“Save Everything” and Eventually You Will Not Be Able to Find Anything: The Sedona Conference Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition

August 13, 2018

If you are a data hoarder, an information pack-rat that saves everything, you will eventually drown in your own data and die. Maybe not literally killed, mind you, but figuratively. Maybe not you personally, but your enterprise, your group, your project, your network. Too much information can render you and your enterprise intellectually paralyzed, cut off and seriously misinformed or uninformed. Saving it all is physically and logistically difficult, if not possible. Even if you could, keeping it all would impede your search, making it hard to find the information you need, when you need it. I address these issues this week in my review of a new commentary by The Sedona Conference Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition (August 2018).

Information overload is better than physical death I know, but still very bad in today’s Google world. You end up not being able to find the information you need, when you need it. That makes it hard to determine what really happened. It allows lies and liars to fester and grow. We are now seeing firsthand in the U.S. where this can lead. It is not good. It has put the whole world into a precarious situation. We need the truth to thrive as a culture; not smoke and mirrors, not conman games. A culture built on lies is a cancer. It is a deadly disease, especially for the Law, which depends on truth, on evidence, on real facts, to attain the goal of Justice.

Saving Too Much

Over-retention is the enemy of effective, efficient search. The more ESI there is to search, the more difficult the search. There can be exceptions to this rule, but for the most part it is true. That makes a “save everything” ESI policy an enemy of search. It interferes with the ability to find the information needed, which in my case is electronic evidence in legal proceedings, when it is needed. It is important for these information needs be filled quickly and completely.

Search is powerful. That is my field. The more data the better, is often true, but not always. It depends on the data and its effective life, how long a particular type of data is of any use to anyone. Big data allows for detection of patterns that would otherwise not be seen. This analysis takes CPU power. The advances in this area have been fantastic. We have the processing power, as well as the cheap storage, but our search and retrieval software has not otherwise kept up with the data explosion in volume and complexity. Predictive coding software and other AI applications have come a long way, but are still sometimes confused by the volume, variety and complexity of useless data that plagues most company IT systems.

Retrieval of specific documents and metadata takes time and specialized human skills. The more worthless data in a collection, such as spam, the greater the number false positives in a search, no matter how powerful the algorithms or skilled the searcher. Vast volumes of data make searches longer to execute and less precise. The more noise in the data, the more difficult to hear the signal. That is a fundamental law of information.

With high data volumes you can often still find the signal, the relevant documents that you need in large chaotic data collections, but it takes time and special tools and skills. There are often too many false positives in searches of data collections containing too much spam-like, useless data. Although search is strong, search alone is inadequate to meet the needs of most organizations. They also need data destruction and retention policies that govern all information. That is one reason why the success of information governance depends on data disposition.

An organization should save as much as it needs, but not too much, and also not too little. It is a Goldilocks situation. If you do not save data, you can never find it. If you save too little, then what you later need might not be there to be found. But if you save too much, you may never be able to find what you need. The signal may be in the collection to be found, in plain view, but hidden in the vast numbers, the noise of spam and other irrelevancies.

Search v. Destroy

I have debated Information Governance leaders for years the importance of search versus file destruction. I was pretty much the only advocate for search over disposition. I favored retention over destruction in most close cases, but I had a cost and proportionality overlay. I am reminded, for instance, of my debate with Jason Baron on the subject at the IQPC 10th Anniversary of Information Governance and eDiscovery, where he managed to quote Churchill at the end and won the debate hands-down. e-Disco News, Knowledge and Humor: What’s Happening Today and Likely to Happen Tomorrow (e-Discovery Team, June 7, 2015); Information Governance v Search: The Battle Lines Are Redrawn (e-Discovery Team, Feb. 8, 2015).

I did not consider it a fair debate because of Jason’s very successful pandering to the jury during his closing argument with a quote by Churchill from his speech, We Shall Fight on the Beaches. That’s the one about never surrendering in the fight against “the odious apparatus of Nazi rule” (sadly, this exhortation still has legs today in the US).

The debate was “unfair” primarily because this was an IG conference. Everybody in IG is pro-destruction and values disposition over search. I think most IG leaders go too far, that they are trigger happy to kill data. I pointed out in my debates that once a file is deleted, it cannot be found, no matter how good your filing, no matter how good your search (forensic recovery issues aside).

I am pro-search and think that the importance of management of ESI by filing and disposition is somewhat overblown. I think search is king, not data deletion. Still, even in my most strident of debates and pro-search arguments, I never advocated for the retention of all data. I always assumed that some file disposition was required and accepted that as a given. I was not a save everything and search advocate. I advocated for both, search and destroy. I advocated for more retention than most, but have never argued to retain everything.

There is a common core of agreement that some ESI should be deleted, that all data should not be saved. The disagreement is on how much data to save. How does a person or company know what is the “just right” data destruction policy for that company? There is agreement among experts that there is no one-size-fits-all solution, so custom work is required. Different retention and destruction policies should apply depending on the company and the particularities of their data universe. Many IG specialists advise clients on the custom fit they need. It involves careful investigation of the company, its data and activities, including law suits and other investigations.

The Sedona Conference  Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition

Kevin Brady

Kevin Brady

These IG specialists, and the companies they serve, now have an excellent new resource tool to analyze and custom-fit data destruction policies. The Sedona Conference Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition (August 2018 Public Comment Version) (Editors-in-Chief, Kevin F. Brady and Dean Kuckelman). I highly recommend this new and excellent work by The Sedona Conferences. My commendations to the Drafting Team: Lauren A. Allen, Jesse Murray, Ross Gotler, Ken Prine, Logan J. Herlinger, David C. Shonka, Mark Kindy; the Drafting Team Leaders: Tara Emory and Becca Rausch; the Staff Editor: Susan McClaim, and Editors-in-Chief, Kevin F. Brady and Dean Kuckelman. Please send to them any comments you may have.

The Commentary begins in usual Sedona fashion by articulation of basic principles and comments tied to principles. The cases and legal authorities cited in all Commentaries by The Sedona Conference are excellent. This commentary on data disposition is no exception. I commend it for your detailed study and reference. Free download here from The Sedona Conference.

The Principles are:

PRINCIPLE 1.    Absent a legal retention or preservation obligation, organizations may dispose of their information.

Comment 1.a.   An organization should, in the ordinary course of business, properly dispose of information that it does not need.

Comment 1.b.   When designing and implementing an information disposition program, organizations should consider the obligation to preserve information that is relevant to the claims and defenses and proportional to the needs of any pending or anticipated litigation.

Comment 1.c. When designing and implementing an information disposition program, organizations should consider the obligation to preserve information that is relevant to the subject matter of government inquiries or investigations that are pending or threatened against the organization.

Comment 1.d.   When designing and implementing an information disposition program, organizations should consider applicable statutory and regulatory obligations to retain information.

PRINCIPLE 2.    When designing and implementing an information disposition program, organizations should identify and manage the risks of over-retention.

Comment 2.a.   Information has a lifecycle, including a time when disposal is beneficial.

Comment 2.b. To determine the “right” time for disposal, risks and costs of retention and disposal should be evaluated.

PRINCIPLE 3.    Disposition should be based on Information Governance policies that reflect and harmonize with an organization’s information, technological capabilities, and objectives.

Comment 3.a.   To create effective information disposition policies, organizations should establish core components of an Information Governance program, which should reflect what information it has, when it can be disposed of, how it is stored, and who owns it.

Comment 3.b. An organization should understand its technological capabilities and define its information objectives in the context of those capabilities.

Document Disposition and Information Governance

The Sedona Conference Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition builds upon Sedona’s earlier work, the Sedona Conference Commentary on Information Governance (Oct. 2014). Principle 6 of the Commentary on Information Governance provides the following guidance to organizations:

The effective, timely, and consistent disposal of physical and electronic information that no longer needs to be retained should be a core component of any Information Governance program. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Information Governance, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 146 (2014) (“Information Governance” is “an organization’s coordinated, interdisciplinary approach to satisfying information compliance requirements and managing information risks while optimizing information value.” Id. at 126).

The Comment to Principle 6 goes on to explain:

It is a sound strategic objective of a corporate organization to dispose of information no longer required for compliance, legal hold purposes, or in the ordinary course of business. If there is no legal retention obligation, information should be disposed as soon as the cost and risk of retaining the information is outweighed by the likely business value of retaining the information. . . . Typically, the business value decreases and the cost and risk increase as information ages. Id. at 147.

The Sedona Conference concluded in 2018 that this 2014 advice, and similar advice from other sources, has not been followed by most organizations. instead, they continue to struggle to make “effective disposition decisions.” The group in Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition concluded in its Introduction that this struggle was caused by many factors, but identified the three main problems:

[T]he incorrect belief that organizations will be forced to “defend” their disposition
actions if they later become involved in litigation. Indeed, the phrase “defensible disposition” suggests that organizations have a duty to defend their information disposition actions. While it is true that organizations must make “reasonable and good faith efforts to retain information that is relevant to claims or defenses,” that duty to preserve information is not triggered until there is a “reasonably anticipated or pending litigation” or other legal demands for records. The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 51, Principle 5, 93 (2018).

Another factor in the struggle toward effective disposition of information is the difficulty in appreciating how such disposition reduces costs and risks.

Lastly, many organizations struggle with how to design and implement effective disposition as part of their overall Information Governance program.

The Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition attempt to address these three factors and provide guidance to organizations, and the professionals who counsel organizations, on developing and implementing an effective disposition program.

Disposition Challenges

The Sedona Conference Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition (August, 2018) concludes by identifying the main challenges to data deletion.

  1. Unstructured Information.
  2. Mergers and Acquisitions.
  3. Departed, Separated, or Former Employees
  4. Shared File Sites
  5. Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”)
  6. Law Firms, eDiscovery Vendors, and Adversaries
  7. In-House Legal Departments
  8. Hoarders (my personal favorite)
  9. Regulations
  10. Cultural Change and Training

There are more, I am sure, but this is a good top ten list to start. I only wish they had included more discussion of these top ten.

Conclusion

Search is still more important for me than destroy. I prefer Where’s Waldo over Kill Waldo! I have not changed my position on that. But neither has mainstream Information Governance. They still disagree with my emphasis on Search. But everyone agrees that we should do both: Search and Destroy. Even I do not want companies to save all of their data. Some data should be destroyed.

I agree with mainstream IG that saving everything forever is not a viable information governance policy, no matter how many resources you also put into ESI search and retrieval. I have never said that you should rely solely on search, just that you should give Search more importance and, when in doubt, that you should save more documents than less. The Search and Destroy argument has always been one of a matter of degree and balance, not whether there should be no destruction at all. The difficult questions involve what should be saved and for how long, which are traditional information management problems.

Where to draw the line on destruction is the big question for everyone. The answer is always company specific, even project specific. It involves questions of varying retention times, files type and custodian analysis. When it comes down to specific decisions, and close questions, I generally favor retention. What may appear to be useless today, may prove to be relevant evidence tomorrow. I hate not being able to prove my case because all of the documents have already been deleted. Then it is just one person’s word against another. IG experts, who usually no longer litigate, or never litigated, do not like my complaints. They are eager to kill, to purge and destroy data. I am more inclined to save and search, but not save too much. It is a question of balance.

Data destruction – the killing of data – can, if done properly, make the search for relevant content much easier. Some disposition of obviously irrelevant, spam and otherwise useless information makes sense on every level. It helps all users of the IT system. It also helps with legal compliance. Too much destruction of data, too aggressive, and you may end up deleting information that you were required by law to keep. You could lose a law suit because of one mistake in a data disposition decision. Where do you draw the line between save and delete? What is the scope of a preservation duty? What files types should be retained? What retention times should apply? How much is too much? Not enough?

The questions go on and on and there is no one right answer. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of the organization and its data. The new Sedona Conference Principles and Commentary on Defensible Disposition is an important new guide to help IT lawyers and technologists to craft custom answers to these questions.

 


Responding Party’s Complaints of Financial Burden of Document Review Were Unsupported by the Evidence, Any Evidence

August 5, 2018

One of the largest cases in the U.S. today is a consolidated group of price-fixing cases in District Court in Chicago. In Re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 290 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (order denying motions to dismiss and discussing the case). The consolidated antitrust cases involve allegations of a wide spread chicken price-fixing. Big Food Versus Big Chicken: Lawsuits Allege Processors Conspired To Fix Bird Prices (NPR 2/6/18).

The level of sales and potential damages are high. For instance, in 2014 the sales of broiler chickens in the U.S. was $32.7 Billion. That’s sales for one year. The classes have not been certified yet, but discovery is underway in the consolidated cases.

The Broiler Chicken case is not only big money, but big e-discovery. A Special Master (Maura Grossman) was appointed months ago and she developed a unique e-discovery validation protocol order for the case. See: TAR for Smart Chickens, by John Tredennick and Jeremy Pickens that analyzes the validation protocol.

Maura was not involved in the latest discovery dispute where, Agri Stats, one of many defendants, claimed a request for production was too burdensome as to it. The latest problem went straight to the presiding Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert who issued his order on July 26, 2018. In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 3586183 (N.D. Ill. 7/26/18).

Agri Stats had moved for a protective order to limit an email production request. Agri Stats claimed that the burden imposed was not proportional because it would be too expensive. Its lawyers told Judge Gilbert that it would cost between $1,200,000 and $1,700,00 to review the email using the keywords negotiated.

Fantasy Hearing

I assume that there were hearings and attorney conferences before the hearings. But I do not know that for sure. I have not seen a transcript of the hearings with Judge Gilbert. All we know is that defense counsel told the judge that under the keywords selected the document review would cost between $1,200,000 and $1,700,000, and that they had no explanation on how the cost estimate was prepared, nor any specifics as to what it covered. Although I was not there, after four decades of doing this sort of work, I have a pretty good idea of what was or might have been said at the hearing.

This representation of million dollar costs by defense counsel would have gotten the attention of the judge. He would naturally have wanted to know how the cost range was calculated. I can almost hear the judge say from the bench: “$1.7 Million Dollars to do a doc review. Yeah, ok. That is a lot of money. Why so much counsel? Anyone?” To which the defense attorneys said in response, much like the students in Ferris Beuller’s class:

“. . . . . .”

 

Yes. That’s right. They had Nothing. Just Voodoo Economics

Well, Judge Gilbert’s short opinion makes it seem that way. In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 3586183 (N.D. Ill. 7/26/18).

If a Q&A interchange like this happened, either in a phone hearing, or in person, then the lawyers must have said something. You do not just ignore a question by a federal judge. The defense attorneys probably did a little hemming and hawing, conferred among themselves, and then said something to the judge like: “We are not sure how those numbers were derived, $1.2M to $1.5M, and will have to get back to you on that question, Your Honor.” And then, they never did. I have seen this kind of thing a few times before. We all try to avoid it. But it is even worse to make up a false story, or even present an unverified story to the judge. Better to say nothing and get back to the judge with accurate information.

Discovery Order of July 26, 2018

Here is a quote from Judge Gilbert’s Order so you can read for yourself the many questions the moving party left unanswered (detailed citations to record removed; graphics added):

Agri Stats represents that the estimated cost to run the custodial searches EUCPs propose and to review and produce the ESI is approximately $1.2 to $1.7 million. This estimated cost, however, is not itemized nor broken down for the Court to understand how it was calculated. For example, is it $1.2 to $1.7 million to review all the custodial documents from 2007 through 2016? Or does this estimate isolate only the pre-October 2012 custodial searches that Agri Stats does not want to have to redo, in its words? More importantly, Agri Stats also admits that this estimate is based on EUCPs’ original proposed list of search terms. But EUCPs represent (and Agri Stats does not disagree) that during their apparently ongoing discussions, EUCPs have proposed to relieve Agri Stats of the obligation to produce various categories of documents and data, and to revise the search terms to be applied to data that is subject to search. Agri Stats does not appear to have provided a revised cost estimate since EUCPs agreed to exclude certain categories of documents and information and revised their search terms. Rather, Agri Stats takes the position that custodial searches before October 3, 2012 are not proportional to the needs of the case — full stop — so it apparently has not fully analyzed the cost impact of EUCPs’ revised search terms or narrowed document and data categories.

The Court wonders what the cost estimate is now after EUCPs have proposed to narrow the scope of what they are asking Agri Stats to do. (emphasis added) EUCPs say they already have agreed, or are working towards agreement, that 2.5 million documents might be excluded from Agri Stats’s review. That leaves approximately 520,000 documents that remain to be reviewed. In addition, EUCPs say they have provided to Agri Stats revised search terms, but Agri Stats has not responded. Agri Stats says nothing about this in its reply memorandum.

EUCPs contend that Agri Stats’s claims of burden and cost are vastly overstated. The Court tends to agree with EUCPs on this record. It is not clear what it would cost in either time or money to review and produce the custodial ESI now being sought by EUCPs for the entire discovery period set forth in the ESI Protocol or even for the pre-October 3, 2102 period. It seems that Agri Stats itself also does not know for sure what it would have to do and how much it would cost because the parties have not finished that discussion. Because EUCPs say they are continuing to work with Agri Stats to reduce what it must do to comply with their discovery requests, the incremental burden on what Agri Stats now is being asked to do is not clear.

For all these reasons, Agri Stats falls woefully short of satisfying its obligation to show that the information [*10] EUCPs are seeking is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.

Estimations for Fun and Profit

In order to obtain a protective order you need to estimate the costs that will likely be involved in the discovery from which you seek protection. Simple. Moreover, it obviously has to be a reasonable estimate, a good faith estimate, supported by the facts. The Brolier Chicken defendant, Agri Stats, came up with an estimate. They got that part right. But then they stopped. You never do that. You do not just throw up a number and hope for the best. You have to explain how it was derived. Blushing at any price higher than that is not a reasonable explanation, but is often honest.

Be ready to explain how you came up with the cost estimate. To break down the total into its component parts and allow the “Court to understand how it was calculated.” Agri Stats did not do that. Instead, they just used a cost estimate of between $1.2 to $1.7 million. So of course Agri Stats’ motion for protective order was denied. The judge had no choice because no evidence to support the motion was presented, neither factual or expert evidence. There was no need for Judge Gilbert to go into the secondary questions of whether expert testimony was also needed and whether it should be under Rule 702. He got nothing remember. No explanation for the $1.7 Million.

The lesson of the latest discovery order in Broiler Chicken is pretty simple. In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 3586183 (N.D. Ill. 7/26/18). Get a real cost estimate from an expert. The expert needs to know and understand document review, search and costs of review. They need to know how to make reasonable search and retrieval efforts. They also need to know how to make reliable estimates. You may need two experts for this, as not all have expertise in both fields, but they are readily available. Many can even talk pretty well too, but not all! Seriously, everybody knows we are the most fun and interesting lawyer subgroup.

The last thing to do is skimp on an expert and just pull out a number from your hat (or your vendor’s hat) and hope for the best.

This is federal court, not a political rally. You do not make bald assertions and leave the court wondering. Facts matter. Back of the envelope type guesses are not sufficient, especially in a big case like Broiler Chicken. Neither are guesstimates by people who do not know what they are doing. Make disclosure and cooperate with the requesting party to reach agreement. Do not just rush to the courthouse hoping to  dazzle with smoke and mirrors. Bring in the experts. They may not dazzle, but they can get you beyond the magic mirrors.

Case Law Background

Judge Paul S. Grewal, who is now Deputy G.C. of Facebook, said quoting The Sedona Conference in Vasudevan: There is no magic to the science of search and retrieval: only mathematics, linguistics, and hard work.Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. Microstrategy Inc., No. 11-cv-06637-RS-PSG, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 163654 (ND Cal Nov 15, 2012) (quoting The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information and Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 189, 208 (2007). There is also no magic to the art of estimation, no magic to calculating the likely range of cost to search and retrieve the documents requested. Judge Grewal refused to make any decision in Vasudevan without expert assistance, recognizing that this area is “fraught with traps for the unwary” and should not be decided on mere arguments of counsel.

Judge Grewal did not address the procedural issue of whether Rule 702 should govern. But he did cite to Judge Facciola’s case on the subject, United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). Here Judge Facciola first raised the discovery expert evidence issue. He not only opined that experts should be used, but that the parties should follow the formalities of Evidence Rule 702. That governs things such as whether you should qualify and swear in an expert and follow otherwise follow Rule 702 on their testimony. I discussed this somewhat in my earlier article this year, Judge Goes Where Angels Fear To Tread: Tells the Parties What Keyword Searches to Use.

Judge Facciola in O’Keffe held that document review issues require expert input and that this input should be provided with all of the protections provided by Evidence Rule 702.

Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread. This topic is clearly beyond the ken of a layman and requires that any such conclusion be based on evidence that, for example, meets the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, if defendants are going to contend that the search terms used by the government were insufficient, they will have to specifically so contend in a motion to compel and their contention must be based on evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Conclusion

In the Boiler Chicken Antitrust Order of July 27, 2018, a motion for protective order was denied because of inadequate evidence of burden. All the responding party did was quote a price-range, a number presumably provided by an expert, but there was no explanation. More evidence was needed, both expert and fact. I agree that generally document review cost estimation requires opinions of experts. The experts need to be proficient in two fields. They need to know and understand the science of document search and retrieval and the likely costs for these services for a particular set of data.

Although all of the formalities and expense of compliance with Evidence Rule 702 may be needed in some cases, it is probably not necessary in most. Just bring your expert to the attorney conference or hearing. Yes, two experts may well disagree on some things, probably will, but the areas of agreement are usually far more important. That in turn makes compromise and negotiation far easier. Better leave the technical details to the experts to sort out. That follows the Rule 1 prime directive of “just, speedy and inexpensive.” Keep the trial lawyers out of it. They should instead focus and argue on what the documents mean.

 

 

 


Another Judge is Asked to Settle a Keyword Squabble and He Hesitates To Go Where Angels Fear To Tread: Only Tells the Parties What Keywords NOT To Use

July 15, 2018

In this blog we discuss yet another case where the parties are bickering over keywords and the judge was asked to intervene. Webastro Thermo & Comfort v. BesTop, Inc., 2018 WL 3198544, No.16-13456 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2018). The opinion was written in a patent case in Detroit by Executive Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen. He looked at the proposed keywords and found them wanting, but wisely refused to go further and tell them what keywords to use. Well done Judge Whalen!

This case is similar to the one discussed in my last blog, Judge Goes Where Angels Fear To Tread: Tells the Parties What Keyword Searches to Use, where Magistrate Judge Laura Fashing in Albuquerque was asked to resolve a keyword dispute in United States v. New Mexico State University, No. 1:16-cv-00911-JAP-LF, 2017 WL 4386358 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2017). Judge Fashing not only found the proposed keywords inadequate, but came up with her own replacement keywords and did so without any expert input.

In my prior blog on Judge Fashing’s decision I discussed Judge John Facciola’s landmark legal search opinion in United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008) and other cases that follow it. In O’Keefe Judge Facciola held that because keyword search questions involve complex, technical, scientific questions, that a judge should not decide such issues without the help of expert testimony. That is the context for his famous line:

Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread. This topic is clearly beyond the ken of a layman and requires that any such conclusion be based on evidence that, for example, meets the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

In this weeks blog I consider the opinion by Judge Whalen in Webastro Thermo & Comfort v. BesTop, Inc., 2018 WL 3198544, No.16-13456 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2018) where he told the parties what keywords not to use, again without expert input, but stopped there. Interesting counterpoint cases. It is also interesting to observe that in all three cases, O’Keefe, New Mexico State University and Webastro, the judges end on the same note where the parties are ordered to cooperate. Ah, if it were only so easy.

Stipulated Order Governing ESI Production

In Webastro Thermo & Comfort v. BesTop, Inc., the parties cooperated at the beginning of the case. They agreed to the entry of a stipulated ESI Order governing ESI production. The stipulation included a cooperation paragraph where the parties pledge to try to resolve all ESI issues without judicial intervention. Apparently, the parties cooperation did not go much beyond the stipulated order. Cooperation broke down and the plaintiff filed a barrage of motions to avoid having to do document review, including an Emergency Motion to Stay ESI Discovery. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the ESI stipulation by “propounding overly broad search terms in its request for ESI.” Oh, how terrible. Red Alert!

Plaintiffs further accused defense counsel of “propounding prima facie inappropriate search criteria, and refusal to work in good faith to target its search terms to specific issues in this case.” Again, the outrageous behavior reminds me of the Romulans. I can see why plaintiff’s counsel called an emergency and asked for costs and relief from having to produce any ESI at all. That kind of approach rarely goes over well with any judge, but here it worked. That’s because the keywords the defense wanted plaintiff to use in its search for relevant ESI were, in fact, very bad.

Paragraph 1.3(3) of the ESI Order establishes a protocol designed to constrain e-discovery, including a limitation to eight custodians with no more than ten keyword search terms for each. It goes on to provide the following very interesting provision:

The search terms shall be narrowly tailored to particular issues. Indiscriminate terms, such as the producing company’s name or its product name, are inappropriate unless combined with narrowing search criteria that significantly reduce the risk of overproduction. A conjunctive combination of multiple words or phrases (e.g. ‘computer’ and ‘system’) narrows the search and shall count as a single term. A disjunctive combination of multiple words or phrases (e.g. ‘computer’ or ‘system’) broadens the search, and thus each word or phrase shall count as a separate search term unless they are variants of the same word. Use of narrowing search criteria (e.g. ‘and,’ ‘but not,’ ‘w/x’) is encouraged to limit the production and shall be considered when determining whether to shift costs for disproportionate discovery.

Remember, this is negotiated wording that the parties agreed to, including the bit about product names and “conjunctive combination.”

Defendant’s Keyword Demands

The keywords proposed by defense counsel for plaintiff’s search then included: “Jeep,” “drawing” and its abbreviation “dwg,” “top,” “convertible,” “fabric,” “fold,” “sale or sales,” and the plaintiff’s product names,  “Swaptop” and “Throwback.”

Plaintiff’s counsel advised Judge Whalen that the ten terms created the following results with five custodians (no word on the other three):

  • Joseph Lupo: 30 gigabytes, 118,336 documents.
  • Ryan Evans: 13 gigabytes, 44,373 documents.
  • Tyler Ruby: 10 gigabytes, 44,460 documents.
  • Crystal Muglia: 245,019 documents.
  • Mark Denny: 162,067 documents.
In Footnote Three Judge Whalen adds, without citation to authority or the record, that:
One gigabyte would comprise approximately 678,000 pages of text. 30 gigabytes would represent approximately 21,696,000 pages of text.

Note that Catalyst did a study of average number of files in a gigabyte in 2014. They found that the average number was 2,500 files per gigabyte. They suggest using 3,000 files per gigabyte for cost estimates, just to be safe. So I have to wonder where Judge Whalen got this 678,000 pages of text per gigabyte.

Plaintiff’s counsel added that:

Just a subset of the email discovery requests propounded by BesTop have returned more than 614,00 documents, comprising potentially millions of individual pages for production.

Plaintiff’s counsel also filed an affidavit where he swore that he reviewed the first 100 consecutively numbered documents to evaluate the burden. Very impressive effort. Not! He looked at the first one-hundred documents that happened to be on top of a 614,000 pile. He also swore that none of these first one-hundred were relevant. (One wonders how many of them were empty pst container files. They are often the “documents” found first in consecutive numbering of an email collection. A better sample might have been to look at the 100 docs with the most hits.)

Judge Whalen Agrees with Plaintiff on Keywords

Judge Whalen agreed with plaintiff and held that:

The majority of defendant’s search terms are overly broad, and in some cases violate the ESI Order on its face. For example, the terms “throwback” and “swap top” refer to Webasto’s product names, which are specifically excluded under 1.3(3) of the ESI Order.

The overbreadth of other terms is obvious, especially in relation to a company that manufactures and sells convertible tops: “top,” “convertible,” “fabric,” “fold,” “sale or sales.” Using “dwg” as an alternate designation for “drawing” (which is itself a rather broad term) would call into play files with common file extension .dwg.

Apart from the obviously impermissible breadth of BesTop’s search terms, their overbreadth is borne out by Mr. Carnevale’s declarations, which detail a return of multiple gigabytes of ESI potentially comprising tens of millions of pages of documents, based on only a partial production. In addition, the search of just the first 100 records produced using BesTop’s search terms revealed that none were related to the issues in this lawsuit. Contrary to BesTop’s contention that Webasto’s claim of prejudice is conclusory, I find that Webasto has sufficiently “articulate[d] specific facts showing clearly defined and serous injury resulting from the discovery sought ….” Nix, 11 Fed.App’x. at 500.

Thus, BesTop’s reliance on City of Seattle v. Professional Basketball Club, LLC, 2008 WL 539809 (W.D. Wash. 2008), is inapposite. In City of Seattle, the defendant offered no facts to support its assertion that discovery would be overly burdensome, instead “merely state[ing] that producing such emails ‘would increase the email universe exponentially[.]’” Id. at *3. In our case, Webasto has proffered hard numbers as to the staggering amount of ESI returned based on BesTop’s search requests. Moreover, while disapproving of conclusory claims of burden, the Court in City of Seattle recognized that the overbreadth of some search terms would be apparent on their face:

“‘[U]nless it is obvious from the wording of the request itself that it is overbroad, vague, ambiguous or unduly burdensome, an objection simply stating so is not sufficiently specific.’” Id., quoting Boeing Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90957, *8 (W.D.Wash. Dec. 11, 2007).

As discussed above, many of BesTop’s terms are indeed overly general on their face. And again, propounding Webasto’s product names (e.g., “throwback” and “swap top”) violates the express language of the ESI Order.

Defense Counsel Did Not Cooperate

Judge Whalen then went on to address the apparent lack of cooperation by defendant.

Adversarial discovery practice, particularly in the context of ESI, is anathema to the principles underlying the Federal Rules, particularly Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, which directs that the Rules “be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” In this regard, the Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation states:

“Indeed, all stakeholders in the system–judges, lawyers, clients, and the general pubic–have an interest in establishing a culture of cooperation in the discovery process. Over-contentious discovery is a cost that has outstripped any advantage in the face of ESI and the data deluge. It is not in anyone’s interest to waste resources on unnecessary disputes, and the legal system is strained by ‘gamesmanship’ or ‘hiding the ball,’ to no practical effect.”

The stipulated ESI Order, which controls electronic discovery in this case, is an important step in the right direction, but whether as the result of adversarial overreach or insufficient effort, BesTop’s proposed search terms fall short of what is required under that Order.

Judge Whalen’s Ruling

Judge Whalen concluded his short Order with the following ruling:

For these reasons, Webasto’s motion for protective order [Doc. #78] is GRANTED as follows:

Counsel for the parties will meet and confer in a good-faith effort to focus and narrow BesTop’s search terms to reasonably limit Webastro’s production of ESI to emails relevant (within the meaning of Rule 26) to the issues in this case, and to exclude ESI that would have no relationship to this case.

Following this conference, and within 14 days of the date of this Order, BesTop will submit an amended discovery request with the narrowed search terms.  …

Because BesTop will have the opportunity to reformulate its discovery request to conform to the ESI Order, Webasto’s request for cost-shifting is DENIED at this time. However, the Court may reconsider the issue of cost-shifting if BesTop does not reasonably narrow its requests.

Difficult to Cooperate on Legal Search Without the Help of Experts

The defense in Webastro violated their own stipulation by the use of a party’s product names without further Boolean limiters, such as “product name AND another term.” Then defense counsel added insult to injury by coming across as uncooperative. I don’t know if they alone were uncooperative, or if it was a two way street, but appearances are everything. The emails between counsel were attached to the motions, and the judge scowled at the defense here, not plaintiff’s counsel. No judge likes attorneys who ignore orders, stipulated or otherwise, and are uncooperative to boot. “Uncooperative” is  label that you should avoid being called by a judge, especially in the world of e-discovery. Better to be an angel for discovery and save the devilish details for motions and trial.

In Webastro Thermo & Comfort v. BesTop, Inc., Judge Whalen struck down the proposed keywords without expert input. Instead Judge Whalen based his order on some incomplete metrics, namely the number of hits produced by the keywords that defense dreamed up. At least Judge Whalen did not go further and order the use of specific keywords as Judge Fashing did in United States v. New Mexico State University. Still, I wish he had not only ordered the parties to cooperate, but also ordered them to bring in some experts to help with the search tasks. You cannot just talk your way into good searches. No matter what the level of cooperation, you still have to know what you are doing.

If I had been handling this for the plaintiff, I would have gotten my hands much dirtier in the digital mud, meaning I would have done far more than just look at the first one-hundred of 614,000 documents. That was a poor quality control test, but obviously, here at least, was better than nothing. I would have done a sample review of each keyword and evaluated the precision of each. Some might have been ok as is, although probably not. They usually require some refinement. Sometimes it only takes a few minutes of review to determine that. Bottom line, I would have checked out the requested keywords. There were only ten here. That would take maybe three hours or so with the right software. You do not need big judgmental sampling most of the time to see the effectiveness, or not, or keywords.

The next step is to come up with, and test, a number of keyword refinements based on what you see in the data. Learn from the data. Test and improve various keyword combinations. That can take a few more hours. Some may think this is too much work, but it is far less time than preparing motions, memos and attending hearings. And anyway, you need to find the relevant evidence for your case.

After the tests, you share what you learned with opposing counsel and the judge, assuming they want to know. In my experience, most could care less about your methods, so long as your production includes the information they were looking for. You do not have to disclose your every little step, but you should at least advise, again if asked, information about “hit results.” This disclosure alone can go a long way, as this opinion demonstrates. Plaintiff’s counsel obtained very little data about the ineffectiveness of the defendants proposed searched terms, but that was enough to persuade the judge to enter a protective order.

To summarize, after evaluating the proposed search terms I would have improved on them. Using the improved searches I would have begun the attorney review and production. I would have shared the search information, cooperated as required by stipulation, case-law and rules, and gone ahead with my multimodal searches. I would use keywords and the many other wonderful kinds of searches that the Legal Technology industry has come up with in the last 25 years or so since keyword search was new and shiny.

Conclusion

The stipulation the parties used in Webastro could have been used at the turn of the century. Now it seems a little quaint, but alas, suits most inexperienced lawyers today. Anyway, talking about and using keywords is a good way to start a legal search. I sometimes call that Relevancy Dialogues or ESI Communications. Try out some keywords, refine and use them to guide your review, but do not stop there. Try other types of search too. Multimodal. Harness the power of the latest technology, namely AI enhanced search (Predictive Coding). Use statistics too and random sampling to better understand the data prevalence and overall search effectiveness.

If you do not know how to do legal search, and I estimate that 98% of lawyers today do not, then hire an expert. (Or take the time to learn, see eg TARcourse.com.) Your vendor probably has a couple of search experts. There may also be a lawyer in town with this expertise. Now there are even a few specialty law firms that offer these services nationwide. It is a waste of time to reinvent the Wheel, plus it is an ethical dictate under Rule 1.1 – Competence, to associate with competent counsel on a legal task when you are not.

Regarding the vendor experts, remember that even though they may be lawyers, they can only go so far. They can only provide technical advice, not legal, such as proportionality analysis under Rule 26, etc. That requires a practicing lawyer who specializes in e-discovery, preferably as a full-time specialty and not just something they do every now and then. If you are in a big firm, like I am, find the expert in your firm who specializes in e-discovery, like me. They will help you. If your firm does not have such an expert, better get one, either that or get used to losing and having your clients complain.

 


Judge Goes Where Angels Fear To Tread: Tells the Parties What Keyword Searches to Use

June 24, 2018

John Facciola was one of the first e-discovery expert judges to consider the adequacy of a producing parties keyword search efforts in United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). He first observed that keyword search and other computer assisted legal search techniques required special expertise to do properly. Everyone agrees with that. He then reached an interesting, but still somewhat controversial conclusion: because he lacked such special legal search expertise, and knew full well that most of the lawyers appearing before him did too, that he could not properly analyze and compel the use of specific keywords without the help of expert testimony. To help make his point he paraphrased Alexander Pope‘s famous line from An Essay on Criticism: “For fools rush in where angels fear to tread.

Here are the well-known words of Judge Facciola in O’Keffe (emphasis added):

As noted above, defendants protest the search terms the government used.[6]  Whether search terms or “keywords” will yield the information sought is a complicated question involving the interplay, at least, of the sciences of computer technology, statistics and linguistics. See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?; 13 Ricn. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2007). Indeed, a special project team of the Working Group on Electronic Discovery of the Sedona Conference is studying that subject and their work indicates how difficult this question is. See The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval, 8 THE SEDONA CONF. J. 189 (2008).

Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread. This topic is clearly beyond the ken of a layman and requires that any such conclusion be based on evidence that, for example, meets the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, if defendants are going to contend that the search terms used by the government were insufficient, they will have to specifically so contend in a motion to compel and their contention must be based on evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Many courts have followed O’Keffe, even though it is a criminal case, and declined to step in and order specific searches without expert input. See eg. the well-known patent case, Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. Microstrategy Inc., No. 11-cv-06637-RS-PSG, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 163654 (ND Cal Nov 15, 2012). The opinion was by U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal, who later became the V.P. and Deputy General Counsel of Facebook. Judge Grewal wrote:

But as this case makes clear, making those determinations often is no easy task. “There is no magic to the science of search and retrieval: only mathematics, linguistics, and hard work.”[9]

Unfortunately, despite being a topic fraught with traps for the unwary, the parties invite the court to enter this morass of search terms and discovery requests with little more than their arguments.

More recently, e-discovery expert Judge James Francis addressed this issue in Greater New York Taxi Association v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 3089 (VSB) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2017) and held:

The defendants have not provided the necessary expert opinions for me to assess their motion to compel search terms. The application is therefore denied. This leaves the defendants with three options: “They can cooperate [with the plaintiffs] (along with their technical consultants) and attempt to agree on an appropriate set of search criteria. They can refile a motion to compel, supported by expert testimony. Or, they can request the appointment of a neutral consultant who will design a search strategy.”[10] Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. v. UBS Real Estate Securities Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1579, 2012 WL 5927379, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).

I am inclined to agree with Judge Francis. I know from daily experience that legal search, even keyword search, can be very tricky, depends on many factors, including the documents searched. I have spent over a decade working hard to develop expertise in this area. I know that the appropriate searches to be run depends on experience and scientific, technical knowledge on information retrieval and statistics. It also depends on tests of proposed keywords; it depends on sampling and document reviews; it depends on getting your hands dirty in the digital mud of the actual ESI. It cannot be done effectively in the blind, no matter what your level of expertise. It is an iterative process of trial and errors, false positives and negatives alike.

Enter a Judge Braver Than Angels

Recently appointed U.S. Magistrate Judge Laura Fashing in Albuquerque, New Mexico, heard a case involving a dispute over keywords. United States v. New Mexico State University, No. 1:16-cv-00911-JAP-LF, 2017 WL 4386358 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2017). It looks like the attorneys in the case neglected to inform Judge Fashing of United States v. O’Keefe. It is a landmark case in this field, yet was not cited in Judge Fashing’s order. More importantly, Judge Fashing did not take the advice of O’Keefe, nor the many cases that follow it. Unlike Judge Facciola and his angels, she told the parties what keywords to use, even without input from experts.

The New Mexico State University opinion did, however, cite to two other landmark cases in legal search, William A. Gross Const. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) by Judge Andrew Peck and Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 260, 262 (D. Md. May 29, 2008) by Judge Paul Grimm. Judge Fashing held in New Mexico State University:

This case presents the question of how parties should search and produce electronically stored information (“ESI”) in response to discovery requests. “[T]he best solution in the entire area of electronic discovery is cooperation among counsel.” William A. Gross Const. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Cooperation prevents lawyers designing keyword searches “in the dark, by the seat of the pants,” without adequate discussion with each other to determine which words would yield the most responsive results. Id.

While keyword searches have long been recognized as appropriate and helpful for ESI search and retrieval, there are well-known limitations and risks associated with them, and proper selection and implementation obviously involves technical, if not scientific knowledge.

* * *

Selection of the appropriate search and information retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by persons qualified to design effective search methodology. The implementation of the methodology selected should be tested for quality assurance; and the party selecting the methodology must be prepared to explain the rationale for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly implemented.

Id. (quoting Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 260, 262 (D. Md. May 29, 2008)).

Although NMSU has performed several searches and produced thousands of documents, counsel for NMSU did not adequately confer with the United States before performing the searches, which resulted in searches that were inadequate to reveal all responsive documents. As the government points out, “NMSU alone is responsible for its illogical choices in constructing searches.” Doc. 117-1 at 8. Consequently, which searches will be conducted is left to the Court.

Judges Francis, Peck and Facciola

Judge Laura Fashing had me in the quote above until the final sentence. Up till then she had been wisely following the four great judges in this area, Facciola, Peck, Francis and Grimm. Then in the next several paragraphs she rushes in to specify what search terms should be used for what categories of ESI requested. Why should the Court go ahead and do that without expert advice? Why not wait? Especially since Judge Fashing starts her opinion by recognizing the difficulty of the task, that “there are well-known limitations and risks associated with them [keyword searches], and proper selection and implementation obviously involves technical, if not scientific knowledge.” Knowing that, why was she fearless? Why did she ignore Judge Facciola’s advice? Why did she make multiple detailed, technical decisions on legal search, including specific keywords to be used, without the benefit of expert testimony? Was that foolish as several judges have suggested, or was she just doing her job by making the decisions that the parties asked her to make?

Judge Fashing recognized that she did have enough facts to make a decision, much less expert opinions based on technical, scientific knowledge, but she went ahead and ruled anyway.

Although NMSU argues that the search terms proposed by the government will return a greater number of non-responsive documents than responsive documents, this is not a particular and specific demonstration of fact, but is, instead, a conclusory argument by counsel. See Velasquez, 229 F.R.D. at 200. NMSU’s motion for a protective order with regard to RFP No. 8 is DENIED.

NMSU will perform a search of the email addresses of all individuals involved in salary-setting for Ms. Harkins and her comparators, including Kathy Agnew and Dorothy Anderson, to include the search terms “Meaghan,” “Harkins,” “Gregory,” or “Fister” for the time period of 2007-2012. If this search results in voluminous documents that are non-responsive, NMSU may further search the results by including terms such as “cross-country,” “track,” “coach,” “salary,” “pay,” “contract,” or “applicants,” or other appropriate terms such as “compensation,” which may reduce the results to those communications most likely relevant to this case, and which would not encompass every “Meaghan” or “Gregory” in the system. However, the Court will require NMSU to work with the USA to design an appropriate search if it seeks to narrow the search beyond the four search terms requested by the United States.

Judge Fashing goes on to make several specific orders on what to do to make a reasonable effort to find relevant evidence:

NMSU will conduct searches of the OIE databases, OIE employee’s email accounts, and the email accounts of all head coaches, sport administrators, HR liaisons working within the Athletics Department, assistant or associate Athletic Directors, and/or Athletic Directors employed by NMSU between 2007 and the present. The USA suggests that NMSU conduct a search for terms that are functionally equivalent to a search for (pay or compensate! or salary) and (discriminat! or fair! or unfair!). Doc. 117-1 at 13. If NMSU cannot search with “Boolean” connectors as suggested, it must search for the terms “pay” or “compensate” or “salary” and “discriminate” or “fair” or “unfair” and the various derivatives of these terms (for example the search would include “compensate” and “compensation”). The parties are to work together to determine what terms will be used to search these databases and email accounts.

Judge Laura Fashing hangs her hat on cooperation, but not on experts. She concludes her order with the following admonishment:

The parties are reminded that:

Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI. Moreover, where counsel are using keyword searches for retrieval of ESI, they at a minimum must carefully craft the appropriate keywords, with input from the ESI’s custodians as to the words and abbreviations they use, and the proposed methodology must be quality control tested to assure accuracy in retrieval and elimination of “false positives.” It is time that the Bar—even those lawyers who did not come of age in the computer era—understand this.

William A. Gross Const. Assocs., Inc., 256 F.R.D. at 136.

Conclusion

Of course I agree with Judge Fashing’s concluding reminder to the parties. Cooperation is key, but so is expertise. There is a good reason for the fear felt by Facciola’s angels. They wisely  knew that they lacked the necessary technical, scientific knowledge for the proper selection and implementation of keyword searches. I only wish that Judge Fashing’s order had reminded the parties of this need for experts too. It would have made her job much easier and also helped the parties. Sometimes the wisest thing to do is nothing, at least not until you have more information.

There is widespread agreement among legal search experts on such simplistic methods as keyword search. They would have helped. The same holds true on advanced search methods, such as active machine learning (predictive coding), at least among the elite. See TARcourse.com. There is still some disagreement on TAR methods, especially when you include the many pseudo experts out there. But even they can usually agree on keyword search methods.

I urge the judges and litigants faced with a situation like Judge Fashing had to deal with in New Mexico State University, to consider the three choices set out by Judge Francis in Greater New York Taxi Association:

  1. Cooperation with the other side and their technical consultants to attempt to agree on an appropriate set of search criteria.
  2. Motions supported by expert testimony and facts regarding the search.
  3. Appointment of a neutral consultant who will design a search strategy.

Going it alone with legal search in a complex case is a fool’s errand. Bring in an expert. Spend a little to save a lot. It is not only the smart thing to do, it is also required by ethics. Rule 1.1: Competence, Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The ABA Comment two to Rule 1.1 states that “Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.” Yet, in my experience, this is seldom done and is not something that clients are clamoring for. That should change, and quickly, if we are ever to stop wasting so much time and money on simplistic e-discovery arguments. I am again reminded of the great Alexander Pope (1688–1744) and another of his famous lines from An Essay on Criticism.

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After I wrote this blog I did a webinar for ACEDS about this topic. Here is a one-hour talk to add to your personal Pierian spring.

 

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