Evidence Code Revisions and the Grimm/Brady Evidence Admissibility Chart

April 22, 2018

Great fanfare was provided for  the changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in December 2015. But not much attention has been given to the December 2017 changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Maybe that has to do with the disappearing trial, the fact that less than one percent of federal cases actually go to trial. Still, you need to know the rules of evidence admissibility, even if you are preparing for a trial that will never come. You need to collect and discover evidence in a way that it can be used, even if it is just in a motion for summary judgment.

Two New Subsections to Rule 902 on Self-Authenticating Evidence

In December 2017 two new subsections were added to Evidence Rule 902, subsections (13) and (14). They are designed to streamline authentication of electronically stored information (ESI). The goal is to eliminate the need to call a witness at trial to authenticate evidence, at least in most instances. Here are the two new provisions:

Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating

The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted: . . .

(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System. A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File. Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule (902(11) or (12). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902 (11).

The Evidence Rules Committee Notes explain the background of these two new subsections.

Committee Notes on Rules—2017 Amendment

Paragraph (14). The amendment sets forth a procedure by which parties can authenticate data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or an electronic file, other than through the testimony of a foundation witness. As with the provisions on business records in Rules 902(11) and (12), the Committee has found that the expense and inconvenience of producing an authenticating witness for this evidence is often unnecessary. It is often the case that a party goes to the expense of producing an authentication witness, and then the adversary either stipulates authenticity before the witness is called or fails to challenge the authentication testimony once it is presented. The amendment provides a procedure in which the parties can determine in advance of trial whether a real challenge to authenticity will be made, and can then plan accordingly.

Today, data copied from electronic devices, storage media, and electronic files are ordinarily authenticated by “hash value”. A hash value is a number that is often represented as a sequence of characters and is produced by an algorithm based upon the digital contents of a drive, medium, or file. If the hash values for the original and copy are different, then the copy is not identical to the original. If the hash values for the original and copy are the same, it is highly improbable that the original and copy are not identical. Thus, identical hash values for the original and copy reliably attest to the fact that they are exact duplicates. This amendment allows self-authentication by a certification of a qualified person that she checked the hash value of the proffered item and that it was identical to the original. The rule is flexible enough to allow certifications through processes other than comparison of hash value, including by other reliable means of identification provided by future technology.

Nothing in the amendment is intended to limit a party from establishing authenticity of electronic evidence on any ground provided in these Rules, including through judicial notice where appropriate.

A proponent establishing authenticity under this Rule must present a certification containing information that would be sufficient to establish authenticity were that information provided by a witness at trial. If the certification provides information that would be insufficient to authenticate the record of the certifying person testified, then authenticity is not established under this Rule.

The reference to the “certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12)” is only to the procedural requirements for a valid certification. There is no intent to require, or permit, a certification under this Rule to prove the requirements of Rule 803(6). Rule 902(14) is solely limited to authentication, and any attempt to satisfy a hearsay exception must be made independently.

A certification under this Rule can only establish that the proffered item is authentic. The opponent remains free to object to admissibility of the proffered item on other grounds—including hearsay, relevance, or in criminal cases the right to confrontation. For example, in a criminal case in which data copied from a hard drive is proffered, the defendant can still challenge hearsay found in the hard drive, and can still challenge whether the information on the hard drive was placed there by the defendant.

A challenge to the authenticity of electronic evidence may require technical information about the system or process at issue, including possibly retaining a forensic technical expert; such factors will affect whether the opponent has a fair opportunity to challenge the evidence given the notice provided.

The reference to Rule 902(12) is intended to cover certifications that are made in a foreign country.

Also see: Paul Grimm, Gregory Joseph, Daniel Capra, Manual on Best Practices for Authenticating Digital Evidence; Authenticating Digital Evidence, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2017).

Grimm/Brady Evidence Admissibility Chart

The rule change is a helpful addition to the litigator’s toolkit, but many challenges remain for attorneys handling electronic evidence. I agree with Kevin Brady, who is a top expert in the field of ESI evidence, who says that “the challenge for lawyers trying to authenticate digital evidence using the traditional rules of evidence can be confusing.” This may be an understatement! Kevin thinks that part of the challenge for attorneys arises from the rapidly-evolving landscape of data sources. He gives examples such as bitcoin, blockchain, smart contracts, social media, IoT, mobile devices, and cloud computing services. Moreover, the use of social media like Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and others continues to increase at an unbelievable rate and adds to the problem. Moreover, according to Business Insider, there are more people using the top four social messaging apps (WhatsApp, Messenger, WeChat, and Viber) than the top four social media apps (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn). According to Tech Crunch, Facebook’s Messenger alone has more than 1.3 billion monthly active users, and Instagram is officially testing a standalone messaging app, Direct.

Recognizing the problem Kevin Brady teamed up with U.S. District Court Judge Paul Grimm, the leading judicial expert in the field, to create the Grimm/Brady Evidence Admissibility Chart shown below.

The detailed reference chart provides discovery lawyers and trial attorneys with a quick reference guide for handling many different sources of ESI evidence. It covers Rule 104 to Rule 803(6) to Rule 901 and 902. The chart provides a step by step approach for authenticating digital information and successfully getting that information admitted into evidence.

The e-Discovery Team highly recommends that you carefully study this chart. Click on the photos and they will open in a larger size. Also suggest you download your own copy here: Grimm Brady Evidence Admission Chart 2018. Many thanks to Kevin Brady for helping me with this blog.



 


TAR Course Expands Again: Standardized Best Practice for Technology Assisted Review

February 11, 2018

The TAR Course has a new class, the Seventeenth Class: Another “Player’s View” of the Workflow. Several other parts of the Course have been updated and edited. It now has Eighteen Classes (listed at end). The TAR Course is free and follows the Open Source tradition. We freely disclose the method for electronic document review that uses the latest technology tools for search and quality controls. These technologies and methods empower attorneys to find the evidence needed for all text-based investigations. The TAR Course shares the state of the art for using AI to enhance electronic document review.

The key is to know how to use the document review search tools that are now available to find the targeted information. We have been working on various methods of use since our case before Judge Andrew Peck in Da Silva Moore in 2012. After we helped get the first judicial approval of predictive coding in Da Silva, we began a series of several hundred document reviews, both in legal practice and scientific experiments. We have now refined our method many times to attain optimal efficiency and effectiveness. We call our latest method Hybrid Multimodal IST Predictive Coding 4.0.

The Hybrid Multimodal method taught by the TARcourse.com combines law and technology. Successful completion of the TAR course requires knowledge of both fields. In the technology field active machine learning is the most important technology to understand, especially the intricacies of training selection, such as Intelligently Spaced Training (“IST”). In the legal field the proportionality doctrine is key to the  pragmatic application of the method taught at TAR Course. We give-away the information on the methods, we open-source it through this publication.

All we can transmit by online teaching is information, and a small bit of knowledge. Knowing the Information in the TAR Course is a necessary prerequisite for real knowledge of Hybrid Multimodal IST Predictive Coding 4.0. Knowledge, as opposed to Information, is taught the same way as advanced trial practice, by second chairing a number of trials. This kind of instruction is the one with real value, the one that completes a doc review project at the same time it completes training. We charge for document review and throw in the training. Information on the latest methods of document review is inherently free, but Knowledge of how to use these methods is a pay to learn process.

The Open Sourced Predictive Coding 4.0 method is applied for particular applications and search projects. There are always some customization and modifications to the default standards to meet the project requirements. All variations are documented and can be fully explained and justified. This is a process where the clients learn by doing and following along with Losey’s work.

What he has learned through a lifetime of teaching and studying Law and Technology is that real Knowledge can never be gained by reading or listening to presentations. Knowledge can only be gained by working with other people in real-time (or near-time), in this case, to carry out multiple electronic document reviews. The transmission of knowledge comes from the Q&A ESI Communications process. It comes from doing. When we lead a project, we help students to go from mere Information about the methods to real Knowledge of how it works. For instance, we do not just make the Stop decision, we also explain the decision. We share our work-product.

Knowledge comes from observing the application of the legal search methods in a variety of different review projects. Eventually some Wisdom may arise, especially as you recover from errors. For background on this triad, see Examining the 12 Predictions Made in 2015 in “Information → Knowledge → Wisdom” (2017). Once Wisdom arises some of the sayings in the TAR Course may start to make sense, such as our favorite “Relevant Is Irrelevant.” Until this koan is understood, the legal doctrine of Proportionality can be an overly complex weave.

The TAR Course is now composed of eighteen classes:

  1. First Class: Background and History of Predictive Coding
  2. Second Class: Introduction to the Course
  3. Third Class:  TREC Total Recall Track, 2015 and 2016
  4. Fourth Class: Introduction to the Nine Insights from TREC Research Concerning the Use of Predictive Coding in Legal Document Review
  5. Fifth Class: 1st of the Nine Insights – Active Machine Learning
  6. Sixth Class: 2nd Insight – Balanced Hybrid and Intelligently Spaced Training (IST)
  7. Seventh Class: 3rd and 4th Insights – Concept and Similarity Searches
  8. Eighth Class: 5th and 6th Insights – Keyword and Linear Review
  9. Ninth Class: 7th, 8th and 9th Insights – SME, Method, Software; the Three Pillars of Quality Control
  10. Tenth Class: Introduction to the Eight-Step Work Flow
  11. Eleventh Class: Step One – ESI Communications
  12. Twelfth Class: Step Two – Multimodal ECA
  13. Thirteenth Class: Step Three – Random Prevalence
  14. Fourteenth Class: Steps Four, Five and Six – Iterative Machine Training
  15. Fifteenth Class: Step Seven – ZEN Quality Assurance Tests (Zero Error Numerics)
  16. Sixteenth Class: Step Eight – Phased Production
  17. Seventeenth Class: Another “Player’s View” of the Workflow (class added 2018)
  18. Eighteenth Class: Conclusion

With a lot of hard work you can complete this online training program in a long weekend, but most people take a few weeks. After that, this course can serve as a solid reference to consult during complex document review projects. It can also serve as a launchpad for real Knowledge and eventually some Wisdom into electronic document review. TARcourse.com is designed to provide you with the Information needed to start this path to AI enhanced evidence detection and production.

 


Waymo v. Uber, Hide-the-Ball Ethics and the Special Master Report of December 15, 2017

December 17, 2017

The biggest civil trial of the year was delayed by U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup due to e-discovery issues that arose at the last minute. This happened in a trade-secret case by Google’s self-driving car division, WAYMO, against Uber. Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc. (Waymo I), No. 17-cv-00939-WHA (JSC), (N.D. Cal. November 28, 2017). The trial was scheduled to begin in San Francisco on December 4, 2017 (it had already been delayed once by another discovery dispute). The trial was delayed at Waymo’s request to give it time to investigate a previously undisclosed, inflammatory letter by an attorney for Richard Jacobs. Judge Alsup had just been told of the letter by the United States attorney’s office in Northern California. Judge Alsup immediately shared the letter with Waymo’s attorneys and Uber’s attorneys.

At the November 28, 2017, hearing Judge Alsup reportedly accused Uber’s lawyers of withholding this evidence, forcing him to delay the trial until Waymo’s lawyers could gather more information about the contents of the letter. NYT (11/28/17). The NY Times reported Judge Alsup as stating:

I can no longer trust the words of the lawyers for Uber in this case … You should have come clean with this long ago … If even half of what is in that letter is true, it would be an injustice for Waymo to go to trial.

NYT (11/28/17).

Judge Alsup was also reported to have said to Uber’s lawyers in the open court hearing of November 28, 2017:

You’re just making the impression that this is a total coverup … Any company that would set up such a surreptitious system is just as suspicious as can be.

CNN Tech (11/28/17).

Judge Alsup was upset by both the cover-up of the Jacobs letter and by the contents of the letter. The letter essentially alleged a wide-spread criminal conspiracy to hide and destroy evidence in all litigation, not just the Waymo case, by various means, including use of: (1) specialized communication tools that encrypt and self-destruct ephemeral communications, such as instant messages; (2) personal electronic devices and accounts not traceable to the company; and, (3) fake attorney-client privilege claims. Judge Alsup reportedly opened the hearing on the request for continuance by admonishing attorneys that counsel in future cases can be “found in malpractice” if they do not turn over evidence from such specialized tools. Fortune (12/2/17). That is a fair warning to us all. For instance, do any of your key custodians use specialized self-destruct communications tools like Wickr or Telegram?

Qualcomm Case All Over Again?

The alleged hide-the-email conduct here looks like it might be a high-tech version of the infamous Qualcomm case in San Diego. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-1958-B(BLM) Doc. 593 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007); Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (Plaintiff Qualcomm intentionally withheld from production several thousand important emails, a fact not revealed until cross-examination at trial of one honest witness).

The same rules of professional conduct are, or may be, involved in both Qualcomm and Waymo (citing to ABA model rules).

RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . .
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending or a reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another person to do any such act.

Although, as we will see, it looks so far as if Uber and its in-house attorneys are the ones who knew about the withheld documents and destruction scheme, and not Uber’s actual counsel of record. It all gets a little fuzzy to me with all of the many law firms involved, but so far the actual counsel of record for Uber claim to have been as surprised by the letter as Waymo’s attorneys, even though the letter was directed to Uber’s in-house legal counsel.

Sarbanes-Oxley Violations?

In addition to possible ethics violations in Waymo v. Uber, a contention was made by the attorneys for Uber consultant, Richard Jacobs, that Uber was hiding evidence in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 802, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002), which states in relevant part:

whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1519. The Sarbanes-Oxley applies to private companies and has a broad reach not limited to litigation that has been filed, much less formal discovery requests. Section 1519 “covers conduct intended to impede any federal investigation or proceeding including one not even on the verge of commencement. Yates v. United States, – U.S. –, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1087 (2015).

The Astonishing “Richard Jacobs Letter” by Clayton Halunen

The alleged ethical and legal violations in Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc. are based upon Uber’s failure to produce a “smoking gun” type of letter (email) and the contents of that letter. Although the letter is referred to as the Jacobs letter, it was actually written by Clayton D. Halunen of Halunen Law (shown right), an attorney for Richard Jacobs, a former Uber employee and current Uber consultant. Although this 37-page letter dated May 5, 2017 was not written by Richard Jacobs, it purports to represent how Jacobs would testify to support employment claims he was making against Uber. It was provided to Uber’s in-house employment counsel, Angella Padilla, in lieu of an interview of Jacobs that she was seeking.

A redacted copy of the letter dated May 5, 2017, has been released to the public and is very interesting for many reasons. I did not add the yellow highlighting seen in this letter and am unsure who did.

In fairness to Uber I point out that the letter states on its face in all caps that it is a RULE 408 CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY VIA EMAIL AND U.S. MAIL, a fact that does not appear to have been argued as a grounds for Uber not producing the letter to Waymo in Waymo v. Uber. That may be because Rule 408, FRCP, states that although such settlement communications are not admissible to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction” they are admissible “for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” Also, Rule 408 pertains to admissibility, not discoverability, and Rule 26(b)(1) still says that “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”

The letter claims that Richard Jacobs has a background in military intelligence, essentially a spy, although those portions of the letter were heavily redacted. I tend to believe this for several reasons, including the fact that I could not find a photograph of Jacobs anywhere. That is very rare. The letter goes on to describe the “unlawful activities within Uber’ s ThreatOps division.” Jacobs Letter at pg. 3. The illegal activities included fraud, theft, hacking, espionage and “knowing violations” of Sarbanes-Oxley by:

Uber’ s efforts to evade current and future discovery requests, court orders, and government investigations in violation of state and federal law as well as ethical rules governing the legal profession. Clark devised training and provided advice intended to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation of several ongoing lawsuits against Uber and in relation to or contemplation of further matters within the jurisdiction of the United States.  …

Jacobs then became aware that Uber, primarily through Clark and Henley, had implemented a sophisticated strategy to destroy, conceal, cover up, and falsify records or documents with the intent to impede or obstruct government investigations as well as discovery obligations in pending and future litigation. Besides violating 18 U.S.C. § 15 19, this conduct constitutes an ethical violation.

Pages 5, 6 of Jacobs Letter. The practices included the alleged mandatory use of a program called WickrMe, that “programs messages to self-destruct in a matter of seconds to no longer than six days. Consequently, Uber employees cannot be compelled to produce records of their chat conversations because no record is retained.” Letter pg. 6.

Remember, Judge Alsup reportedly began the trial continuance hearing of November 28, 2017, by admonishing attorneys that in future cases they could be “found in malpractice” if they do not turn over evidence from such specialized communications tools. Fortune (12/2/17). There are a number of other secure messaging apps in adddition to Wickr that have encryption and self destruct features. A few I have found are:

There are also services on the web that will send self-destructing messages for you, such as PrivNote. This is a rapidly changing area so do your own due diligence.

Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi reacted to the November 29, 2017 hearing and Judge Alsup’s comments by tweeting on November 29, 2017 that Uber employees did, but no longer, use Wickr and another program like it, Telegram.

True that Wickr, Telegram were used often at Uber when I came in. As of Sept 27th I directed my teams NOT to use such Apps when discussing Uber-related business.

This seems like a good move to me on the part of Uber’s new CEO, a smart move. It is also an ethical move in a sometimes ethically challenged Silicon Valley culture. The culture is way too filled with selfish Ayn Rand devotees for my taste. I hope this leads to large scale housekeeping by Khosrowshahi. Matt Kallman, a spokesman for Uber, said after the public release of the letter:

While we haven’t substantiated all the claims in this letter — and, importantly, any related to Waymo — our new leadership has made clear that going forward we will compete honestly and fairly, on the strength of our ideas and technology.

NYT (12/15/17). You know the old saying about Fool me once …

Back to the Jacobs letter, it also alleges at pgs. 6-9 the improper use of fake attorney-client privilege to hide evidence:

Further, Clark and Henley directly instructed Jacobs to conceal documents in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley by attempting to “shroud” them with attorney-client privilege or work product protections. Clark taught the ThreatOps team that if they marked communications as “draft,” asked for a legal opinion at the beginning of an email, and simply wrote “attorney-client privilege” on documents, they would be immune from discovery.

The letter also alleges the intentional use of personal computers and accounts to conduct Uber business that they wanted to hide from disclosure. Letter pgs. 7-8.

The letter at pages 9-26 then details facts purporting to show illegal intelligence gathering activities by Uber on a global scale, violating multiple state and federal laws, including:

  • Economic Espionage Act
  • Uniform Trade Secret Act
  • California Uniform Trade Secrets Act
  • Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
  • Wire Fraud law at 18 U.S.C § 1343, and California Penal Code § 528.5
  • Wiretap Act at 18 U .S.C. § 25 10 et seq.
  • Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

Special Master John L. Cooper

Judge Alsup referred the discovery issues raised by Uber’s non-disclosure of the “Jacobs Letter” to the Special Master handling many of the discovery disputes in this case, John L. Cooper of Farella Braun + Martel LLP. The Special Master Report with Cooper’s recommendations concerning the issues raised by the late disclosure of the letter is dated December 15, 2017. Cooper’s report is a public record that can be found here. This is  his excellent introduction of the dispute found at pages 1-2 of his report.

The trial of this trade secrets case was continued for a second time after the belated discovery of inflammatory communications by a former Uber employee came to light outside the normal discovery process. On April 14, 2017, Richard Jacobs sent a resignation e-mail to Uber’s then-CEO and then-general counsel, among others, accusing Uber of having a dedicated division with a “mission” to “steal trade secrets in a series of code-named campaigns” and engaging in other allegedly wrongful or inappropriate conduct. A few weeks later, on May 5, 2017, Mr. Jacobs’ lawyer, Clayton Halunen, sent a letter to Angela Padilla, Uber’s Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for Litigation and Employment. That 37-page letter expanded in some  detail on Mr. Jacobs’ e-mailed accusations regarding clandestine and concerted efforts to steal competitors’ trade secrets, including those belonging to Waymo. It also addressed allegations touching on Anthony Levandowski’s alleged downloading of Waymo trade secrets. The Jacobs Letter laid out what his lawyer described as a set of hardware and software programs, and usage protocols that would help Uber to allegedly carry out its thefts and other corporate espionage in secret and with minimized risk of evidence remaining on Uber servers or devices. By mid-August Mr. Jacobs and Uber settled their disputes and executed a written settlement agreement on August 14-15,2017.

Despite extensive discovery and multiple Court orders to produce an extensive amount of information related to the accusations in the Jacobs Materials, Waymo did not learn of their existence until after November 22, when the Court notified the parties that a federal prosecutor wrote a letter to this Court disclosing the gist of the Jacobs allegations.

The Special Master’s report then goes on to analyze whether Uber was obligated to produce the Jacobs Materials in response to any of the Court’s prior orders or Waymo’s discovery requests. In short, Master Cooper concluded that they were not directly covered by any of the prior court orders, but the Jacobs Letter was responsive to certain discovery requests propounded by Waymo, and Uber was obligated to produce it in response to those requests.

Special Master Cooper goes on to describe at page 7 of his report the Jacobs letter by Halunen. To state the obvious, this is clearly a “hot” document with implications that go well beyond this particular case.

That 37-page letter set forth multiple allegations relating to alleged efforts by Uber individuals and divisions. Among other things, the letter alleges that Uber planned to use certain hardware devices and software to conceal the creation and destruction of corporate records that, as a result, “would never be subject to legal discovery.” See ECF No. 2307-2 at 7. These activities, Mr. Jacobs’ lawyer asserted, “implicate ongoing discovery disputes, such as those in Uber’s litigation with Waymo.” Id. at 9. He continued:

Specifically, Jacobs recalls that Jake Nocon, Nick Gicinto, and Ed Russo went to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to educate Uber’s Autonomous Vehicle Group on using the above practices with the specific intent of preventing Uber’s unlawful schemes from seeing the light of day.

Jacobs’ observations cast doubt on Uber’s representation in court proceedings that no documents evidencing wrongdoing can be found on Uber’s systems and that other communications are actually shielded by the attorney-client privilege. Aarian Marshall, Judge in Waymo Dispute Lets Uber’s Self-driving Program Live—for Now, wired.com (May 3, 2017 at 8:47p.m.) (“Lawyers for Waymo also said Uber had blocked the release of 3,500 documents related to the acquisition of Otto on the grounds that they contain privileged information …. Waymo also can’t quite pin down whether Uber employees saw the stolen documents or if those documents moved anywhere beyond the computer Levandowski allegedly used to steal them. (Uber lawyers say extensive searches of their company’s system for anything connected to the secrets comes up nil.)”), available at (citation omitted).

Id. at 9-10.

Uber Attorney Angela Padilla

Angella Padilla was Uber’s Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for Litigation and Employment. She testified on these issues. Here is Special Master Cooper’s summary at pages 8-9 of his report:

Ms. Padilla testified in this Court that she read the letter “in brief’ and turned it over to other Uber attorneys, including Ms. Yoo, to begin an internal investigation. Nov. 29, 2017 Hr’g Tr. at 15:17-24. The letter also made its way to two separate committees of Uber’s Board of Directors, including the committee that was or is overseeing special litigation, including this case and the Jacobs matter. Id. at 20:10-13; 26:23-25. On June 27, Uber disclosed the allegations in the Jacobs Letter to the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California. Id. at 27:20-14. It disclosed the Jacobs Letter itself on or around September 12 to the same U.S. Attorney’s Office, to another U.S. Attorney, in the Southern District of New York, and to the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington. Id. at 28:4-10. Ms. Padilla testified that Uber made these disclosures to multiple prosecutors “to take the air out of [Jacobs’] extortionist balloon.” Id. at 28:18-19. Nearly one month before that distribution of the letter to federal prosecutors, on August 14, Uber settled with Mr. Jacobs—the terms of which included $4.5 million in compensation to Jacobs and $3 million to his lawyers. See id. at 62:6-63-12.

I have to pause here for a minute because the settlement amount takes my breath away. Not only the payment of $4.5 Million to Richard Jacobs who had a salary of $130,000 per year, but also the additional payment of $3.0 million dollars to his lawyers. That’s an incredible sum for writing a couple of letters, although I am sure they would claim to have put much more into their representation than meets the eye.

Other Attorneys for Uber Involved

Back to Special Master Cooper’s summary of the testimony of Uber attorney Padilla and other facts in the record about attorney knowledge of the “smoking gun” Jacobs letter (footnotes omitted):

Uber distributed the Jacobs E-Mail to two of Uber’s counsel of record at Morrison Foerster (“MoFo”) in this case. See Dec. 4, 2017 Hr’g Tr. at 46:1-47:5. Other MoFo attorneys directly involved in this case and related discovery issues e-mailed with other MoFo attorneys in late April about “Uber’s ediscovery systems regarding potential investigation into Jacobs resignation letter.” See Waymo Ex. 21.

None of the Uber outside counsel working on this case got a copy of the Jacobs Letter. Neither did the two Uber in-house lawyers who were or are handling this case; Ms. Padilla testified that she did not send it to them. Nov. 29, 2017 Hr’g Tr. at 47:8-16. By late June, some attorneys from Boies Schiller and Flexner, also counsel in this matter for Uber, had discussions with other outside counsel and Ms. Padilla about issues arising from the internal investigation triggered by the Jacobs Materials. See Waymo Ex. 20, Entries 22-22(h).

So now you know the names of the attorneys involved, and not involved, according to Special Master Cooper at page 9 of his report. Apparently none of the actual counsel of record knew about it. I would have to assume, and I think the court will too, that this was intentional. It was so clever as to be obvious, or, as the British would say too clever by half.

U.S. Attorney Notifies Judge Alsup of the Jacobs Letter

To complete the procedural background, here is what happened next leading to the referral to the Special Master. Note that a U.S. Attorney taking action like this to notify a District Court Judge of a piece of evidence is extraordinary, especially to do so just before a trial. Judge Alsup said that he had never had such a thing happen in his courtroom. The U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California is Brian Stretch. Obviously he was concerned about the fairness of Uber’s actions. In my opinion this was a good call by Stretch.

On November 22, 2017, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California notified this Court of the Jacobs allegations and specifically referenced the account Jacobs put in his letter about the efforts to keep the Ottomotto acquisition secret. See ECF No. 2383. The Court on the same day issued an order disclosing receipt of the letter from the U.S. Attorney and asked the parties to inform the Court about the extent of any prior disclosure of the Jacobs allegations. See ECF Nos. 2260-2261. After continuing the trial date in light of the parties’ responses to that query, the Court on December 4, 2017, ordered the Special Master “to determine whether and to what extent, including the history of this action and both sides’ past conduct, defendants were required to earlier produce the Jacobs letter, resignation email, or settlement agreement, or required to provide any information in those documents in response to interrogatories, Court orders, or other agreements among counsel.” ECF No. 2334, 2341.

Special Master report at pgs. 9-10.

Special Master Cooper’s Recommended Ruling

Master Cooper found that the Richard Jacobs letter was responsive to two of Waymos’ requests to produce: RFP 29 and RFP 73. He rejected Uber’s argument that they were not responsive to any request, an argument that must have been difficult to make concerning a document this hot. They tried to make the argument seem more reasonable by saying that even if the letter was “generally relevant,” it was not responsive. Then they cite to cases standing for the proposition that you have no duty to produce relevant documents that you are not going to rely on, namely documents adverse to your position, unless they are specifically requested. Here is a quote of the conclusion of that argument from page 16 of Uber’s Response to Waymo’s Submission to Special Master Cooper Re the Jacobs Documents.

Congress has specified in Rule 26(a)(ii) what documents must be unilaterally produced, and they are only those that a party “may use to support its claims or defenses.” Thus, a party cannot use a document against an adversary at trial that the party failed to disclose. However, Rule 26 very pointedly does not require the production of any documents other than those that a party plans to use “to support” its claims. Obviously, Uber is not seeking to use any of the documents at issue to support its claims. If Waymo believes that this rule should be changed, that is an issue they need to address with Congress, not with the Court.

Master Cooper did not address that argument because he found the documents were in fact both relevant and directly responsive to two of Waymo’s requests for production.

Uber’s attorney also made what I consider a novel argument that even if the Jacobs letter was found to be responsive, they still did have to produce it because, get this – it did not include any of the keywords that they agreed to use to search for documents in those categories. Incredible. What difference does that make, if they knew about the document anyway? Their client, Uber, specifically including in-house counsel, Ms. Padilla, clearly knew about it. The letter was to her. Are they suggesting that Uber did not know about the letter because some of their outside counsel did not know about it? Special Master Cooper must have had the same reaction as he disposed of this argument in short order at page 17 of his report:

Uber argues, that in some scenarios, reliance on search terms is enough to satisfy a party’s obligation to find responsive documents. See, e.g., T.D.P. v. City of Oakland, No, 16-cv-04132-LB, 2017 WL 3026925, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2017) (finding certain search terms adequate for needs of case). But I find there are two main reasons why an exclusive focus on the use of search terms is inappropriate for determining whether the Jacobs Letter should have been produced in response to RFP 29 and RFP 73.

First, the parties never reached an agreement to limit their obligation to searching for documents to only those documents that hit on agreed-upon search terms. See Waymo Ex. 5 (Uber counsel telling Waymo during search-term negotiations that “Waymo has an obligation to conduct a reasonable search for responsive documents separate and apart from any search term negotiations”). (Emphasis added)

Second, Uber needed no such help in finding the Jacobs Materials. They were not stowed away in a large volume of data on some server. They were not stashed in some low-level employee’s files. Parties agree to use search terms and to look into the records of the most likely relevant custodians to help manage the often unwieldy process of searching through massive amounts of data. These methods are particularly called for when a party, instead of merely having to look for a needle in a haystack, faces the prospect of having to look for lots of needles in lots of haystacks. This needle was in Uber’s hands the whole time.

I would add that this needle was stuck deep into their hands, such that they were bleeding profusely. Maybe the outside attorneys did not see it, but Uber sure did and they had a duty to advise their attorneys. Uber’s attorneys would have been better off saving their powder for attacking the accuracy of the contents of the Jacobs letter and talking about the fast pace of discovery. They did that, but only as a short concluding argument, almost an afterthought. See page 16-19 of Uber’s Response to Waymo’s Submission to Special Master Cooper Re the Jacobs Documents.

Here is another theoretical argument that Uber’s lawyers threw up and Cooper’s practical response at pages 17-18 of his report:

Uber argues that it cannot be that the mere possession and knowledge of a relevant document must trigger a duty to scrutinize it and see if it matches any discovery requests. It asked at the December 12, 2017, hearing before the Special Master: Should every client be forced to instruct every one of its employees to turn over every e-mail and document to satisfy its discovery obligations to produce relevant and responsive documents? Must every head of litigation for every company regularly confronted with discovery obligations search their files for responsive documents, notwithstanding any prior agreement with the requesting party to search for responsive documents by the use of search terms?

It is not easy, in the abstract, to determine where the line regarding the scope of discovery search should be drawn. But this is not a case involving mere possession of some document. The facts in this case suggest that Ms. Padilla knew of the Jacobs Letter at the time Uber had to respond to discovery requests calling for its production—it certainly was “reasonably accessible.” Mr. Jacobs’ correspondence alleged systemic, institutionalized, and criminal efforts by Uber to conceal evidence and steal trade secrets, and not just as a general matter but also specifically involving the evidence and trade secrets at issue in this case—maybe the largest and most significant lawsuit Uber has ever faced. Ms. Padilla, Uber’s vice president and deputy general counsel for litigation and employment received the Jacobs Materials around the same time that discovery in this case was picking up and around the same time that the Court partially granted Waymo’s requested provisional relief. Shortly after that, Uber told federal prosecutors about the Jacobs allegations and then later sent them a copy of the letter. It sent the materials to outside counsel, including lawyers at MoFo that Uber hired to investigate the allegations. Two separate Uber board committees got involved, including the committee overseeing this case. Uber paid Mr. Jacobs $4.5 million, and his lawyer $3 million, to settle his claims.

The Federal Rules obligate a party to produce known, relevant and reasonably accessible material that on its face is likely to be responsive to discovery requests. RFP 29 and RFP 73 were served on Uber on May 9, just a few days after Ms. Padilla received the Jacobs Letter on May 5. Uber was therefore obligated to conduct a reasonable inquiry into those requests (and all others it received) to see if it had documents responsive to those requests and produce non-privileged responsive documents.

Special Master John Cooper concluded by finding that the “Jacobs letter was responsive to Waymo’s Request for Production No. 29 and Request for Production No. 73, and Uber should have produced it to Waymo in response to those requests.” It was beyond the scope of his assignment as Special Master to determine the appropriate remedy. Uber will now probably challenge this report and Judge William Alsup will rule.

Like everyone else, I expect Judge Alsup will agree with Cooper’s report. The real question is what remedy will he provide to Waymo and what sanctions, if any, will Judge Alsuop impose.

Conclusion

At the hearing on the request for a trial delay on November 28, 2017, Judge William Alsup reportedly told Uber’s in-house attorney, Angella Padilla:

Maybe you’re in trouble … This document should have been produced … You wanted this case to go to trial so that they didn’t have the document, then it turns out the U.S. attorney did an unusual thing. Maybe the guy [Jacobs] is a disgruntled employee but that’s not your decision to make, that’s the jury’s.

The Recorder (November 29, 2017).

In response to Angella Padilla saying that Jacobs was just a “extortionist” and the allegations in his letter were untrue. Judge Alsup reportedly responded by saying:

Here’s the way it looks … You said it was a fantastic BS letter with no merit and yet you paid $4.5 million. To someone like me and people out there, mortals, that’s a lot of money, that’s a lot of money. And people don’t pay that kind of money for BS and you certainly don’t hire them as consultant if you think everything they’ve got to contribute is BS. On the surface it looks like you covered this up.

The Recorder (November 29, 2017).

Judge William Alsup is one of the finest judges on the federal bench today. He is a man of unquestioned integrity and intellectual acumen. He is a Harvard Law graduate, class of 1971, and former Law clerk for Justice William O. Douglas, Supreme Court of the United States, 1971-1972.  How Judge Alsup reacts to the facts in Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc. now that he has the report of Special Master Cooper will likely have a profound impact on e-discovery and legal ethics for years to come.

No matter what actions Judge Alsup takes next, the actions of Uber and its attorneys in this case will be discussed for many years to come. Did the attorneys’ non-disclosure violate Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal? Did they violate Rule 3.4, Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel? Also, what about Rule 26(g) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? Other rules of ethics and procedure? Did Uber’s actions violate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Other laws? Was it fraud?

Finally, and these are critical questions, did Uber breach their duty to preserve evidence when they knew that litigation was reasonably likely? Did their attorneys do so if they knew of these practices? What sanctions are appropriate for destruction of evidence under Rule 37(e) and the Court’s inherent authority? Should an adverse inference be imposed? A default judgment?

The preservation related issues are big questions that I suspect Judge Alsup will now address. These issues and his rulings, and that of other judges who will likely face the same issues soon in other cases, will impact many corporations, not just Uber. The use of software such as Wickr and Telegram is apparently already wide-spread. In what circumstances and for what types of communications may the use of such technologies place a company (or individual) at risk for severe sanctions in later litigation? Personally, I oppose intentionally ephemeral devices, where all information self-destructs, but, at the same time, I strongly support the right of encryption and privacy. It is a question of balance between openness and truth on the one hand, and privacy and security on the other. How attorneys and judges respond to these competing challenges will impact the quality of justice and life in America for many years to come.

 


Good New 33-Point e-Discovery Checklist From Miami

October 1, 2017

The United States District Court for the Southern District Court of Florida is now revising it’s Local Rule 16.1 on Pretrial Procedure in Civil Actions. (In the interests of full disclosure, I am a member of that Court, but am not on the Committee that prepared the proposed revisions.) The revisions pertain to Rule 16.1(b),  Scheduling Conference and Order. The amendments will go into effect on December 1, 2017. These amendments include an excellent new 33-point e-discovery checklist.

The main revision in the local rules is the addition of a new subsection (K) under 16.1(b)(2) Conference Report that lists what must be included in the attorneys’ report:

(K) any issues about: (i) disclosure, discovery, or preservation of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced; (ii) claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, including — if the parties agree on a procedure to assert those claims after production — whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502: and (iii) when the parties have agreed to use the ESI Checklist available on the Court’s website (www.flsd.uscourts.gov), matters enumerated on the ESI Checklist;

This rule revision and checklist are a fine addition to the local rules. My congratulations to the ad hoc committee that prepared them. My only criticism of the rule change is that it does not go far enough on Federal Rule of Evidence 502. A 502(d) order should be entered in every case where there is a production of ESI. It should be a standing order and follow the standard language used by Judge Andrew Peck and many others, including my law firm:

1. The production of privileged or work-product protected documents, electronically stored information (“ESI”) or information, whether inadvertent or otherwise, is not a waiver of the privilege or protection from discovery in this case or in any other federal or state proceeding. This Order shall be interpreted to provide the maximum protection allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d).
2. Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit a party’s right to conduct a review of documents, ESI or information (including metadata) for relevance, responsiveness and/or segregation of privileged and/or protected information before production.

My only criticism of the ESI Checklist itself in their use of vague bullet-points, instead of numbering. With that one exception, other courts around the country should consider using the 33-point ESI Checklist for their own local rules. Many already have their own similar checklists, of course, but this is the latest and one of the best. It is complete, but not overly long and complicated.

Checklist Use Is Discretionary

The first thing to note about this new local rule 16.1(b)(2)(K) is that it does not require attorneys to use or follow the ESI Checklist in their discovery plan discussions. Perhaps future versions of the rule will require its use, but I agree with the Ad Hoc Committee’s thinking here to start with discretionary use. There are still plenty of Milton-type lawyers in Florida, and elsewhere, who only think of discovery as near-endless mind-numbing exercises of looking at boxes of paper. IMO there are way too many of these guys, young and old, but the clients who retain attorneys seem to love them, so what can you do? They do often seem to win at the end, as all Office Space fans know. I knew a multi-zillionairre attorney in Miami once where you had to clear a path through all of the paper in his office just to walk to his desk.

If, however, the parties are cool and do agree to use the ESI Checklist, then they are required by the new local rule to include the Checklist points in their Conference Report. It is unclear whether they must include all 33-items in their Report, which, by the way, is supposed to be a Joint Report, but I predict that most will. The Checklist does, however, include the introductory sentence that justifies partial use: “The usefulness of any particular topic may depend on the nature and complexity of the matter.

I also predict that some judges will strongly encourage the use of the Checklist, the way that only judges can do. It may even become an Order when the failure to do so causes time-consuming disputes and other issues that could have been avoided by timely discussion of the checklist points. In most complex cases especially, attorneys would be well advised to agree to this list and not hide their head in the sands of wishful thinking. Better to be realistic and spend the time necessary for the proper use of the ESI List. The List is an excellent way to timely and efficiently comply with the rules.

Preparing for 26(f) conferences and talking about all of the items on the list may increase the costs somewhat upfront, but this expense will almost certainly cause substantial cost-savings dividends down the road. Attorneys and their clients should not be penny wise and pound foolish. You can have your cake and eat it too. Case preparation does not drive up the costs of litigation. It allows you to win, even in the close cases, or at least to mitigate damages. The failure to prepare is not only a sure way to lose, but also to generate high fees from motion practice over discovery. Better to avoid and contain the disputes than to hope they will never happen. Hoping for the best, including incompetence by opposing counsel, is not what lawyers are paid to do.

ESI Checklist

This blog next will explore and make some comments on the 33-point checklist. I begin by reproduction below of the checklist itself in somewhat altered form. I have not revised any of the words in the checklist, but I have added numbers not found in the original to facilitate discussion (actually Roman Numeral letters). So it is fair to say my revisions are not of actual content, but of metadata only. I also add after each item a personal comment, put in parenthesis, italicized and in blue font, so as to be very clear on what is Losey and what is not.

If you want to see the original, bullet points and all,  the PDF version of the Checklist and Rules are published on the Court’s web. Go to the end of the document (currently pages 78-79) to find the ESI Checklist.

United States District Court
Southern District of Florida

Checklist for Rule 26(f) Conference
Regarding Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”)
(Original Bullet Points Changed to Letters and Losey Comments put in parenthesis after each list item, are shown in italics and blue font)

In connection with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference and in preparing the Local Rule 16.1(b)(2) conference report, the Court encourages the use of the following checklist. The usefulness of any particular topic may depend on the nature and complexity of the matter.

I. Preservation

A. The ranges of creation or receipt dates for any ESI to be preserved. (In almost every case there is a date before which the ESI is not relevant. In many there is also an after date. Disagreement between parties on date range should be resolved by phased discovery and reservation of rights to object after first phase is completed.)

B. The description of ESI from sources that are not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost and that will not be reviewed for responsiveness or produced, but that will be preserved in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B). (Backup ESI is  almost always so protected, unless it has the only copy of important information.)

C. The description of ESI from sources that: (a) the party believes could contain relevant information; but (b) has determined, under the proportionality factors, is not discoverable and should not be preserved. (The keyword here is “could.” Maybe it has relevant information, maybe it does not. Also important in determining discoverability under governing proportionaity rules is the “importance” of the information to material issues of fact in dispute. You must consider probative value. In my experience with big data most “merely relevant” information is a waste of time. There is too little probative value to most of it to even try to capture it all.)

D. Whether to continue any interdiction of any document-destruction program, such as ongoing erasures of e-mails, voicemails, and other electronically recorded material. (Typically the key custodians identified should have their email auto-delete functions turned off, and voice mail, but as to them only, not the whole enterprise. Plus, I cannot recall voice mail ever making a difference in a case. It typically has low probative value.)

E. The number and names or general job titles or descriptions of custodians for whom ESI will be preserved (e.g., “HR head,” “scientist,” “marketing manager”). (This is the broad list of key custodians. They are often divided in classes by probable importance of their ESI to the outcome of the case. Although all classes may be preserved, only the most important are actually reviewed, at least at first.)

F. The list of systems, if any, that contain ESI not associated with individual custodians and that will be preserved, such as enterprise databases. (A list not associated with custodians usually refers to department type servers where a number of people in the department could store documents, to document management systems, or to general databases, such as payroll.)

G. Any disputes related to scope or manner of preservation. (You should get these issues resolved asap. Typically you would want to preserve until the issue is resolved, unless the expense is too great or the other side’s position is too unreasonable. But even then you run some risk, and so quick adjudication on issues like this are important.)

II. Liaison

A. The identity of each party’s e-discovery liaison, who will be knowledgeable about and responsible for each party’s ESI. (I always like to see the role and name that I invented back in 2006 – “e-discovery liaison” – used by a court. One of my first e-Discovery “Liaisons” is now a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Southern District, and a very good one at that, especially in e-discovery.)

III. Informal Discovery About Location and Types of Systems

A. Identification of systems from which discovery will be prioritized (e.g., e-mail, finance, HR systems). (Typically the communications between people, the contemporaneous writings, are the ESI with the highest probative value.)

B.  Descriptions and location of systems in which potentially discoverable information is stored. (Typically this means a description of all IT systems where relevant ESI might be stored, and not just the high value targets like communications. Document management systems and network drives might also be listed here.)

C.  How potentially discoverable information is stored. (This is a follow-up on the prior checklist item that describes how the ESI is stored. Usually it is stored manually at the discretion of listed custodians. They either save the documents or email or not. Where they save it may also be within their control. They may save it on personal thumb drives, or they may print it out to store. You have to interview the custodians to find out how they stored it. Sometimes the potentially discoverable information is stored automatically by other software systems, such as payroll systems, and sometimes the location is predetermined.)

D.  How discoverable information can be collected from systems and media in which it is stored. (Usually it is collected by copying. That needs to be done carefully so that metadata is not changed. Not hard to do, but IT expertise is usually required to do it correctly. Forensic collection is usually not necessary, especially collection of double-deleted files and unallocated space, as such ESI is usually protected under 26(b)(2)(B).)

IV. Proportionality and Costs

A.  The amount and nature of the claims being made by either party. (The monetary value should not be exaggerated by plaintiffs, but usually they feel the need to do so for posturing purposes and other reasons. Suggest this impediment be avoided by disclaimers and reservation of rights. Beyond amount issues, the “nature” of the claims should be carefully understood and discussed with an aim to identifying the actual disputed facts. Discovery should always be focused and have evidentiary value. It is never an end in itself, or at least should not be. Also, do not forget that subject matter discovery is no longer permitted under revised Rule 26(b)(1). It is now limited to claims and defenses that have actually been raised in the case.)

B.  The nature and scope of burdens associated with the proposed preservation and discovery of ESI. (Try to include actual monetary burden expected, usually with a range, but restrain the urge to exaggerate. Spend time to do this right and get into some detailed metrics. Consult an expert where necessary, but never b.s. the judge. They do not like that and will remember you.)

C.  The likely benefit of the proposed discovery. (The requesting party should spell it out. Fishing expeditions are not permitted. The old “reasonably calculated” jargon is gone from new Rule 26(b)(1), at least as a definition of scope, and that change voids a lot of case-law on the subject.)

D.  Costs that the parties will share to reduce overall discovery expenses, such as the use of a common electronic-discovery vendor or a shared document repository, or other cost saving measures. (In my experience this is very rare, Typically it only makes sense in very big cases and or between co-defendants or co-plaintiffs. There are usually too many confidentiality issues to share a vendor with opposing parties.)

E.  Limits on the scope of preservation or other cost-saving measures. (Cost savings should always be considered. This is required of all parties, attorneys and judges under the 2015 revision to Rule 1, FRCP. So too is “speedy” and “just.”)

F.  Whether there is relevant ESI that will not be preserved in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), requiring discovery to be proportionate to the needs of the case. (Typically the answer here is yes, or should be, and some discussion may be required. Preservation is required by law to be reasonable, not exhaustive or perfect. Reasonable means proportionate. Moreover, if ESI is not relevant under the proportionate definitions of revised Rule 26(b)(1) then it does not have to be preserved because only relevant ESI need be preserved.)

V. Search

A.  The search method(s), including specific words or phrases or other methodology, that will be used to identify discoverable ESI and filter out ESI that is not subject to discovery. (Please people, exchanging keywords should be just the beginning, not the whole process. It is only one of many possible search methods. Use the Hybrid Multimodal method, which all readers of my blog and books should know pretty well by now.)

B.  The quality-control method(s) the producing party will use to evaluate whether a production is missing relevant ESI or contains substantial amounts of irrelevant ESI. (The problem of missing relevant ESI is the problem of Recall, whereas the problem of too much irrelevant ESI is the problem of Precision, but also, to some extent, to the problem of duplication. All good electronic document review experts have a number of different quality control techniques to improve recall and precision. Not an expert? Then perhaps you should consult with one in your firm, or if you have none (pity), then ask your e-discovery vendor.)

VI. Phasing

A.  Whether it is appropriate to conduct discovery of ESI in phases. (Yes. It is a great way to resolve disagreements by postponing excessive demands for second or third phases. Chances are these other phases will not be necessary because all that is needed is produced in the first phase. Alternatively, the producing party might agree to them if the first production makes their necessity obvious.)

B.  Sources of ESI most likely to contain discoverable information and that will be included in the first phases of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 document discovery. (Here is where the producing party lists what sources they will search, most often communication ESI such as Outlook Exchange email servers.)

C.  Sources of ESI less likely to contain discoverable information from which discovery will be postponed or not reviewed. (These are sources that are unlikely to have ESI with strong probative value, if any, but might. There may never be a need to review these sources. As a compromise where there is disagreement put these sources in a later phase. After the first phase is completed  it may not be necessary to look for more evidence in these secondary sources.)

D.  Custodians (by name or role) most likely to have discoverable information and whose ESI will be included in the first phases of document discovery. (Here is where you list the key custodians. In most lawsuits all you will ever need to search is the contents of the mailboxes of these key witnesses, the emails, attachments, calendar items, etc in their email system.)

E.  Custodians (by name or role) less likely to have discoverable information from whom discovery of ESI will be postponed or avoided. (These are secondary custodians that might possibly have important information, but it is less likely. Typically, if you cannot revolve disagreements on importance, you agree to postpone the disputed custodians to second phases.)

F.  The time period during which discoverable information was most likely to have been created or received. (Again, limit the review by timing and if you cannot agree, then postpone disputed additional times for second phases.)

VII. Production

A.  The formats in which structured ESI (database, collaboration sites, etc.) will be produced. (Typically database production is done by spreadsheet reports, or sometimes native. The person in charge of the structured ESI should know.)

B.  The formats in which unstructured ESI (e-mail, presentations, word processing, etc.) will be produced. (Producing parties should follow the requesting parties format request most of the time, except if they ask for paper production. Paper production is ridiculous and expensive for ESI. Otherwise format should not matter. It is, or should be, a non-issue.)

C.  The extent, if any, to which metadata will be produced and the fields of metadata to be produced. (A non-issue too. If metadata is part of the document, then produce it. Your vendor can give you a standard list.)

D.  The production format(s) that ensure(s) that any inherent searchability of ESI is not degraded when produced. (This is a must. In my court it can be sanctionable to change an electronic document so that it is no longer searchable.)

VIII. Privilege

A.  How any production of privileged or work-product protected information will be handled. (Of course you do not produce it, but you log it.)

B.  Whether the parties can agree on alternative ways to identify documents withheld on the grounds of privilege or work product to reduce the burdens of such identification. (Look for ways to streamline your privilege log. For instance, under other Southern District local rule you never have to log communications made after suit was filed.)

C.  Whether the parties will enter into a Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) stipulation and order that addresses inadvertent or agreed production. (You should always have a 502(d) Order whenever you are making an electronic production. Mistakes happen and this is the closest thing we have in the law to a fail-safe. There is no valid reason to oppose this order. Clear enough for you?)

 

 

 

 


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