t hit people.
Put things back where you found them.
Clean up your own mess.
Don’t take things that aren’t yours.
Say you’re sorry when you hurt somebody.

Play Fair is something you often say to the spoiled child. That directive seems especially appropriate to the practice of law. As I have pointed out before in my article Ethics of  Electronic Discovery, Part One and Part Two, Rule 3.4 of the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct, entitled Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, is designed to require simple fairness. That includes the ethical duty not to “make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” Cooperation in law is not just an academic exercise, it is an ethical imperative. We must implement this directive in adult fashion and overcome childish inclinations and personality aggressive tendencies that most of us litigators have.

Uncooperative Lawyers Are Per Se Unethical

Judge Waxse recognizes that cooperation in discovery is not an ideal, it is a baseline ethical imperative. In private correspondence with him recently on this article he told me that:

Cooperation has to be considered as part of a lawyers professionalism responsibility. Too many lawyers today are too focused on making money and forgetting their professional responsibilities. As the preamble to the Model Rules says:

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.

That includes the following:

[6]  As  a  public  citizen,  a  lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access  to  the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.

Cooperation in litigation is a way to improve “the administration of justice and the quality of the service rendered by the legal profession” and a way obtain the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination” of the dispute.

These sentiments are spelled out in Judge Waxse’s article with specific references to our rules of ethics. He begins with an important  history lesson. In 1983 the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were amended to remove a duty of zealous advocacy from Rule 1.3. Apparently many firms did not get that memo. The ethics rule was modified after much debate and for good reason. Model Rule 1.3 used to say:

A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.

In 1983 it was revised to say, and still says:

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

As Judge Waxse points out, even before the 1983 amendment, Canon 7, Ethical Consideration [EC 7-39] discussed cooperation and put zealous advocacy in perspective. It stated:

In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary system depends upon cooperation between lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve the impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the obligation of lawyers to represent their clients zealously within the framework of the law.

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-39 (1980).

Even with the tempering comments, lawyers focused too much on the zealous advocacy parts. They used it as an excuse to cover spoiled brat behavior that made a mockery of cooperation. For this reason the zealous duties language was eliminated in 1983 and replaced by the more mature and responsible dictates of diligence and promptness. As Judge Waxse points out, after that amendment zealous advocacy was only mentioned in the Preamble:

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.

[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2006).

After the amendment to Rule 1.3 the Comment still mentioned zealous advocacy and explained its limits:

A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt (2006).

Again, many lawyers just don’t understand. They act like bullies and try to justify their behavior as zealous advocacy. They need to better understand the lessons of kindergarten as Robert Fulghum said:

What we learn in kindergarten comes up again and again in our lives as long as we live. In far more complex, polysyllabic forms, to be sure. In lectures, encyclopedias, bibles, company rules, courts of law, sermons, and handbooks. Life will examine us continually to see if we have understood and have practiced what we were taught that first year of school.

Judge Waxse analyzes why cooperation and “playing fair” seems so difficult to many litigators. He concludes that it is both the over-aggressive personality disorder common to us litigators, combined with a basic misunderstanding of ethics.

There are numerous reasons why cooperation is often not happening. One is the misconception I have already discussed—that lawyers have an ethical obligation of zealous advocacy in every aspect of litigation. Another reason is that lawyers who become litigators often have personalities that love conflict and competition.

Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, supra at 12.

Judge Waxse goes onto mention a third reason, greed, that I also examine in my law review article, Lawyers Behaving Badly, 60 Mercer L. Rev. 983 (Spring 2009). Judge Waxse observes:

Another reason that is not openly discussed often is that the hourly billing system used by many law firms is an incentive to engage in conflict instead of cooperation.46 It takes more time to fight over everything than it takes to cooperate. Thus, when the lawyer is paid based solely on how much time they spend working, there is a disincentive to cooperate and therefore a potential conflict with the client’s interest in resolving the litigation in a cost effective manner.

Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, supra at 12. Judge Waxse does not mention another greed factor -  the big money involved for lawyers in contingency cases. The prospect of making millions of dollars can often  tempt otherwise reasonable people into bad behavior. The greed factor is often exasperated by the tendency to automatically vilify the other side, or its close cousin, to vilify all plaintiff’s lawyers or all defense lawyers. It is an unfair bias. Lawyers sitting on both sides of the courtroom can easily fall into this trap. Don’t stereotype opposing counsel. See them as people, as individuals, and treat them with respect, not abuse. As Robert Fulghum said:

Yelling at living things does tend to kill the spirit in them. Sticks and stones may break our bones, but words will break our hearts.

Judge Waxse’s Rule-Based Solution

After pointing out that cooperation is an ethical imperative Judge Waxse’s new article provides practical, rule-based advice on how to make cooperation happen, even when faced with spoiled, scorpion type non-cooperators. His advice is directed to both lawyers and judges. Indeed, cooperation is impossible in dealing with hopeless bickerers unless judges provide adult guidance and a stern hand. Judge Waxse begins by pointing to Rule 16(a) where a judge can and should be “establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management” and “discouraging wasteful pretrial activities.”

Next Judge Waxse points to Rule 26(b)(2)(C) where a judge is required to limit discovery in certain instances where the parties cannot cooperate enough to do it on their own. In that situation where counsel for one side, or for both sides, cannot cooperate, Judge Waxse reminds judges that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allows them on motion, or on their own initiative, to “limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed.” Their are a variety of grounds to so limit discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), including disproportionate burden compared to benefit, the so-called proportionality principle.

Judge Waxse then refers to the duties lawyers have under Rule 26(f) to work together in good faith to agree on a plan of discovery for the case and to discuss “the nature and basis of their claims and defenses.” Next, Rule 26(g) “allows the court to insure that lawyers are not being uncooperative by making improper discovery requests and responses.” Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, supra at 14. Judge Waxse points out, as Judge Grimm did before him in Mancia, that Rule 26(g)(3) provides courts with a strong enforcement tool to punish uncooperative lawyers for making an improper discovery request, response, or objection. Judge Waxse  notes that a judge could go even further and punish lawyers who act like petulant children by using 28 U.S.C. §1927, which states:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

Judge Waxse sums up by saying that the rules and the enforcement statute “provide a clear path to cooperation.” In other words, Judge Waxse is saying what every parent knows, that clear, consistent, and firm discipline is the only solution to a petulant child. A judge must be ready to step in and provide adult supervision, including punishment of an uncooperative lawyer. In some cases a judge may even have to impose monetary sanctions against an attorney personally. They may have to use  §1927 to force him or her to pay the fees and costs the other side incurs because of their vexatious conduct.

Conclusion

Although I did not follow the maxim spare the rod, spoil the child when raising my children (I personally think that is barbaric), I never hesitated to take away their allowance (or computers and other toys) and impose other monetary sanctions. Judges should be prepared to provide the same kind of tough-love in their court room to lawyers who don’t cooperate.

Cooperation must always be a two-way street. It must never mean capitulation to a bully. We all know that some lawyers are like spoiled children and are incapable of cooperation. They are incapable of reasonable dialogue. It is either their way or the highwaytake it or leave it. When you are unfortunate enough to have attorneys like that as your opposing counsel, cooperation is impossible without strong judicial involvement. It is as simple as that.

When one attorney refuses to cooperate, the judge must step in and enforce the rules and the statute in order to make the other side cooperate. Judge Waxse points out how the rules and Section 1927  “provide a clear path to cooperation.” But that path only works if there is a wise judge with the intestinal fortitude necessary to enforce those rules and statute against sometimes very powerful uncooperative attorneys.

If a judge will not step in, who will? The bully must not be allowed to make a mockery of justice. Our whole system of justice depends on enforcement of the law, even, or perhaps especially, when the enforcement is against lawyers. Judges – make your courtroom a bully free zone!

For judges to fulfill their duty they must, of course, first take care to find out what is really going on in a case. They should not simply assume that both sides are to blame. That just rewards the petulant, the bullies who try to blame the other side (“he started it!”). Judges need to take the time to determine which counsel is a bona fide cooperator and which a poser. It may sometimes be the case that both sides are phonies and neither are cooperative. But it may also be the case that only one side is uncooperative. It may take a series of hearings to sort things out, but when a judge recognizes a one-sided, playground-bully type situation, the judge must act, and act decisively. Fulfillment of the purpose of Rule 1 to attain the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action depends on it.

As a final thought I leave you with the words of Robert Fulghum, who, strangely enough, kind of looks like Judge Waxse with a bow-tie. As a sixty-year-old myself, I can resonate with these observations.

My convictions have validity for me because I have experimented with the compounds of ideas of others in the laboratory of my mind. And I’ve tested the results in the living out of my life. At twenty-one, I had drawn an abstract map based on the evidence of others. At sixty, I have accumulated a practical guide grounded in my own experience. At twenty-one, I could discuss transportation theory with authority. At sixty, I know which bus to catch to go where, what the fare is, and how to get back home again. It is not my bus, but I know how to use it.