Jerry Seinfeld Meets eDiscovery: Rules of the Game and the Pony Scene

May 14, 2022
Ralph Reading the Rules

I could not resist writing about a new case that mentions electronic discovery (yes, I have a standing Lexis search), not because it creates any kind of great precedent or anything, but because it involves one of my all-time favorite comedians, Jerry Seinfeld. Charles v. Seinfeld, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54387, Case No. 18-cv-1196 (AJN), (SDNY, April 29, 2022). The opinion is by Judge Alison Julie Nathan, who was sitting by designation after her elevation on March 30, 2022, to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The opinion itself, is, with all due respect, kind of like the Seinfeld’s series. It is not about anything terribly important. It’s not about much really. But still, I found it very funny in a cynical, jealous lawyer sort of way and it does have an important, between the lines, message. Read on if you are into that sort of thing.

Rules of the Game

To lay the proper groundwork for this blog about Seinfeld (personal opinions only), I have to start by sharing, for fair use educational purposes only, one of my favorite Jerry Seinfeld quotes. You’ve all heard it, the one about lawyers and judges. It explains my photo.

“What are lawyers, really? To me a lawyer is basically the person that knows the rules of the country. We’re all throwing the dice, playing the game, moving our pieces around the board, but if there’s a problem, the lawyer is the only person that has read the inside of the top of the box. I think one of the fun things for them is to say, ‘objection.’ ‘Objection! Objection, Your Honor.’ Objection, of course, is the adult version of, ‘’fraid not.’ To which the judge can say two things, he can say, ‘overruled’ which is the adult version of ‘’fraid so,’ or he could say, ‘sustained,’ which is the adult version of ‘Duh.’”

Jerry Seinfeld, Seinfeld, Season 4: The Visa

Who Wouldn’t Love A Pony ?

I have seen every episode of Seinfeld many times. The famous Pony scene in Season 2, Episode 2, immediately came to mind when I read Charles v. Seinfeld. As you read on, see if you can figure out why that popped into my head. In case you don’t have instant recall of this great, family dinner table scene, check out this excerpt on YouTube. Better yet, treat yourself and watch the whole episode. It’s one of the best.

Before I do a fair use educational quote of the Pony script, let me share another Seinfeld quote, one that is supposedly serious. Being the naive idealist that I am, I believe it. Anyway, Jerry is credited with saying: “I like money, but it’s never been about the money.” I get that, as I truly feel the same way. Still, I do like money as much as the next person, maybe even the next lawyer (nah, probably not), and money is what Charles v. Seinfeld is all about. It considers a request for an award of fees and costs in favor of the prevailing party, Jerry Seinfeld, which includes costs of $32,692.21 for electronic discovery database hosting fees. Charles v. Seinfeld at *18 (by the way, check out Fn 5 on that page for a great Seinfeld-like note by the obviously very sharp, Judge Nathan: “There is a $0.30 discrepancy in the costs requested ($100,918.71) and the sum of the component costs.”)

Here are the lines and scene that came to mind when I read Charles v. Seinfeld. First, to set the stage, Manya is an elderly Jewish immigrant relative who is hosting a family dinner that Jerry and Elaine were roped into attending. Jerry and Elaine were bored and wanted to leave. At Elaine’s prodding, Jerry started to rant about children who had ponies.

Elaine: What about Ponies huh? What kind of abnormal animal is that? And those kids who had their own ponies.

Jerry: I know. I hated those kids. In fact, I hate anyone that ever had a pony when they were growing up.

Manya: I had a pony!

Jerry: Well, I didn’t mean a pony per se

Manya: When I was a little girl in Poland, we all had ponies. My sister had pony, my cousin had pony. So, what’s wrong with that?

Jerry: Nothing. Nothing at all. I was just expressing

Helen: Should we have coffee? Who’s having coffee?

Manya: He was a beautiful pony. And I loved him!

Jerry: Well, I’m sure you did. Who wouldn’t love a pony? Who wouldn’t love a person who had a pony?

Manya: You! You said so!

Jerry Seinfeld, Seinfeld, Season 2, Episode 2.

At the end of this scene, Manya storms out, very upset at Jerry, saying “That’s it! I had enough!” Unfortunately, Jerry learns the next day that Manya died later that night.

Charles v. Seinfeld: A Run of the Mill Frivolous Copyright Case

If you are really interested (I’m not) in the dubious merits of the case, see the 2019 order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Fraid-so!) by then District Court Judge Nathan. Charles v. Seinfeld, 410 F. Supp. 3d 656, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169543, 2019 WL 4805684 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2019). It is enough for my purposes to hear Judge Nathan’s later summary of the case in her April 29, 2022 order ruling on defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505.

Plaintiff Christian Charles, an award-winning writer, director, and producer, alleged copyright claims against Jerry Seinfeld and several related Defendants related to the show Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. The Court ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds, explaining [*2] that Charles was on notice of his claims since at least 2012 but did not file suit until 2018, far outside the three-year statute of limitations for such claims. Id. at 8.

Charles v. Seinfeld, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54387, Case No. 18-cv-1196, *1-2, at pg. 5 of 13, (SDNY, April 29, 2022),

The Second Circuit affirmed (Fraid not. Duh!) the Sept. 30, 2019 dismissal on June 18, 2020. The obvious Statute of Limitations winner, Jerry Seinfeld, et al, then moved for fees. That’s when the real fun began. To get an award of fees under the copyright statute Seinfeld’s attorneys had to show that Charles’s claims were objectively unreasonable. They failed to convince the Magistrate (Fraid not!) who was assigned to hear their motion for fees and costs, Judge Katharine H. Parker.

Seinfeld then objected to Judge Parker’s Report and Recommendation and Judge Nathan agreed (Fraid so. Duh!) with Seinfeld. Judge Nathan concluded that Charles’s claims were objectively unreasonable and that other relevant factors favored awarding Defendants’ attorneys’ fees. Id. She ordered Charles to file a brief on “the amount of the fee award,” with particular attention to the relative financial strength of the parties. Id.

Charles didn’t do that, instead he re-argued the merits of the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation denying any award at all. That usually upsets a judge, but here, Judge Nathan, now an appellate judge sitting by designation to wrap up old business, showed great restraint. She heard the procedurally improper, caveman lawyer type motion for rehearing and ruled on it here. She denied the rehearing argument (Duh!) and went on to address the issue of the amount of the award with no help from Charles. Id. at *3-5 at pgs. 5-6 of 13. Who knows, that might have been a smart move on his part.

Seinfeld Attorney’s Fee and Costs Motion – Those Are Some Expensive Ponies!

Before we get to the ponies, remember that this case was decided on a motion to dismiss. There was no discovery. None. Yet, somehow Seinfeld’s attorneys incurred costs of $32,692.21 for electronic discovery database hosting. Hmm. They moved for an award of these costs and, of course, the motion was denied. They got nada, because, as all ediscovery lawyers know, the ancient federal costs award statute does not allow for ediscovery costs. Moreover, as Judge Nathan patiently explained, instead of just saying duh:

Similarly, the electronic database hosting fees are [*19]  very high and not properly imposed on Charles in a case that did not proceed to discovery. Defendants of course had an obligation to preserve relevant documents for discovery, as did Charles, but both sides bear and typically retain that cost.

Id. at *17 at pg. 11 of 13.

Seinfeld’s attorneys were, however, awarded costs of $92 for paper copies. I personally find that funny.

In another Fraid Not! type eliciting move, Seinfeld’s attorneys also asked for an award of costs of $66,386.26 for electronic research fees. Again, same result, zero award for that. (Duh!) As Judge Nathan ruled, it is well settled such charges are already accounted in the attorneys’ hourly rates and research time. Id. at *16 at pg. 10 of 13. Wish it were not so, but it is; besides, $66,386.26 is one large Westlaw or Lexis fee for a simple Statute of Limitations case. Plus, as everyone knows, including the judge I presume, law firms are not charged by the project.

Still, Seinfeld’s attorneys justified the reasonableness of the fees and costs award requested on the representation that these were the fees and costs at rates actually billed to and paid by their clients. Here again is Judge Nathan explaining that argument, one which I have carefully used myself, and I emphasize carefully, because the representations better be true. Note I have omitted the lawyers names here as I have no intent to offend and I understand their frustration perfectly well with the obviously very annoying opposing counsel.

Generally, an “attorney’s customary billing rate for fee-paying clients is ordinarily the best evidence of” a reasonable hourly rate.

According to the ______’s declaration, the rates listed above are those actually charged and paid by ___________ clients for comparable work. That weighs in favor of finding the rates reasonable, but is not dispositive.

Id. at *6, *9 at pgs 6, 7 of 13.

Now we finally get to the unusually large ponies, the facts that took my breath away, namely the hourly rates of the attorneys, the fees requested, and the things they billed their client for. They also seemed to shock Judge Nathan, a very experienced judge in New York City, where all of the judges have pretty much seen it all, and so that’s really saying something.

Defendants request a staggering $872,939.66 in attorneys’ fees and $100,918.71 in costs. … That fee amount is constituted by 1,465.9 hours of work completed by eight attorneys as well as paralegals and support staff…

Id. at *8 at pg. 7 of 13.

Wow. I’m staggered. All for a simple copyright case that the defense argued was frivolous and they won on a motion to dismiss based on an obvious statute of limitation defense. But wait, there are still more ponies. The senior partner in charge of the case represented that his hourly rate in 2020 was $1,550.00. Yup, that’s One Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty Dollars per hour. Ok. I’m really impressed, maybe just a wee bit jealous. <Secret thought: I really need to raise my rates. I’ve read the rules on the back of many game boxes.> And that was two years ago. I bet his rate is even higher now.

But wait, my sisters and cousins have ponies too. The sixth year associate working on the case had a standard rate of $965 per hour. Gees! But wait, there’s more. Five first-year associates, yup, kids barely out of law school, had their own ponies. Their hourly rates ranged from $545 in 2018 to $650 in 2020. <Secret thought: All right, that does it! I’m raising my rates.> There’s still more. Everyone had ponies. Three paralegals working on the case had standard rates of $431.25 per hour. If you are not astonished yet, consider this additional detail by Judge Nathan, who, along with her clerks, obviously put a lot of work into this. But I guess “a lot of work” is relative as these comments show.

A few examples demonstrate the excessive nature of the hours billed. First, take the series of motions to dismiss that Defendants filed. The lead associate, _______, alone billed 120 hours to research and draft the initial motion to dismiss; an additional [*14]  130 hours to update the motion following the first amended complaint; and a further 37 hours to update it following the second amended complaint. And partners and junior associates also billed hours to contribute to and review this work. The Court finds substantial overlap in the authorities across the three briefs filed in support of the motions to dismiss, suggesting that the hours billed to modify later briefs were in large part unnecessary. And the approximately 180 hours spent by associates to analyze Charles’s response and to draft a reply exacerbates the issue. At bottom, given the straightforward statute-of-limitations defense at the center of this case, Defendants’ request of $300,000 for drafting just the moving briefs alone is plainly unreasonable.4

FN 4- As Defense counsel observed at the oral argument before Judge Parker: “There was no novelty here. There was no mystery here. This case was as dead on arrival as a copyright case can be. I’ve been practicing copyright for a lot of years, 30 years.” Tr. at 13, Dkt. No. 135.

Id. at *13-14 at pg. 9 of 13.

I could go on, but the icing on the pony cake for me was that the defense attorneys put on and billed for a mock argument. Not only that, they even billed for first years to watch it. I kid you not. Here is Judge Nathan again and her dry wit. I’m pretty sure she is a Seinfeld fan too.

Third, the records reflect hours billed for multiple attorneys, including junior associates, to attend a mock argument and oral argument. Typically, courts do not pass the cost of associates observing mock arguments or oral arguments on to the opposing party in a fee award.

Id. *15 at pg. 9 of 13.

Conclusion – DUH!

Judge Alison Nathan

Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alison Julie Nathan, sitting by designation as the former trial judge of Charles v. Seinfeld, considered Seinfeld’s motion for award of fees of $872,939.66 and costs of $100,918.71. She also considered the objections of the plaintiff, Charles. She ruled and awarded only $28,750 in attorneys’ fees and $92 in costs for a total of $28,842. Judge Nathan did make the award joint and several against the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel. Some small solace to Seinfeld’s attorneys. They were pushing hard for personal sanctions against opposing counsel. On the other hand, as a final gesture, that seems funny to me at least, Judge Nathan said Charles and his attorney could make these payments in equal monthly installments over a ten-year period.

Dear fellow lawyers, even if opposing counsel is beyond annoying, a real caveman, don’t kid around with a judge in seeking sanctions. This is, in effect, what was going on here, seeking sanctions in the form of fees against opposing counsel. The judges have not only read the rules of the game, but they know them well and know how to apply them fairly. Do not try to game the system with inflated demands.


The Importance of a 502(d) Order and Attorney Candor

October 27, 2019

I always suggest that attorneys ask for a 502(d) Order under Federal Rules of Evidence before production of ESI. A new case out of Texas demonstrates some of the many bad things that can happen if you do not. Bellamy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Texas, LLC, No. SA-18-CV-60-XR, 2019 WL 3936992 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2019). The opinion is from one of the leading e-discovery jurists in the country, Texas District Court Judge Xavier Rodriguez. Although he allowed the inadvertently produced documents to be clawed back, it was a close call. In the process Judge Rodriguez considered those documents and sanctioned defendants based on what he read. He struck defendant’s comparative negligence defense and awarded fees and costs. It could have been worse. The accidentally disclosed attorney emails suggested multiple rule violations and a disturbing lack of candor to the court.

This is a must read opinion, not only because of who wrote it, Judge Rodriguez, and the quality of his research and analysis, but also because of the facts of the case. There are many things we can learn from the mistakes highlighted in this opinion. Including the all important ethical values of attorney candor to the court and cooperation.

I will let the learned Judge Rodriguez’ own words in Bellamy explain this case, which was colored by the  attorney conduct he uncovered.

This is a slip and fall case. Plaintiff alleges that she . .  tripped over a pallet while walking through sliding doors into the garden center. . . .

There have been several discovery disputes that have arisen in this case. The Magistrate Judge presided over the first round of disputes and eventually ordered that the Plaintiff’s [First] Motion for Sanctions be dismissed without prejudice to allow for the deposition of a Wal-Mart employee who may have been responsible for leaving the pallet unattended. The Magistrate Judge further ordered that Defendant supplement its disclosures and discovery responses, amend its objections, and provide Plaintiff with a privilege log as to any withheld documents.

This latest round of disputes centers on what happened next. In responding to the Magistrate Judge’s Order, a paralegal in counsel for Defendant’s office inadvertently produced documents that Defendant claims are privileged under the attorney-client privilege or work product. Plaintiff responds that some documents are not privileged. With regard to documents that are privileged, Plaintiff argues that these documents nonetheless demonstrate that Defendant’s counsel has acted in bad faith and engaged in discovery abuse.

Id. at pg. 1 of 7.

Judge Rodriguez starts with an analysis of Evidence Rule 502.

This Court encourages parties to enter into a Rule 502(d) Order[1], which states: “A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court.” FED. R. EVID. 502(d). Despite this Court’s encouragement, the Defendant did not request such an Order.[2] This was the first of many mistakes by Defendant’s counsel in this case. In the absence of a 502(d) Order, the Court then turns to an analysis under Rule 502(b).  . . .

In this case the privilege log was woefully deficient. Specifically, the Court is unable to ascertain the identities of various recipients of the emails in question.

Id. at pg 2 of 7.

The emails were all submitted to Judge Rodriguez for review in camera. The opinion makes clear that Judge Rodriguez did not think all of these emails were in fact privileged under case law, but plaintiff’s counsel had for some reason, not explained, conceded that they were.

But as stated above, because Plaintiff concedes that the documents are privileged, the Court will not disturb the concession that the documents are covered by the attorney-client privilege.

Id.

The elements of Rule 502(b) were met with this odd concession, so Judge Rodriguez had no choice but to order their return and prevent plaintiff from using the emails at trial, but Judge Rodriguez was not at all happy about the contents of the emails. This is where the hammer falls:

*3 Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B), Defendant is entitled to “claw back” the documents it inadvertently produced. But that is not the end of this analysis. Although Plaintiff may not further use these documents in this case, preventing their use in analyzing the pending motion for sanctions would result in a perverse result, upending the rules of civil procedure and encouraging discovery abuse.

Id.

Judge Rodriguez starts by noting defense counsel became aware of key witnesses and failed to disclose them.

With regard to the above individuals, Defendant failed to list them in its Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) initial disclosures and failed to timely list them in answers to interrogatories. It is apparent from a reading of the materials submitted either Defendant’s counsel was grossly negligent in fulfilling their discovery obligations or they realized they had an uncooperative manager who was refusing to assist in their investigation, and they did not want to disclose the identities of potentially “bad” witnesses. Counsel for Defendant attempts to shift some of this blame by stating that Plaintiff was already aware of the manager and garden center employee because of her prior employment with Wal-Mart. This shifting is unpersuasive. Defendant’s counsel had obligations to provide this information and it unreasonably and untimely did not.

Id. at pg. 3 of 7.

The in camera privileged emails Judge Rodriguez read also showed that a video of the slip and fall once existed. Yikes. That is a real problem.

Counsel for Defendant never disclosed to Plaintiff’s counsel that at one time video may have existed that was now lost. Rather, counsel merely kept repeating that video does not exist.

Id.

That was way too cute. Disclosure to opposing counsel and the court was expected by Judge Rodriguez.

If that were not all bad enough, the emails revealed another hidden fact:

Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel discovered in the inadvertently produced emails that: (9) Defendant hired an
investigator to conduct a full social media/background check on the Plaintiff on June 20, 2018; and (10)
outside counsel for Defendant notified “Travis Rodmon-Legal” that surveillance had been completed on the Plaintiff and “it is debatable if the footage will be beneficial…. The investigator informs me that she moves very slowly, gingerly and hobbles a bit.”

*4 Counsel for Defendant never disclosed that it possessed video of the Plaintiff. Defendant was under an obligation to disclose any such video as a request for production had been made to that effect. Likewise, Wal-Mart had obtained numerous statements from the Plaintiff prior to her obtaining representation. These statements were requested in requests for production, but not timely disclosed. Counsel for Defendant attributes this failure to the fact that one attorney working this file left the firm and the file was reassigned and the new attorney was unaware of the video’s existence. Although this suggests no “bad faith”, at the time Wal-Mart sent its responses to requests for production and stated that it had no video of the Plaintiff it violated Rule 26(g).

Plaintiff requests that Defendant be sanctioned for failing to disclose that store surveillance video at one point existed and at some point became “lost.” Plaintiff also seeks sanctions because the Wal-Mart manager testified at her deposition that she took multiple photos (including of the pallet) and these photos have never been produced. Likewise, the manager testified that she obtained a statement from the employee who left the pallet unattended and that statement has never been produced. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions because Wal-Mart did not preserve the pallet in question. Finally, Plaintiff requests sanctions generally for Defendant’s failure to honor its discovery obligations. Plaintiff also requests that the Court provide an adverse inference instruction to the jury regarding the missing information. Plaintiff seeks these various sanctions citing generally to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and the court’s “inherent
authority.”

Id.

Judge Rodriguez examines the law on sanctions and then considers the ethical Duty of Candor to the Court (Rule 3.3, Model Rules of Professional Conduct) the Duty of Cooperation and Rule 1, FRCP (just, speedy and inexpensive).

D. Duty of Candor, Cooperation and FED. R. CIV. P. 1

Counsel for Defendant wisely opened its Response brief with the following: “Defendant’s counsel
acknowledges and accepts it made mistakes during the discovery of this matter. It accepts that consequences may come from the Court as it considers Plaintiff’s Motions before the Court.”

It is apparent that at the time of the accident, Defendant considered this a low-value or nuisance case. It did not contemplate the severity of the Plaintiff’s injuries and medical treatment. But once Plaintiff placed Defendant on notice that she was going to pursue litigation, reasonable and proportionate preservation obligations were required to be met. Likewise, defense counsel may be on billing constraints, but discovery obligations and adherence to the rules of civil procedure must be met.

*7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 and 26(f) contemplate that the parties meet in good faith to discuss the case and facilitate resolution of the case and discovery issues because the parties have an obligation “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Rather than complying with the rules, defense counsel delayed the production of adverse material and the identity of witnesses and the extent of the inappropriate acts only fully became revealed after an inadvertent production of emails was made (after intervention by the Magistrate Judge).

Id. at pgs. 5-6 of 7.

Judge Rodriguez then concludes:

A reading of the file in this case makes apparent that Wal-Mart has known early on that it is responsible for the pallet being left unattended for some period of time in an area frequented by customers. Many counsel for defendants argue that the burden is on a plaintiff to establish all elements of their causes of action. That is true. But if that is going to be the Defendant’s strategy (even when knowing they will likely suffer defeat), this Court is not sympathetic to complaints that litigation is too expensive. In this case, rather than focusing on the extent of Plaintiff’s damages, Wal-Mart has now expended significant time and fees on the liability issue its own claims investigator conceded a long time ago.

Conclusion

Defendant’s Motion to Abate or Strike Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Sanctions (docket no. 49) is DENIED, but as stated above Plaintiff may not use the inadvertently produced documents for any other purpose and counsel must return any documents still in Plaintiff’s possession, if any, to Defendant. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions (docket no. 50) is GRANTED as stated above. Defendant may not assert any comparative negligence defense in this case, including arguing that the danger was open and obvious.

Id. at pgs. 6-7 of 7.

 


Cautionary Tale from Brooklyn: Search Terms ‘Designed To Fail’

October 20, 2019

Every lawyer who thinks e-discovery is not important, that you can just delegate it to a vendor, should read Abbott Laboratories, et al. v. Adelphia Supply USA, et al., No. 15 CV 5826 (CBA) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019). This opinion in a trademark case in Brooklyn District Court (shown here) emphasizes, once again, that e-discovery can be outcome-determinative. If you mess it up, you can doom your case. If a lawyer wants to litigate today, they either have to spend the substantial time it takes to learn the many intricacies of e-discovery, or associate with a specialist who does. The Abbott Labs case shows how easily a law suit can be won or lost on e-discovery alone. Here the numbers did not add up, key custodians were omitted and guessed keywords were used, keywords so bad that opposing counsel called them designed to fail. The defendants reacted by firing their lawyers and blaming everything on them, but the court did not buy it. Instead, discovery fraud was found and judgment was entered for the plaintiff.

Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom (shown right) begins the Opinion by noting that the plaintiff’s motion for case ending sanctions “… presents a cautionary tale about how not to conduct discovery in federal court.” The issues started when defendant made its first electronic document production. The Electronically Stored Information was all produced in paper, as Judge Bloom explained “in hard copy, scanning them all together, and producing them as a single, 1941-page PDF file.” Opinion pg. 3. This is not what the plaintiff Abbott Labs wanted. After Abbott sought relief from the court the defendants on March 24, 2017 were ordered  to “produce an electronic copy of the 2014 emails (1,941 pages)” including metadata. Defendant then “electronically produced 4,074 pages of responsive documents on April 5, 2017.” Note how the page count went from 1,942 to 4,074. There was no explanation of this page count discrepancy, the first of many, but the evidence helped Abbott justify a new product counterfeiting action (Abbott II) where the court ordered a seizure of defendant’s email server. That’s were the fun started. As Judge Bloom put it:

Once plaintiffs had seized H&H’s email server, plaintiffs had the proverbial smoking gun and raised its concerns anew that defendants had failed to comply with the Court’s Order to produce responsive documents in the instant action (hereinafter “Abbott I”). On July 12, 2017, the Court ordered the H&H defendants to “re-run the document search outlined in the Court’s January 17 and January 21 Orders,” “produce the documents from the re-run search to Abbott,” and to produce “an affidavit of someone with personal knowledge” regarding alleged technical errors that affected the production.³ Pursuant to the Court’s July 12, 2017 Order to re-run the search, The H&H defendants produced 3,569 responsive documents.

Opinion pg. 4 (citations to record omitted).

Too Late For Vendor Help and a Search Strategy Designed to Fail

After the seizure order in Abbott II, and after Abbott Labs again raised issues regarding defendants’ original production, Judge Bloom ordered the defendants to re-run the original search. Defendants then retained the services of an outside vendor, Transperfect, to re-run the original search for them. In supposed compliance with that order, the defendants, aka H&H, then produced 3,569 documents. Id. at 8. Defendants also filed an affidavit by Joseph Pochron, Director in the Forensic Technology and Consulting Division at Transperfect (“Pochron Decl.”) to try to help their case. It did not work. According to Judge Bloom the Pochron Decl. states:

… that H&H utilized an email archiving system called Barracuda and that there are two types of Barracuda accounts, Administrator and Auditor. Pochron Decl. ¶ 13. Pochron’s declaration states that the H&H employee who ran the original search, Andrew Sweet, H&H’s general manager, used the Auditor account to run the original search (“Sweet search”). Id. at ¶ 19. When Mr. Pochron replicated the Sweet search using the Auditor account, he obtained 1,540 responsive emails. Id. at ¶ 22. When Mr. Pochron replicated the Sweet search using the Administrator account, he obtained 1,737 responsive emails. Id. Thus, Mr. Pochron attests that 197 messages were not viewable to Mr. Sweet when the original production was made. Id. Plaintiffs state that they have excluded those 197 messages, deemed technical errors, from their instant motion for sanctions. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 9; Waters Decl. ¶ 8. However, even when those 197 messages are excluded, defendants’ numbers do not add up. In fact, H&H has repeatedly given plaintiffs and the Court different numbers that do not add up.

Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the H&H defendants purposely used search terms designed to fail, such as “International” and “FreeStyle,” whereas H&H’s internal systems used item numbers and other abbreviations such as “INT” and “INTE” for International and “FRL” and “FSL” for FreeStyle. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law at 10–11. Plaintiffs posit that defendants purposely designed and ran the “extremely limited search” which they knew would fail to capture responsive documents …

Opinion pgs. 8-9 (emphasis by bold added). “Search terms designed to fail.” This is the first time I have ever seen such a phrase in a judicial opinion. Is purposefully stupid keyword search yet another bad faith litigation tactic by unscrupulous attorneys and litigants? Or is this just another example of dangerous incompetence? Judge Bloom was not buying the ‘big oops” theory, especially considering the ever-changing numbers of relevant documents found. It looked to her, and me too, that this search strategy was intentionally design to fail, that it was all a shell-game.

This is the wake-up call for all litigators, especially those who do not specialize in e-discovery. Your search strategy had better make sense. Search terms must be designed (and tested) to succeed, not fail! This is not just incompetence.

The Thin Line Between Gross Negligence and Bad Faith

The e-discovery searches you run are important. The “mistakes” made here led to a default judgment. That is the way it is in federal court today. If you think otherwise, that e-discovery is not that important, that you can just hire a vendor and throw stupid keywords at it, then your head is dangerously stuck in the sand. Look around. There are many cases like Abbott Laboratories, et al. v. Adelphia Supply USA.

I say “mistakes” made here in quotes because it was obvious to Judge Bloom that these were not mistakes at all, this was fraud on the court.

E-Discovery is about evidence. About truth. You cannot play games. Either take it seriously and do it right, do it ethically, do it competently; or go home and get out. Retire already. Discovery gamesmanship and lawyer bumbling are no longer tolerated in federal court. The legal profession has no room for dinosaurs like that.

Abbott Labs responded the way they should, the way you should always expect in a situation like this:

Plaintiffs move for case ending sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and invoke the Court’s inherent power to hold defendants in default for perpetrating a fraud upon the Court. Plaintiffs move to strike the H&H defendants’ pleadings, to enter a default judgment against them, and for an order directing defendants to pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and costs, for investigating and litigating defendants’ discovery fraud.

Id.

Rule 37(e) was revised in 2015 to make clear that gross negligence alone does not justify a case-ending sanction, that you must prove bad faith. This change should not provide the incompetent with much comfort. As this case shows, the difference between mistake and intent can be a very thin line. Do your numbers add up? Can you explain what you did and why you did it? Did you use good search terms? Did you search all of the key custodians? Or did you just take the ESI the client handed to you and say thank you very much? Did you look with a blind eye? Even if bad faith under Rule 37 is not proven, the court may still find the whole process stinks of fraud and use the court’s inherent powers to sanction misconduct.

As Judge Bloom went on to explain:

Under Rule 37, plaintiffs’ request for sanctions would be limited to my January 17, 2017 and January 27, 2017 Orders which directed defendants to produce documents as set forth therein. While sanctions under Rule 37 would be proper under these circumstances, defendants’ misconduct herein is more egregious and goes well beyond defendants’ failure to comply with the Court’s January 2017 discovery orders. . . .  Rather than viewing the H&H defendants’ failure to comply with the Court’s January 2017 Orders in isolation, plaintiffs’ motion is more properly considered in the context of the Court’s broader inherent power, because such power “extends to a full range of litigation abuses,” most importantly, to fraud upon the court.

Opinion pg. 5.

Judge Bloom went on the explain further the “fraud on the court” and defendant’s e-discovery conduct.

A fraud upon the court occurs where it is established by clear and convincing evidence “that a party has set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by . . . unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.” New York Credit & Fin. Mgmt. Grp. v. Parson Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc., 432 Fed. Appx. 25 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (quoting Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2002))

Opinion pgs. 5-6 (subsequent string cites omitted).

Kill All The Lawyers

The defendants here tried to defend by firing and blaming their lawyers. That kind of Shakespearean sentiment is what you should expect when you represent people like that. They will turn on you. They will use you for their nefarious ends, then lose you. Kill you if they could.

Judge Bloom, who was herself a lawyer before becoming a judge, explained the blame-game defendants tried to pull in her court.

Regarding plaintiffs’ assertion that defendants designed and used search terms to fail, defendants proffer that their former counsel, Mr. Yert, formulated and directed the use of the search terms. Id. at 15. The H&H defendants state that “any problems with the search terms was the result of H&H’s good faith reliance on counsel who . . . decided to use parameters that were less robust than those later used[.]” Id. at 18. The H&H defendants further state that the Sweet search results were limited because of Mr. Yert’s incompetence. Id.

Opinion pg. 9.

Specifically defendants alleged:

… the original search parameters were determined by Mr. Yert and that he “relied on Mr. Yert’s expertise as counsel to direct the parameters and methods for a proper search that would fulfill the Court’s Order.” Sweet Decl. ¶ 3–4.  As will be discussed below, the crux of defendants’ arguments throughout their opposition to the instant motion seeks to lay blame on Mr. Yert for their actions; however, defendants cannot absolve themselves of liability here by shifting blame to their former counsel.

Opinion pg. 11.

Here is how Judge Bloom responded to this “blame the lawyers” defense:

Defendants’ attempt to lay blame on former counsel regarding the design and use of search terms is equally unavailing. It is undisputed that numerous responsive documents were not produced by the H&H defendants that should have been produced. Defendants’ prior counsel conceded as much. See generally plaintiffs’ Ex. B, Tr. Of July 11, 2017 telephone conference.

Mr. Yert was asked at his deposition about the terms that H&H used to identify their products and he testified as follows:

Q. Tell me about the general discussions you had with the client in terms of what informed you what search terms you should be using.

A. Those were the terms consistently used by H&H to identify the particular product.

Q. So the client told you that FreeStyle and International are the terms they consistently used to refer to International FreeStyle test strips; is that correct?

A. That’s what I recall.

Q. Did the client tell you that they used the abbreviation FSL to refer to FreeStyle?

A. I don’t recall.

Q. If they had told you that, you would have included that as a search term, correct?

A. I don’t recall if it was or was not included as a search term, sir.

Opinion pgs. 10-11.

The next time you are asked to dream up keywords for searches to find your client’s relevant evidence, remember this case, remember this deposition. Do not simply use keywords that the client suggests, as the attorneys did here. Do not simply use keywords. As I have written here many, many times before, there is a lot more to electronic evidence search and review than keywords. This is the Twenty First Century. You should be using AI, specifically active machine learning, aka Predictive Coding.

You need an expert to help you and you need them at the start of a case, not after sanctions motions.

Judge Lois Bloom went on to explain that, even if defendant’s story of innocent reliance on it lawyers was true:

It has long been held that a client-principal is “bound by the acts of his lawyer agent.” Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash RR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962)). As the Second Circuit stated, “even innocent clients may not benefit from the fraud of their attorney.” Id. . . .

However, notwithstanding defendants’ assertion that the search terms “FreeStyle” and “International” were used in lieu of more comprehensive search terms at the behest of Mr. Yert, it is undisputed that Mr. Sweet, H&H’s general manager, knew that H&H used abbreviations for these terms. Mr. Sweet admitted this at his deposition. See Sweet Dep. 81:2-81:24, Mar. 13, 2018. . . . The Court need not speculate as to why defendants did not use these search terms to comply with defendants’ obligation to produce pursuant to the Court’s Order. Mr. Sweet, by his own admission, states that “on several occasions he contacted Mr. Yert with specific questions about whether to include certain emails in production.” Sweet Decl. ¶ 7. It is inconceivable that H&H’s General Manager, who worked closely with Mr. Yert to respond to the Court’s Order, never mentioned that spelling out the terms used, “International” and “FreeStyle”, would not capture the documents in H&H’s email system. Mr. Sweet knew that H&H was required to produce documents regarding International FreeStyle test strips, regardless of whether H&H’s documents spelled out or abbreviated the terms. Had plaintiffs not seized H&H’s email server in the counterfeiting action, plaintiffs would have never known that defendants failed to produce a trove of responsive documents. H&H would have gotten away with it.

Opinion pgs. 12-13.

Defendants also failed to produce any documents by three custodians Holland Trading, Howard Goldman, and Lori Goldman. Again, they tried to blame that omission on their attorney, who they claim directed the search. Oh yeah, for sure. To me he looks like a mere stooge, a tool of unscrupulous litigants. Judge Bloom did not accept that defense either, holding:

While defendants’ effort to shift blame to Mr. Yert is unconvincing at best, even if defendants’ effort could be credited, counsel’s actions, even if they were found to be negligent, would not shield the H&H defendants from responsibility for their bad faith conduct.

Opinion pgs. 19-20. Then Judge Bloom went on to cite the record at length, including the depositions and affidavits of the attorneys involved, to expose this blame game as a sham. The order then concludes on this point holding:

There is no credible explanation for why the Holland Trading, Howard Goldman, and Lori Goldman documents were not produced except that the documents were willfully withheld. Defendants’ explanation that there were no documents withheld, then that any documents that weren’t produced were due to technical glitches, then that the documents didn’t appear in Mr. Sweet’s original search, then that if documents were intentionally removed, they were removed per Mr. Yert’s instructions cannot all be true. The H&H defendants have always had one more excuse up their sleeve in this “series of episodes of nonfeasance,” which amounts to “deliberate tactical intransigence.” Cine, 602 F.2d at 1067. In light of the H&H defendants’ ever-changing explanations as to the withheld documents, Mr. Sweet’s inconsistent testimony, and assertions of former counsel, the Court finds that the H&H defendants have calculatedly attempted to manipulate the judicial process. See Penthouse, 663 F.2d 376–390 (affirming entry of default where plaintiffs disobeyed an “order to produce in full all of [their] financial statements,” engaged in “prolonged and vexatious obstruction of discovery with respect to closely related and highly relevant records,” and gave “false testimony and representations that [financial records] did not exist.”).

Opinion pgs. 22-23.

The plaintiff, Abbott Labs, went on to argue that “the withheld documents freed David Gulas to commit perjury at his deposition. The Court agrees.” Id. at 24. The Truth has a way of finding itself out, especially with competent counsel on the other side and a good judge.

With this evidence the Court concluded the only adequate sanction was a default judgment in plaintiff’s favor. Message to spoliating defendants, game over, you lose.

Based on the full record of the case, there is clear and convincing evidence that defendants have perpetrated a fraud upon the court. Defendants’ initial conduct of formulating search terms designed to fail in deliberate disregard of the lawful orders of the Court allowed H&H to purposely withhold responsive documents, including the Holland Trading, Howard Goldman, and Lori Goldman documents. Defendants proffered inconsistent positions with three successive counsel as to why the documents were withheld. Mr. Sweet’s testimony is clearly inconsistent if not perjured from his deposition to his declaration in opposition to the instant motion. Mr. Goldman’s deposition testimony is evasive and self-serving at best. Finally, Mr. Gulas’ deposition testimony is clearly perjured. Had plaintiffs never seized H&H’s server pursuant to the Court’s Order in the counterfeiting case, H&H would have gotten away with their fraud upon this Court. H&H only complied with the Court’s orders and their discovery obligations when their backs were against the wall. Their email server had been seized. There was no longer an escape from responsibility for their bad faith conduct. This is, again, similar to Cerruti, where the “defendants did not withdraw the [false] documents on their own. Rather, they waited until the falsity of the documents had been detected.” Cerruti.,169 F.R.D. at 583. But for being caught in a web of irrefutable evidence, H&H would have profited from their misconduct. . . .

The Court finds that the H&H defendants have committed a fraud upon the court, and that the harshest sanction is warranted. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions should be granted and a default judgment should be entered against H&H Wholesale Services, Inc., Howard Goldman, and Lori Goldman.

Conclusion

Attorneys of record sign responses under Rule 26(g) to requests for production, not the client. That is because the rules require them to control the discovery efforts of their clients. That means the attorney’s neck is on the line. Rule 26(g) does not allow you to just take a client’s word for it. Verify. Supervise. The numbers should add up. The search terms, if used, should be designed and tested to succeed, not fail. This is your response, not the client’s. You determine the search method, in consultation with the client for sure, but not by “just following orders.” You must see everything, not nothing. If you see no email from key custodians, dig deeper and ask why. Do this at the beginning of the case. Get vendor help before you start discovery, not after you fail. Apparently the original defense attorneys here did just what they were asked, they went along with the client. Look where it got them. Fired and deposed. Default judgment entered. Cautionary tale indeed.

 

 


Purple Rain of Sanctions Falls on the Record Company in the “Prince Case” for their Intentional Destruction of Text Messages

March 10, 2019

Honey, I know, I know
I know times are changing
It’s time we all reach out
For something new, that means you too.
Purple Rain
PRINCE Rogers Nelson
1958-2016

I know, I know, it used to be good enough just to save the relevant emails and ESI on company computers. Not any more. Times are changing. Important business is now conducted by phone text and other messages. It’s time we all reach out and save something new, save the texts, save the phones. That directive applies to everyone, that means you too. Prince record company executives recently found that out the hard way in District Court in Minneapolis. Paisley Park Enters. v. Boxill, No. 0:17-cv-01212, (D. Minn., 3/5/19) (copy here: Prince_Discovery_Order).

United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung sanctioned the record company defendant and its two top executives in a suit over the posthumous release of Prince’s “Deliverance” album. They were sanctioned because the plaintiff, the Prince Estate via Paisley Park, proved that the defendant executives intentionally destroyed text messages about the album. They denied bad intent and claim they did what they thought the law required, save the emails and office computer data. Defendants claimed they provided discovery from other sources of ESI, including their work computers, cooperated with a forensic data firm to ensure Plaintiffs obtained everything they sought, but, they further argue that Plaintiffs never asked to inspect their cell phones during this process. They claimed they did not know they also had to preserve their text messages.

One is reminded of the first verse to Purple Rain:
I never meant to cause you any sorrow
I never meant to cause you any pain
I only wanted to one time to see you laughing
I only wanted to see you
Laughing in the purple rain

Judge Tony Leung was not laughing, purple rain or not. He did not believe defendants’ good faith intent argument. He was no more impressed by their “times are changing,” “we didn’t know” argument than Prince was in Purple Rain. In today’s world preservation of email is not enough. If text messages are how people did business, which was the case in Paisley Park, then these messages must also be preserved. As Judge Leung put it:

In the contemporary world of communications, even leaving out the potential and reality of finding the modern-day litigation equivalent of a “smoking gun” in text messages, e-mails, and possibly other social media, the Court is baffled as to how Defendants can reasonably claim to believe that their text messages would be immune from discovery.

Perhaps what really got to the judge was that these record executives not only the deleted the texts, they wiped the phones and then they threw them away. This was all before suit was filed, but they knew full well at the time that the Estate was going to sue them for copyright violations.  As Judge Leung explained (emphasis added):  “An e-discovery lawyer for Plaintiffs’ law firm indicates that had Staley and Wilson not wiped and discarded their phones, it might have been possible to recover the deleted messages. (ECF No. 387, p. 2).” (Note: this is the first time I can recall this expression “e-discovery lawyer”  being used in an opinion.)

Text Message Spoliation Law

Judge Leung provides a good summary of the law.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that parties take reasonable steps to preserve ESI that is relevant to litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). The Court may sanction a party for failure for failure to do so, provided that the lost ESI cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery. Id. Rule 37(e) makes two types of sanctions available to the Court. Under Rule 37(e)(1), if the adverse party has suffered prejudice from the spoliation of evidence, the Court may order whatever sanctions are necessary to cure the prejudice. But under Rule 37(e)(2), if the Court finds that the party “acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation,” the Court may order more severe sanctions, including a presumption that the lost information was unfavorable to the party or an instruction to the jury that it “may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party.” The Court may also sanction a party for failing to obey a discovery order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Sanctions available under Rule 37(b) include an order directing that certain designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, payment of reasonable expenses, and civil contempt of court.

Pgs.6-7

There is no doubt that Staley and Wilson are the types of persons likely to have relevant information, given their status as principals of RMA and owners of Deliverance. Nor can there be any reasonable dispute as to the fact that their text messages were likely to contain information relevant to this litigation. In fact, Boxill and other third parties produced text messages that they sent to or received from Staley and Wilson. Neither party disputes that those text messages were relevant to this litigation. Thus, the RMA Defendants were required to take reasonable steps to preserve Staley and Wilson’s text messages.

The RMA Defendants did not do so. First, Staley and Wilson did not suspend the auto-erase function on their phones. Nor did they put in place a litigation hold to ensure that they preserved text messages. The principles of the “standard reasonableness framework” require a party to “suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.” Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 96, 108 (E.D. Va. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It takes, at most, only a few minutes to disengage the auto-delete function on a cell phone. It is apparent, based on Staley’s affidavit, that he and Wilson could have taken advantage of relatively simple options to ensure that their text messages were backed up to cloud storage. (ECF No. 395, pp. 7-9). These processes would have cost the RMA Defendants little, particularly in comparison to the importance of the issues at stake and the amount in controversy here. Failure to follow the simple steps detailed above alone is sufficient to show that Defendants acted unreasonably.

Pgs. 8-9

But that is not all the RMA Defendants did and did not do. Most troubling of all, they wiped and destroyed their phones after Deliverance and RMA had been sued, and, in the second instance for Wilson, after the Court ordered the parties to preserve all relevant electronic information, after the parties had entered into an agreement regarding the preservation and production of ESI, and after Plaintiffs had sent Defendants a letter alerting them to the fact they needed to produce their text messages. As Plaintiffs note, had Staley and Wilson not destroyed their phones, it is possible that Plaintiffs might have been able to recover the missing text messages by use of the “cloud” function or through consultation with a software expert. But the content will never be known because of Staley and Wilson’s intentional acts. The RMA Defendants’ failure to even consider whether Staley and Wilson’s phones might have discoverable information before destroying them was completely unreasonable. This is even more egregious because litigation had already commenced.

Pg. 9

It is obvious, based on text messages that other parties produced in this litigation, that Staley and Wilson used their personal cell phones to conduct the business of RMA and Deliverance. It is not Plaintiffs’ responsibility to question why RMA Defendants did not produce any text messages; in fact, it would be reasonable for Plaintiffs to assume that Defendants’ failure to do so was on account of the fact that no such text messages existed. This is because the RMA Defendants are the only ones who would know the extent that they used their personal cell phones for RMA and Deliverance business at the time they knew or should have reasonably known that litigation was not just possible, but likely, or after Plaintiffs filed suit or served their discovery requests.

Furthermore, the RMA Defendants do not get to select what evidence they want to produce, or from what sources. They must produce all responsive documents or seek relief from the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (outlining process for obtaining protective order).

Pg. 12

Having concluded that the RMA Defendants did not take reasonable steps to preserve and in fact intended to destroy relevant ESI, the Court must next consider whether the lost ESI can be restored or replaced from any other source. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).

Pg. 13

While it is true that Plaintiffs have obtained text messages that Boxill and other parties sent to or received from Staley and Wilson, that does not mean that all responsive text messages have been recovered or that a complete record of those conversations is available. In particular, because Wilson and Staley wiped and destroyed their phones, Plaintiffs are unable to recover text messages that the two individuals sent only to each other. Nor can they recover text messages that Staley and Wilson sent to third parties to whom Plaintiff did not send Rule 45 subpoenas (likely because they were not aware that Wilson or Staley communicated with those persons). The RMA Defendants do not dispute that text messages sent between Staley and Wilson are no longer recoverable.  . . .

At most, Plaintiffs now can obtain only “scattershot texts and [e-mails],” rather than “a complete record of defendants’ written communications from defendants themselves.” First Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Lee, No. 14 cv-1843, 2016 WL 881003 *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2016). The Court therefore finds that the missing text messages cannot be replaced or restored by other sources.

Pgs. 13-14

There is no doubt that Plaintiffs are prejudiced by the loss of the text messages. Prejudice exists when spoliation prohibits a party from presenting evidence that is relevant to its underlying case. Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 532. As set forth above, in the Court’s discussion regarding their ability to replace or restore the missing information, Plaintiffs are left with an incomplete record of the communications that Defendants had with both each other and third parties. Neither the Court nor Plaintiffs can know what ESI has been lost or how significant that ESI was to this litigation. The RMA Defendants’ claim that no prejudice has occurred is “wholly unconvincing,” given that “it is impossible to determine precisely what the destroyed documents contained or how severely the unavailability of these documents might have prejudiced [Plaintiffs’] ability to prove the claims set forth in [their] Complaint.” Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 110 (S.D. Fl. 1987); see also Multifeeder Tech., Inc. v. British Confectionary Co. Ltd, No. 09-cv-1090, 2012 WL 4128385 *23 (D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2012) (finding prejudice because Court will never know what ESI was destroyed and because it was undisputed that destroying parties had access to relevant information), report and recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part by 2012 WL 4135848 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2012). Plaintiffs are now forced to go to already existing discovery and attempt to piece together what information might have been contained in those messages, thereby increasing their costs and expenses. Sanctions are therefore appropriate under Rule 37(e)(1).

Sanctions are also appropriate under Rule 37(e)(2) because the Court finds that the RMA Defendants acted with the intent to deprive Plaintiffs of the evidence. “Intent rarely is proved by direct evidence, and a district court has substantial leeway to determine intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness credibility, motives of the witnesses in a particular case, and other factors.” Morris v. Union Pacific R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004). There need not be a “smoking gun” to prove intent. Auer v. City of Minot, 896 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2018). But there must be evidence of “a serious and specific sort of culpability” regarding the loss of the relevant ESI. Id.

Pgs. 15-16

The Court can draw only one conclusion from this set of circumstances: that they acted with the intent to deprive Plaintiffs from using this information. Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions are particularly appropriate as to Wilson, RMA, and Deliverance for this reason as well.

Pg. 17

The Court believes that Plaintiffs’ request for an order presuming the evidence destroyed was unfavorable to the RMA Defendants and/or for an adverse inference instruction may well be justified. But given the fact that discovery is still on-going, the record is not yet closed, and the case is still some time from trial, the Court believes it more appropriate to defer consideration of those sanctions to a later date, closer to trial. See Monarch Fire Protection Dist. v. Freedom Consulting & Auditing Servs., Inc., 644 F.3d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to defer sanction considerations until trial). At that point, the trial judge will have the benefit of the entire record and supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the parameters of any such instruction or presumption.

The Court will, however, order the RMA Defendants to pay monetary sanctions pursuant to Rules 37(b), and 37(e) and the Court’s pretrial scheduling orders.

Pgs. 18-19

The Court will therefore order, pursuant to Rules 37(b)(2)(C), 37(e)(1), and 37(e)(2) and the Court’s pretrial scheduling orders, the RMA Defendants to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, that Plaintiffs incurred as a result of the RMA Defendants’ misconduct. The Court will order Plaintiffs to file a submission with the Court detailing such expenses and allow the RMA Defendants the opportunity to respond to that submission. In addition, pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2) and the Court’s pretrial scheduling order, the Court will also order the RMA Defendants to pay into the Court a fine of $10,000. fn3 This amount is due within 90 days of the date of this Order.

Pg. 20

Let’s close with the original music of Prince.

 

 


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